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INTRODUCTION 
The Problem
Kantian ethics Is the origin of all ethics of autonomy in which 
"autonomy" means the self-legislation or self-determination of the man 
who acknowledges no law except one which he has made. Nothing ultimate­
ly can have authority, perhaps even reality, for man which is not cap­
able of being appropriated as his own and identified as proceeding from 
his own self. Kant's concept of autonomy is one of the most crucial 
suggestions of the modem period, serving not only as the capstone of 
his own ethical theory, but also as the impetus for the contemporary 
notion of authenticity among existentialists. The expanding nuances 
of autonomy and its vital role among Kant's successors have not been 
adequately explored. My purpose in this dissertation is to aid in 
filling this gap by exploring the manner in which the concept of , 
autonomy was modified and utilized by Schelling's philosophy of freedom 
and in the thought of Kierkegaard. My thesis is that Schelling and 
Kierkegaard can be interpreted as having engaged in a series of thought- 
experiments to elucidate (1) the precise nature of moral autonomy and 
(2) the conditions which either preclude its possibility or contribute 
to its attainment.
It must be emphasized, however, that Schelling and Kierkegaard 
are not engaged in a direct and continuous expansion of the Kantian 
theory of moral autonomy. They are neither mere disciples nor impie—
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mentors of a Kantian program. Kant's theory of moral autonomy was 
regarded as merely a stimulus for, and not an Inventory of, moral_ 
autonomy. It would be amiss to assume that autonomy Is a seamless robe 
serving the same role for each man. On the contrary, each man may be 
seen developing a theory of moral autonomy within the framework of his 
own presuppositions, methodology and concerns. More specifically, an 
analysis of their concepts of autonomy must be undertaken from within 
the context of their respective theories of man.
I shall proceed in the following manner. First, in the remainder
of the Introduction I shall provide two things: (1) a resume of the
nature and position of autonomy within Kant's ethical theory in order 
to set the historical backdrop for the present study and (2) a statement 
of problems inherent within Kant's theory which serve as a transition 
to the positions of Schelling and Kierkegaard. Secondly, in the body
of the dissertation I shall present a chapter each on Schelling and
Kierkegaard. By emphasizing the concept of moral autonomy in Schelling 
and Kierkegaard I intend to establish an interpretative framework which 
will (1) expand the existing literature on autonomy by demonstrating 
how the concept was expanded by two of Kant’s nineteenth century 
successors, (2) provide tenable solutions to Interpretative problems 
which have perplexed scholars with respect to Schelling and Kierkegaard, 
and (3) clarify an important aspect (albeit not the only one) whereby 
Schelling and Kierkegaard may be properly identified as Existentialists. 
This last point is the case if a philosophical school is best defined 
in terms of a continuity of intentions rather than an identity of 
conclusions. The continuity of intention in this case is autonomy and 
its subsequent relationship to the contemporary existentialist notion
of authenticity. Finally, in the Conclusion I shall show how the 
doctrines of Schelling and Kierkegaard must complement each other to 
provide a more comprehensive and defensible notion of moral autonomy.
X shall also discuss the weaknesses and incompleteness of the concept 
of autonomy as developed by Schelling and Kierkegaard.
' Kant's Theory of Moral Autonomy
Kant's theory of autonomy issues from his concept of man. In 
fact, his entire Critical Philosophy may be viewed as an elaborate 
philosophical anthropology.^ Kant's philosophy is an attempt to 
disclose the essential elements which ground the ontological priority 
of man in matters of knowledge (theoretical reason) and conduct 
(practical reason). Kant states that the ultimate end of philosophic 
activity "is no other than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy 
which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy."^ In this light,
Kant regarded the first Critique as the necessary first step of limiting 
theoretical reason so that practical reason, or moral philosophy, could 
assume its position of priority.̂
Kant accomplishes the limitation of theoretical reason by
Isee, for example, Frederick P. Van de Pitte, Kant as 
Philosophical Anthropologist. The Hague (Martinus Nijhoff, 1971) who 
argues for this interpretation.
^Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp 
Smith, New York (St. Martin's Press, 1964), A 840/ B 868.
^an de Pitte, op. cit.. marshals a good deal of evidence to 
support the view that this was Kant's own understanding of the role of 
the first Critique. See, for example, pp. 36-38. Compare also Kant's 
Critique. A 838-41/ B 866-69.
■ *  ''reversing the traditional relation between knower and the known object. 
Whereas his predecessors had assumed that the mind must conform to the 
object, Rant argued that the object must be made to conform to the mind. 
Thus Rant argues that the mind Is a logical schematic which organizes 
data according to certain a priori categories. These categories of the 
understanding are superimposed upon sense data (sensibility) In such a 
way that the resulting synthesis provides knowledge. Rnowledge always 
derives Its form from the mind and its content from the world. Thus 
knowledge In the Rantlan sense concerns the manner In which man Is 
aware of the world. Norman Kemp Smith suggests that Kant was the first 
thinker In modem times to raise the problem of the nature of consciou- 
ness In such a way as to Investigate the manner In which consciousness 
Is aware of the world.^ But such consciousness is not the mere passive 
representationalism of the Empiricists. Consciousness in the Kantian 
sense consists partially in the active judgments which we make of the 
world.^ It Is in this light that we must understand Kant’s technical 
vocabulary. His terminology does not spring from the objects in them­
selves but concerns the manner In which we experience or' make judgments 
about objects.
Kant’s aim in the first Crltioue Is to trace back all experience 
to a synthetic unity of self. Thus, our fundamental concepts, such as 
those of mathematics and Newtonian mechanics, have their ground In the 
synthesizing activity of the self. What remains Indubitable within the 
realm of theoretical knowledge, according to Kant, Is the certainty of
1Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary on Kant’s "Critique of Pure 
Reason", New York (Humanities Press, 1962, 2nd ed.), p. xxxlx.
^Ibld, p. xlll.
■■■ ^
the self with Its faculties of sensibility. Its a priori categories, 
and Its synthesizing activity. Thus, Kant argues for the priority and 
spontaneity (autonomy) of the transcendental self in all matters of 
theoretical knowledge.
As theoretical reason Is legislative In Its judgmental awareness 
of the realm of nature, so practical reason Is legislative In Its judg­
mental awareness of the realm of freedom. Kant first develops the 
doctrine of practical reason's self—legislation of the moral law in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.̂  Three points concerning the 
self-legislated moral law are requisite to an understanding of Kant's 
theory of autonomy: the origin, the form, and the end of the moral law.
My purpose in the subsequent discussion is not to solve the many inter­
nal problems in Kant's ethical theory but merely to underscore the 
salient points and the parameters of Kant's theory of autonomy in order 
to clarify the historical matrix within which the discussions of 
Schelling and Kierkegaard originate.
The origin of the moral law
Man initially becomes aware of the moral law through the experi­
ence of a conflict within ordinary moral consciousness, which Kant calls 
a "na';ural dialectic" (405) . This natural dialectic consists in (1) a
^Critique of Pure Reason. A 840/ B 868.
^Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. New York 
(Harper Torchbooks, 1964). Hereafter referred to as Groundwork. All 
quotations from the Groundwork are from HiJ. Baton's translation and all 
page references— henceforth included in parentheses within the text—  
are keyed to the text of the Royal Prussian Academy in Berlin since this 
pagination is usually provided in the margins of the different transla­
tions .
■ '
consciousness of desires and Inclinations which are ultimately derived 
from sensory data and (2) a consciousness of a sense of duty which 
ultimately proceeds from reason. The existence of this conflict 
discloses the Inadequacy of reason alone to direct man toward his proper 
ends and the attainment of his welfare. Reason alone Is Inadequate to 
discriminate between the multiplicity of desires and Inclinations as 
well as to account for the origin of our sense of duty. In fact. 
Instinct would have been a far more reliable guide than reason for 
providing our moral duty (395). There must be a different end toward 
which reason Is properly directed than the direct control of our 
desires. Thus, the proper end of reason is the establishment of a pure 
rational or good will (396) , since only a pure rational will always acts 
from a sense of disinterested duty. Thus, although the moral law 
originates within reason, reason alone Is Inadequate to resolve the 
conflict in man’s moral life without first establishing a pure rational 
will. "Only a rational being has the power to act In accordance with 
his Idea of laws— that Is, In accordance with principles— and only so 
has he a will"(412) . But how is man to attain this sense of disinter­
ested duty and what Is this Idea of law which constitutes a pure 
rational will?
The form of the moral law
Kant argues that In our will we are aware of an ought which Is 
formulated In laws, and the form of this moral law Is to be found In the 
will’s Idea of law. Since the moral law may run counter to our Incli­
nations and desires. It must be expressed as an Imperative (413). But 
Imperatives are of two kinds: hypothetical and categorical. Hypothet-
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leal imperatives, since they presuppose a superordinate aim or end, 
merely provide the appropriate means whereby to attain the desired end. 
Since the duty inherent within hypothetical imperatives is subject to 
contamination from such empirical factors as inclination and social 
prudence, they do not provide the essential or ultimate ends of human 
conduct. Kant does contend, however, that even this qualified sense of 
duty must have its source in a prior sense of unconditional duty. Such 
an unconditional duty is found in categorical imperatives. In contra­
distinction to hypothetical imperatives, categorical imperatives lay 
claim to universal validity and have their ground in themselves. Cate­
gorical imperatives tell us what we ought to do, not how to achieve what 
we want to do, and, thus, provide the form of the moral law.
Categorical imperatives aid us in distinguishing a sense of 
disinterested duty from those cases in which duty has been rendered 
impure by the inclusion of sensuous motives. Kant says that there is 
only one categorical imperative, although it may be given various 
formulations. ̂ The categorical imperative provides the form of the 
moral law and, as such, the criterion by which all particular moral 
maxims must be judged.
Whatever else Kant intends to say by means of his various formu­
lations of the categorical imperative, he certainly means the morally 
justifiable actions are universalizable. Thus unlversalizability is a
^His most important formulations are as follows : 1. Always act
so that you could at the same time will the maxim of your actions to 
become a universal law of nature (421); 2. Always treat humanity, 
whether in the person of your own self or the person of another, as an 
end and never solely as a means (429); 3. Always act as if you were a 
member of an ideal kingdom of ends in which you are at once both 
monarch and subject (433).
■ . ' ■ 
criterion of the moral law and must be applicable to morally good
actions. On the negative side, actions are not unlversalizable if they
are either self—contradictory or would, be self-destructive within the
objective order. On the positive side, unlversalizability means that if
an action were morally permissible for me, then it would be morally
permissible for everyone. To engage in any act which is not universal-
Izable is to perform an act out of self-preferential treatment. Such
actions are motivated by personal desires and inclinations and not by
a disinterested, respect for the moral law.
The only moral law derivable from the nature of reason is a pure­
ly formal law of self-consistency and unlversalizability which suffices 
to rule out inconsistent policies but does not serve to select some 
specific consistent policies rather than others. Perhaps this explains 
why Kant's examples of unlversalizability are usually prohibitive rather 
than prescriptive. Moreover, since the moral law issues from reason, 
it is a formal paradigm, an abstract norm. The formal moral law, to be 
actually applicable, must be concretized into empirical moral maxims. 
Kant attempts the concretizing of the formal moral law by means of the 
*'typic of the moral law."^ Man can concretize the empirically empty 
moral law in terms of the empirical world by reference to a purely 
hypothetical world. Kant suggests that this is precisely what occurs 
in the ordinary moral consciousness when the average man asks : What if
everyone did what I am about to do? Two things are discernible in this
^Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans., with an 
introduction, by Lewis White Beck, New York (Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 
1969), pp. 70-74.
question» which Dietrichson^ suggests provide two secondary tests of 
universalizability• First, is it possible to regard my act as becoming 
a universal law? Second, is it desirable that my act become a universal 
law? By reference to this hypothetical order of nature, Kant asks us 
to visualize the world as it might become if my action were universal­
ized and, further, to determine if I would want to live in such a world. 
Thus, the typic discloses Kant's intention in the universalizability 
criterion. Theoretical reason is consciousness of the world as it 
currently exists and is known through the synthesizing activity of the 
mind while practical reason is consciousness of the world as it could 
become through my actions.
Autonomy as the end 
of the moral law
In spite of the importance and length of his discussion of 
unlversalizability, Kant does not consider it the final ground of 
ethics. A rational being may entertain the question of the universal­
izability of his acts, only if "the will is . . . not merely subject to 
the law, but is so subject that if must be considered as also making' 
the law for itself . . ."(431). This characteristic of making the law 
for itself is what Kant calls "autonomy of the will." Man is subject 
to the moral law as expressed in the categorical imperative only because 
he has a will capable of being a law to itself (Cf. 440), i.e., capable 
of being autonomous. An action has moral worth and manifests a man's
^Paul Dietrichson, "Kant's Criteria of Universalizability" in 
Kant: Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals with Critical Essays ed.
by Robert Paul Wolff, New York (Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1969), 
pp. 184-85.
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good will only when it is done for the sake of duty, and duty can be 
properly fulfilled only when one has adopted the principles of autonomy 
as the ultimate standard whereby he judges all his other moral maxims 
and his actions.
Kant states emphatically that the "principle of autonomy is the 
sole principle of ethics”(440). Thus, autonomy is the end of the moral 
law. Kant has now. come full circle. The moral law originates within 
man’s nature as a rational being, carries its own form of universal­
izability with it, and seeks autonomy as its end. Man is autonomous- 
when his action coincides with his nature as a rational being.
Autonomy contrasted 
with heteronomy
Kant expands the notion of autonomy by contrasting it with 
heteronomy. "If the will seeks the law that is to. determine it anywhere 
else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own making .of universal 
law the result is always heteronomy"(441). It must be noted in advance, 
however, that Kant’s selection of historical representatives is rather 
arbitrary although the various principles are easily discernible.
Kant classifies all previous ethical theories as heteronomous, 
i.e., as deriving the moral good from principles external to man’s own 
will. He divides these heteronomous principles into two groups— those 
empirically based on the principle of happiness and those rationally 
based on the principle of perfection. He summarily rejects empirical 
heteronomy because this type of theory involves basing morality on 
external or sensuous motives, thereby adulterating the motive of the 
moral law. Kant lists as examples of this group the philosophical
11
derivation of the good from the legal system (Mandevllle), from educa­
tion (Montaigne), from physical pleasure (Epicurus), and from moral 
feeling (Hutcheson).
Kant deals at length with rationally heteronomous principles 
because of the possibility of confusing them with his own view. He 
divides this group into those deriving perfection from an internal 
source (an immanent teleological principle) and those deriving 
perfection from an external or transcendent source such as the will of . 
God.
Internal perfection may be either theoretical or practical. 
Theoretical perfection may be either metaphysical— the perfection of a 
being merely as a finite being generally— or transcendental— the perfec­
tion of a being within its own species. An example of this latter type 
might be a champion show dog as exemplifying the ideal of its breed. 
Practical perfection, on the other hand, is the fitness of a being to 
achieve any kind of ends, such as a talent or a skill which enhances a 
talent. As an example we might imagine that same champion dog winning 
a field trial or performance contest. Kant rejects all principles of 
internal perfection because they claim that morally good actions result 
from some immanent principle (entelechy) within a particular being. 
Perfection here is a possible result of a predetermined course of action 
which leaves the subject without either choice or responsibility.
There are, on the other hand, those who seek to derive the 
principle of perfection from a transcendent source such as the will of 
God. For adherents of this principle, morally good actions are those 
which conform to the will of God. This approach is contingent upon the 
sufficiency of a supreme being (God) to be all ends in general. Such
"  ■ ■
perfection is possible only if we may perform the will of God, and we 
may perform the will of God only if we know the will of God, and we may 
know the will of God only if we are assured of the existence of God.
But, according to the Critical Philosophy, this is impossible because 
it demands insight into the unknowable noumenal realm. Hence, perfec­
tion according to the will of God cannot be the ground of morality 
because it relies upon an antecedent notion of perfection which is 
Independent of man and to which it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
hold man as a finite being .responsible. Even Christianity, for example, 
teaches that man can perform the will of God only consequent to God’s 
impartation of grace.
Consequently, Kant rejects all heteronomous principles because 
they cannot determine the. will.immediately but must do so through some 
external desire or sensuous impulse. At best, they only provide 
hypothetical imperatives : I ought to do something because I desire
something else. For example-, one may choose to perform the will of God 
because he desires the promised blessings attendant upon such perfor­
mance. This obviously perverts the moral law.
To review Kant’s argument to this point, the categorical 
imperative must have a metaphysical foundation- That is, in Kant’s 
sense of ’’metaphysical", it must have its ground in the a priori struc­
tures of the human mind. This explains Kant’s insistence that no 
command issuing from an external or heteronomous source could be 
unconditionally binding upon the human will. "Morality lies in the 
relation of actions to the autonomy of the will"(439). Consequently, 
moral principles must be built upon an understanding of human reason 
which reveals the a priori concept of duty as expressed in the categor-
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leal imperative. Obedience to the categorical imperative involves 
adopting as one's chief maxim the principle of autonomy: "Act only on
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it could 
become a universal law" (421), Whatever else Kant might have meant by 
autonomy, and despite the internal problems of reconciling elements of 
his theory with other elements of the Critical Philosophy, he certainly 
intends to affirm that an action is autonomous only if it is determined 
internally by freedom and not externally by sense solicitation of any 
kind. Moreover, an action is autonomous only if it is spontaneous 
and not conditioned by an immanent teleological impulse.
Although there are many problems surrounding Kant's theory of 
autonomy, an intriguing prospect arises as a result of his suggestion of 
autonomy: the rehabilitation of the valuational viewpoint. Value
predicates must be grounded in an autonomous personality. Kant's 
seminal suggestion is that a morally autonomous personality must be 
grounded in a pure rational or good will. But to have introduced the 
principle of moral autonomy is not to have developed it to its full 
extent, and to have provided a new foundation for ethical values is not 
to give an account of them.^ One result of Kant's theory, however, is 
obvious :
. . .  by transferring the moral enterprise from the theoretical 
intellect to the will, it facilitates the development of 
morality as a whole that would hardly have been possible with­
out this change of venue.^
^For the eventual outcome of this development, see below, pp.
162-65.
^Frederick A, Olafson, Principles and Persons, Baltimore (John 
Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 42.
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The concept of autonony was to reveal an astonishing capacity for 
expansion once certain limitations imposed on it by Kant were elimi­
nated. The identification of these limitations provides the transition 
to Schelling and Kierkegaard, and the elimination of these limitations 
provides the substance of Schelling's and Kierkegaard's philosophy to 
be subsequently examined.
Transition to Schelling 
and Kierkegaard
Two major issues provide the transition to Schelling and 
Kierkegaard: (1) a general dissatisfaction with Kant's assumption of
man's essential rationality because of its attendant problems, and 
(2) an attempt to overcome this dissatisfaction by extending Kant's own 
suggestions regarding the will as the basis of morality. While each of 
these issues is important separately, they are also important because 
of their, convergence, on a crucial point in the closing section of Kant’s 
Groundwork. Accordingly, I shall examine each of these problems, first 
separately and then jointly as they converge.
First, it is the rationalistic foundation of Kantian ethics 
which elicits the greatest disagreement from Schelling and Kierkegaard. 
Kant, as a child of the Enlightenment, gave priority to reason over all 
the other elements of human nature. The essential, a priori structures 
of theoretical and practical reason which Kant identified were regarded 
by him as universal. The dissatisfaction results from two implications 
of Kant's assumption of the essential and ontological priority of 
reason. First, in order to account for both the realm of nature and the 
realm of freedom. Kant had divided reason into a theoretical and a
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practical apsect. Yet, in spite of Kant's claim in the first Critique^ 
that the two aspects of reason are united in a common ground and in 
spite of the centrality of this unity to his argument in the closing 
section of the Groundwork. Kant never demonstrates precisely how these 
two aspects are united. The attempt to specify the unity of theoretical 
and practical reason constitutes one of the central concerns of 
Schelling and, before him, Fichte. The second implication of Kant's 
position is his assumption of the inevitable and irreconcilable conflict 
between reason and desire (or inclination). Kant seems to argue that 
however closely they may converge, the ends of reason and the ends of 
inclination can never be fused or share a common end except inciden­
tally. Neither Schelling nor Kierkegaard shares such a totally negative 
view of human desires and inclinations; they regard them, rather, as 
essential elements of human nature to be integrated with other essential 
elements.
The second transitional issue is the elevation of will from the 
level of an ethical principle to the status of an ontological principle. 
In spite of his emphasis on rationality, Kant had made the important 
suggestion that the good will is the source of the moral law. And later 
thinkers, during an age of romantic individualism, tended to elevate 
will to a position of ontological priority.
The elevation of will to the status of an ontological principle 
has two important implications for Schelling and Kierkegaard. The first 
implication is that it yields a new dimension to the widely accepted 
definition of human freedom as action in accordance with man's nature.
^critique of Pure Reason. A 840/B 868-A 841/B 859.
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But If the nature of man's being is freedom, then he is free in acting 
freely, i.e., in being self-determining or autonomous. While this is a 
doctrine of radical freedom, it is not a doctrine of absolute freedom 
or indeterminism. Freedom needs restrictions, even if they are self- 
imposed, in order to prevent itself from being dissipated and its 
center from becoming vacuous. Yet its self-imposed restrictions cannot 
become absolutely binding lest its freedom become lost. How can freedom 
remain free without becoming dissipated? How can freedom restrict or 
focus itself without becoming lost in the structure of its own restric­
tions? The attempted resolution of this apparent paradox constitutes 
a primary concern for Schelling and Kierkegaard.
The second implication of positing the ontological priority of 
will is that it provides a perspective for detecting an inconsistency 
in Kant's theory which someone sharing his assumption of the ontological 
priority of reason might not notice. Kant had argued that moral 
judgments cannot'be founded on conditional a priori prin&iples, i.e., 
principles conditioned by, or derived from, the mere nature of human 
nature. Schelling and Kierkegaard concur with Kant on this point. Yet, 
in spite of his disclaimer, Kant appears to have grounded this theory 
on just such a conditional a priori principle by positing a pure 
positivity of rationality in the center of man. Had not Kant grounded 
the origin and dynamics of the moral law in the practical reason, argued 
that the categorical imperative's criterion of universalizability 
provides its form, and concluded that the end of the moral law is the 
autonomy of reason? If rationality is the only legitimate mode of 
expressing freedom as autonomy, then is not freedom restricted, hence 
determined or conditioned by reason?
:
Schelling and, to a lesser extent, Kierkegaard take the opposite 
approach of positing a pure negativity of freedom in the center of man. 
Thus, moral judgments cannot be based on principles conditioned by the 
mere nature of human nature because there is no predetermined and 
universal "nature" of human nature. They posit, instead, only a 
negativity of freedom, a freedom which is subject to determination by 
the individual himself. Accordingly, they are able to ground moral 
judgments in unconditional a priori principles which are choices, even 
creations, of individuals. Men become autonomous through the free 
choice among, even creation of, various systems and theoretical 
constructs. In short, Schelling and Kierkegaard concur that Kant erred 
in making autonomy a predicate of reason rather than of the whole person 
understood as ontological freedom. This posited negativity of freedom 
as the essential ontological reality of human nature permits the line of 
development concerning autonomy that will be explored in this 
dissertation and connects both Schelling and Kierkegaard to the movement 
of Existential philosophy.____________________________________________
Both of these transitional issues and their implications converge 
in a crucial passage in the closing section of Groundwork. Kant’s 
argument centers around the definition and demonstration of the "freedom 
of the will" so critical to his moral philosophy. Will is first defined 
as a kind of causality possessed by all rational beings (446). Then 
"freedom of the will" is first defined negatively as the property of the 
will to exercise itself independently of alien determination, and then 
defined positively as autonomy. Kant obviously attaches great impor­
tance to the concept of autonomy because it is "the ground of the 
dignity of human nature and of every rational nature" (436) .
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Having defined what he Intends by the.phrase "freedom of the 
will," Kant turns his attention to the possible demonstration of Its 
existence. He argues that if we presuppose the Idea of freedom, then 
there springs from It a "consciousness of a law of action" which can 
"serve for our own enactment of universal law"(449). But the 
presupposition of freedom is not a demonstration of Its existence. 
Moreover, how can such a law be binding when we recognize ourselves as 
being determined within the realm of nature? Preparatory to his answer, 
Kant solicits the aid of his famllar distinction between the sensible 
and intelligible worlds. Then he presents a dilemmatlc argument. If I 
were solely a member of the intelligible world, all my actions would be 
in perfect conformity with my autonomy as a self-legislative being; and 
if I were solely a part of the sensible world, then all my actions would 
be in conformity with the law of nature governing desires and inclina­
tions, I must be either a member of the intelligible order or a member 
of the. sensible order. Therefore, my actions mus.t be in conformity, 
with the principle of autonomy or the laws of nature, Kant escapes from 
this dilemma by arguing that the minor premise is an inclusive 
disjunctive, i.e., man must regard himself as a member of both the 
Intelligible order of freedom and the sensible order of necessity. This 
is the case because "the Intelligible world contains the ground of the 
sensible world and therefore also of its laws"(453), i.e., the sensible 
world derives its order and necessity from the synthesizing activity of 
human reason. Thus, while freedom of the will and the morality derived 
from it are no phantom of the brain, "this freedom is no concept of 
experience, nor can it be such"(455), Hence, human freedom deals with 
the Intelligible or noumenal world but is experientially unknowable.
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Kant's position obviously rests on the Idea of the noumenal 
realm. But later thinkers could not rest content with the problematic 
noumena. Fichte was the first to reject the noumenal altogether and to 
elevate the moral will to the status of an ontological principle. 
Schelllng followed In the direction charted by Fichte. Schelllng posits 
will as primordial reality and a pure negativity of freedom as the 
ontological reality of man In which this negativity means that will Is 
not subject to complete rational formulation. Will Is then presented 
as expressing Itself In two antithetical modes as the realm of reason 
and the realm of nature. Hence, Schelllng unites the theoretical and 
practical reason of Kant In a common ground. Next, this antithesis 
provides the resolution of the conflict between reason and desire or 
Inclination. Further, this antithesis provides a resolution of the 
apparent paradox of freedom's self-imposed limitations. In this light, 
the concept of autonomy assumes a new dimension. Autonomy Is not merely 
self-legislative but Integrative Ih nature. Its role Is the eventual 
Integration or synthesis of the antithetical elements of reason and 
nature, theoretical and practical reason, reason and desire, freedom 
and restrictions. Kierkegaard will be seen to follow a similar line of 
thought of regarding autonomy as Integration, although he transcends 
some of the more dubious metaphysical elements of Schelllng's 
philosophy.
CHAPTER I
AITTONOMÏ IN SCHELLING*S 
"PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM"
In this chapter I shall demonstrate the manner in which Schelllng 
may be interpreted as having engaged in an experimentation to elucidate 
(1) the precise nature of moral autonomy and (2) the conditions which 
either preclude its possibility or contribute to its attainment. To 
accomplish this I shall focus on some themes in Schelllng*s Philosophy 
of Freedom which are usually ignored and rarely appreciated. The first 
theme is his metaphysical voluntarism. While his metaphysical volun­
tarism can be more appropriately regarded as a theological voluntarism, 
it nevertheless permits him, secondly, to posit a pure negativity of 
freedom as the ontological reality of man. Third, it is in the context 
of his metaphysical voluntarism that the outlines of a theory of moral 
autonomy can be detected. Finally, it is within this context that he 
introduces the notion of personality. In fact, autonomy is synonomous 
with personality for Schelling,
The primary work upon which I shall rely, for reasons to be 
clarified shortly, is Schelling^s Philosophical Inquiries the Nature of 
Human Freedom,̂  Accordingly, a few remarks are in order concerning the 
position and importance of this work within the Schellingean corpus.
^Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling, Of Human Freedom, translated by 
James Gutmann, Chicago (Open Court Publishing Co., 1936). Translation
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The Unity of Schelllng's Philosophy
The Issue of the position of Human Freedom Is related to the 
broader Issue of the unity of Schelllng's philosophical activity. This 
Issue arises since Schelllng's thought can apparently be divided Into 
several parts, e.g., his Philosophy of Nature, his System of Transcen­
dental Idealism, and his Philosophy of Freedom. Do these parts 
constitute several discrete philosophies or merely several phases In 
one comprehensive philosophical system?
Because of this apparent division Schelllng's philosophy has been 
subjected to widely divergent Interpretations. The older interpreta­
tion, popular around the turn of the century, was to Interpret his 
philosophical activity as a series of discrete systems lacking real 
continuity.1 Hence, It became fashionable to speak of Schelllng's three 
philosophies— the Philosophy of Nature, the Philosophy of Transcendental 
Idealism, and the Philosophy of Freedom. This approach produced some 
unfortunate treatments. First Schelllng was viewed as a mere transi­
tional figure between Fichte and Hegel In the development of Post- 
Kantlan Idealism. This Interpretation, based largely on the System of 
Transcendental Idealism, emphasized his early philosophic activity and 
his relation to Fichte while largely ignoring his other work. But It
of Phllosophlsche Untersuchungen urber das Wesen der menschllchen 
Frelhelt. Hereafter I shall refer to this work by the abbreviated title 
Human Freedom.
Ipor a succinct account of the diverse ways In which Schelllng's 
philosophy has been divided Into "phases," "stages," or "philosophies" 
by historians of philosophy, see Victor C. Hayes, "Schelllng: Persis­
tent Legends, Improving Image," The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 
III, 3 (Fall, 1973), pp. 66-69. Hereafter referred to as Haves.
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must also be remembered that Schelling became the first great critic of 
Idealism. Consequently, a second interpretation, based on his Philoso­
phy of Nature and developed by those who accepted his criticism of 
Idealism, emphasized his influence on nineteenth—century Romanticism. 
This interpretation stressed his aesthetics and his dynamic view of 
nature while underplaying his later critical activity. Both of these 
interpretations, however, ignore or underplay his later Philosophy of 
Freedom which contains his implicit theory of autonomy.
Recent scholarship, in arguing for a stronger continuity within 
Schelling's philosophical activity, challenges the older tradition with 
its lop-sided interpretations. Victor C. Hayes argues that Schelling's 
work is the result of "continuous reflection" on new problems arising 
from the solutions to old problems.^ Copleston contends that Schelling 
was continuously involved in carrying out a program first formulated in 
his youth.2 Paul Tillich, in following Schelling's own suggestion, 
divides Schelling's work into two parts— an early or negative part and 
a later or positive part— but then argues that the two parts are 
dialectically related.^ This sort of division leads Tillich to talk of 
a Schelling I and a Schelling II. At any rate, Tillich says that "the
^Haves. p. 69.
^Frederick Copleston. A History of Philosophy. London (Bums and 
Oates Limited, 1965), VII, pp. 97—99. Copleston's discussion of 
Schelling is the best and most extensive treatment available in English. 
Hereafter referred to as Copleston.
3paul Tillich, Mysticism and Guilt-consciousness in Schelling's 
Philosophical Development, translated with an Introduction and Notes by 
Victor Nuovo, Lewisburg, Pa. (Bucknell University Press, 1974), pp. 
22—25. This work was Tillich's dissertation for his doctorate in 
theology.
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great turning in Schelling’s thought . . .  occurred before the publica­
tion of Oh the Nature of Human Freedom."̂  Bolman concurs with Tillich 
by arguing that Schelling shifted from a rational dialectic to an 
"existential dialectic. This "existential dialectic" is developed in 
Schelling’s Human Freedom and The Ages of the World, Whatever the final 
verdict regarding the unity of Schelling’s philosophic activity, the 
dominant note of recent scholarship is towards a greater continuity.
Two facts warrant my concentration on Schelling’s Human Freedom 
for a discussion of moral autonomy. First, given Tillich’s claim that 
the major shift in Schelling’s thought occurred before its composition. 
Human Freedom is the first systematic statement which incorporates and 
expands the nuances of this shift. The second justification is 
Schelling’s own claim that Human Freedom contains his first treatment of 
such topics as the "freedom of the will, good and evil, personality, 
etc."3 From time to time, however I shall appeal to certain collateral 
works for clarification and expansion of various points.
Preliminary Matters
Schelling’s major concern in Human Freedom is the resolution of 
the problem of evil. In the opening sections of this work, comprising 
one—fourth of its total length, Schelling attempts to establish two
^Ibid. p. 24.
2See Bolman’s "Introduction," p. 3, in Friedrich Wilhelm 
Schelling, The Ages of the World, trans, with Introduction and Notes by 
Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, New York (AMS Press, Inc., 1967). His 
"Introduction" shall hereafter be referred to as Bolman and the 
translated work as The Ages of the World.
^Human Freedom, p. 4.
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preliminary points. First, the primary thrust of the opening section is 
that freedom is compatible with a system of patheism, provided that such 
a pantheistic system is vitalized with a voluntaristic basis. Second, 
Schelling attempts to develop the ground for the construction of his own 
solution by underscoring the inadequacies of all previous solutions to 
the problem. The theories of Augustine, Spinoza, Leibniz and Fichte 
receive special attention. This section, while containing many sugges­
tions that are relevant to the problem of evil, contains little that is 
germane to a discussion of moral autonomy. The material that is perti­
nent will be developed in the course of the following exposition. The 
first point, however, contains several suggestions necessary to an 
adequate understanding of Schelling's fundamental program in general and 
his theory of autonomy. In order to clarify these suggestions, I shall 
retrace Schelling's steps in the introductory section of Human Freedom.
Compatibility of freedom 
and "system"
Schelling's demonstration that freedom is compatible with
voluntaristic pantheism is accomplished through three intermediate
steps. The first step is to show that system qua system does not
necessarily preclude freedom. Schelling's concern is with the claim
made by some that
the idea of freedom is said to be entirely inconsistent 
with the idea of system, and every philosophy which makes 
claim to unity and completeness is said to end in denying 
freedom.1
^Human Freedom, p. 7.
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Schelllng concedes that it Is difficult to answer such a vague charge 
because it is impossible to know "what restricting notions have already 
been attached to the word ’system’ its e l f . B u t  Schelling interprets 
this claim to mean that freedom is incompatible with a world view.
Since all men possess an ingrained sense of freedom, theoretical 
inquiries regarding this sense of freedom may be occupied either with 
defining the concept of freedom itself or in clarifying "the relation of 
this concept to a whole systematic world view".^ But Schelling contends 
that the two separate types of inquiry must coincide because an unde­
fined or poorly defined concept of freedom is difficult to locate within 
a system while a concept of freedom without a systematic framework is of 
little value. Once the concept of freedom has been delineated, the 
crucial issue is whether it is to be an incidental or a dominant feature 
of the system. Previous systems which incorporated the idea of freedom 
have proved inadequate, according to Schelling, because they attempted 
to maintain freedom as an incidental feature of the system. Schelling 
insists that since freedom cannot be merely incidental to a system, it
must be a dominant, if not the dominant, feature of any satisfactory
3 ‘ ■system.*̂
Freedom within a pantheistic system
The second step is to demonstrate that pantheism does not pre­
clude freedom. The usual thesis is that "pantheism is the only system
K̂uman Freedom, p. 7. 
'̂ Human Freedom, pi. 9. 
^Human Freedom, p. 7.
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of reason but is inevitably fatalism".^ But Schelllng distinguishes 
two types of pantheism. On the one hand, pantheism can be understood to 
mean the immanence of all things in God. Since such a view entails 
granting absolute causal power to God and unconditional passivity to the 
creature, it necessarily follows that the very existence of the creature 
is a constantly renewed creation which determines each creature in a 
particular manner. Hence, if pantheism is understood to mean that man 
exists in God and that all human activity belongs to and is a manifes­
tation of the divine life, then pantheism must be regarded as fatalis­
tic. But many persons have been driven to the pantheistic outlook in an 
effort to preserve a sense of human freedom. Consequently, pantheism 
as the immanence of all things in God is not the variety of pantheism 
which Schelling defends.^
On the other hand, pantheism can be understood as the total 
identification of God with all things. Schelling points out that.two 
corollaries are frequently deduced from the initial definition:
(1) that the totality of things constitute God, and (2) that each indi­
vidual must be identified with God. Schelling rejects both of these 
corollaries by pointing out that they rest on a misunderstanding of the
^Human Freedom, pp. 9-10.
2See pp. 10-14 of Human Freedom for Schelling's discussion. My 
Interpretation disagrees with Copleston, who concludes that if "panthe­
ism is interpreted as meaning that all things are immanent in God, 
Schelling is quite prepared to be called a pantheist" (Copleston, p. 
130). I also disagree with Bolman's suggestion that Schelling is at­
tempting to overcome the charge of pantheism altogether (Bolman. p. 5). 
It is more accurate to conclude that Schelling is trying to avoid cer­
tain traditional charges against pantheism rather than pantheism per se. 
A careful reading of Schelling's text and the reasons which I have 
adduced on this and the following page will substantiate my interpre­
tation.
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law of identity, or the meaning of the copula in judgment,^ The
misunderstanding arises as a result of confusing identity with sameness.
Two distinct things, red spots for example, can be identical without
being the same thing. This is an Instance of what Aristotle had called
specific sameness.2 Schelling points out that
the profound logic of the ancients distinguished subject and 
predicate as the antecedent and the consequent (antecedens et 
consequens) and thus expressed the real meaning of the law of 
identity. Even a tautological statement, if it is not to be 
altogether meaningless, retains this relationship. Thus if 
one says: A body is body; he is assuredly thinking something
different in the subject of the sentence than in its predicate.
In the former, that is, he refers to the unity, in the latter 
to the individual qualities contained in the concept, body, 
which are related to the unity as tûe antecedens to the 
consequens.3
Such a distinction suggests important implications for the two corol­
laries which some maintain can be drawn from the proposition "God in all 
things." The distinction implies that things, whether in their totality 
or individually, stand to God in a relation of consequent to antecedent. 
Accordingly, God and things may be in some sense identical but not- the 
same or coincidental.
Individuality within a 
pantheistic system
A far more serious consequence of pantheism as the identification 
of God with all things is the claim that such a view denies all individ­
uality to the constituent things. Spinozism is a case in point. When
Ĥuman Freedom, p. 13.
^Aristotle Topics, i- 7, 103^ 6-14. 
^HUman Freedom, p. 14.
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Spinoza's fundamental premise that substance is "that which Is In itself 
and Is conceived through Itself"^ is combined with his principle that 
determination Is negation, the result tends to be that the whole Is the 
only real individual. Consequently, individuality cannot be predicated 
of the constituent parts.
The apparent denial of Individuality within this form of panthe­
istic system is a serious claim which Schelllng refutes In the following 
manner. He again argues that the difficulty Is based on a misunder­
standing of the law of Identity. To say that all things are united with 
or dependent upon God does not preclude their autonomy. The law of 
identity merely permits us to claim that a dependent entity exists as 
"a consequence of that upon which it is dependent,"2 but It does not 
determine the nature of the dependent entity. For example, every 
organic being Is dependent upon another organism for Its genesis but not 
for the character of its existence. In the same way, the dependence of 
entitles upon God for their existence does not entail their dependence 
upon God for all their actions. I.e., while dependent for their origin, 
they may be independent or autonomous In their actions.%
From his systematic refutation of certain charges against panthe­
ism, we may deduce that Schelllng is prepared to be classified as a 
pantheist. But in the course of his refutations, he has rejected cer­
tain traditional forms of pantheism. He has rejected both acosmism, the 
theory that the world Is non-existent, and the view that all things are 
immanent in God, since the latter position Is fatalistic. Further, he
^Spinoza Ethics. Bk. I. Def. III. 
’̂ Human'Freedom, p. 18.
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has rejected the interpretation which Identifies the world with God. 
Schelling is attempting to develop his own position* a position (1) which 
holds that God and the creatures are identical hut not coincidental and
(2) which retains individuality, and hence autonomy, for the creatures.
To accomplish this, Schelling reinterprets his famous principle of iden­
tity, This reinterpretation is the basis for both of the moves 
Schelling has made. God and Nature are identical as ground and conse­
quence. Nature is a consequence of the first principle, but not the 
first principle itself. God and Nature are identical, but not coinci­
dental. Accordingly, Schelling is a pantheist, but one who seeks to 
maintain individuality and freedom for the creature. The precise nature 
of this relationship of non—coincidental identity remains to be 
clarified.
The vitalization of pantheism
Schelling's third step is to show that pantheism must, and can, 
be vitalized. There are two phases to this demonstration— its imperative 
and its possibility. It is necessary that pantheism be vitalized, if it 
is to be satisfactory to the most profound feelings of the religious 
mind. This profound religious feeling is that "god is not a God of the 
dead but of the living."1 Hence, "it is incomprehensible that an all­
perfect Being could rejoice in even the most perfect mechanism possi­
ble."^ Since God is a living God, the procession of creatures from God 
can be neither a mechanical production nor an emanation in which the 
emanated lacks individuality and independence. As Schelling states it.
^Hiiman Freedom, p. 19.
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the procession of things from God is God's self-revelation.
But God can only reveal himself in creatures who resemble 
him» in free, self-activating beings for whose existence 
there is no reason save God, but who are as God is.^
In the process of arguing for the imperative of the vitalization 
of pantheism, Schelling develops his most pointed criticism of Spinoza. 
Schelling does not reject the Spinozistic notion of conceiving all things 
in God, but he does reject the lifelessness of his system, his mechan­
istic view of Nature. As Schelling phrases it, the fundamental "error 
of his system is by no means due to the fact that he posits all things 
in God, but to the fact that they are t h i n g s ."2 Regarded as a thing, as 
a mere mode of Infinite Substance, the finite self must surrender itself 
to the absolute causality of the divine substance. Such self-surrender, 
by renunciating freedom as an illusion, demands that the finite self be 
absorbed in an impersonal Absolute. Schelling obviously wishes to avoid 
such Spinozistic implications.
This brings us to the second phase of this demonstration: How
can pantheism possibly be revised in such a manner as to avoid the 
mechanistic implications of Spinozism? To maintain pantheism while 
overcoming mechanism, Schelling attempts to establish an alternative 
interpretation of nature by appealing to his own earlier Philosophy of 
Nature. It is the idealistic elements of that philosophy which he 
brings to bear upon the present problem. In his Philosophy of Nature 
he had regarded Nature as an independent, self-constructive, teleo- 
logical and autonomous activity which is an immediate manifestation of
^Human Freedom, p. 19.
'̂ Human Freedom, p. 22.
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the Absolute. He had regarded Nature as moving through various stages, 
or potencies, from the lower to the higher, as a gradual preparation for 
the appearance of consciousness. It is through consciousness that free­
dom is realized.^ But how may nature be legitimately regarded as self- 
constructive and teleological? How can freedom be more than a mere 
hypothetical construct or regulative principle? Schelling responds by 
sounding the key-note of Human Freedom, that of voluntarism: "Will is
primordial B e i n g . W i l l  is the elusive Kantian "thing-in-itself."
Will as primordial reality is the sufficient reason that can account for 
the activities of both the objective and the subjective orders. If God 
as primordial reality is Will, then God is free. And if God is free 
then his creatures as manifestations of himself, whether as ego or non- 
ego, must also be free. Thus, Schelling argues that pantheism can be 
vitalized via the spirit of idealism. But what is the "spirit of 
Idealism" and precisely how does it serve to vitalize pantheism?
Fichte and the "spirit 
of idealism"
Schelling insists that "the true conception of freedom was lacking 
in all modern systems, that of Leibniz as well as that of Spinoza, until 
the discovery of idealism.By "idealism," Schelling seems to be
^Compare Emile Brehier, A History of Philosophy. trans. by Wade 
Baskin, Chicago (University of Chicago Press, 1968), vol. VI, pp. 139-40, 
142, 146. Brehier is especially clear in his account of Schelling's 
Philosophy of Nature and his doctrine of "potencies," which plays an 
important role in his metaphysics.
^Human Freedom, p. 24.
^Human Freedom, p. 17.
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referring primarily to Fichte and his own earlier thought. And the clue 
to the particular aspect of idealism in question is found in his affir­
mation of "will" as primordial reality.
Fichte had opened his Wissenschaftslehre^ by noting that, while 
consciousness is always consciousness of an object by a subject, the 
philosopher can isolate conceptually two factors in our experience which 
yield two important concepts— intelligence—in—Itself and the thing-in- 
itself. Consequently, the philosopher has two paths before him. On the 
one hand, he can attempt to explain experience as the effect of the 
thing-in-itself, or the objective order. This is the position which 
Fichte calls dogmatism. On the other hand, the philosopher can attempt 
to explain experience as the product of intelligence, that is, of cre­
ative thought. Fichte calls this path idealism and it is the one which 
he chooses to travel. Fichte's method of breaching the Kantian limita­
tion on reason was to expand radically the jurisdiction of the practical 
reason so as to bring all of reason within its scope. For Fichte, the 
world is that which the self makes. Josiah Eoyce, in a succinct 
summarization, identifies the basic principles of Fichte's philosophy 
as the following:
(1) All philosophy has its source in one primal truth, 
namely, the truth that living and voluntary selves freely 
choose to assert themselves, and so build up their whole 
organized world; (2) The moral law is, in consequence of 
this, really prier to all other knowledge, and conditions 
all that we theoretically k n o w . ^
^Fichte: Science of Knowledge, edited and translated by Peter
Heath and John Lachs, New York (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 8-9. 
Hereafter referred to as Fichte.
^Josiah Royce, The Spirit of Modem Philosophy. New York (W.W. 
Norton and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 152.
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Since the philosopher is faced with two paths, which Fichte 
regards as mutually exclusive, the next question is that of a criterion 
or principle for choosing between the paths. Fichte argues that the 
choice cannot be made by an appeal to any basic theoretical principle, 
nor can dogmatism or idealism theoretically refute each other. The 
issue must be decided by the "inclination and interest" of each respec­
tive philosopher. And the "interest" in question is one's interest in 
and for the self, which Fichte regards as the highest interest. "What 
sort of philosophy one chooses depends, therefore, on what sort of man 
one Is-"^ Thus, the choice between dogmatism or idealism must be made 
on practical grounds. Accordingly, Fichte's clear preoccupation is with 
the free and morally active self. And this emphasis on the free and 
morally active self is the spirit of idealism which Schelling employs 
to vitalize pantheism, a move which prepares the way for his theory of 
autonomy.
Movement beyond Fichte
Although once a disciple and expositor of Fichte, Schelling moved 
beyond Fichte. Just how far beyond and the manner of his going beyond 
clarify two important phases of Schelling's development. First, he 
had moved beyond Fichte in his Philosophy of Nature. Whereas Fichte had 
sought to deduce the objective world from the activities of the posited 
Ego, Schelling had sought to perform the deduction in the opposite 
direction, moving from the world to the Ego. His criticism of Fichte 
was that the latter had reduced nature, or the non-ego, to a purely
^Fichte, p. 16.
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passive and negative creation of the ego. The details of Schelllng's 
deduction are based on the theories of physics, chemistry and biology 
current during the period. Nonetheless, Schelllng contends that his 
Philosophy of Nature Is a "genuine system of reason" which was completed 
by the emergence of freedom in which "the whole of nature found Its 
transfiguration In feeling, in Intelligence, and ultimately in. will-
Secondly, he has moved beyond Fichte in the present work. Human 
Freedom. While his positing of Will as ultimate reality appears to be a 
Flchtean move. It actually is not. Schelling considers the major diffi­
culty of Fichte's position, a difficulty which led to the charge of 
atheism and cost Fichte his teaching position at Jena, to be his reduc­
tion of the finite ego to a mere manifestation of the Absolute E g o .2 
Schelling is careful to maintain a clear distinction between the finite 
ego and the Infinite Ego or Absolute. He insists that God and the 
creatures are identical, but no coincidental. Schelling, by employing 
his reinterpreted principle of identity, thinks he has been able to 
retain genuine individuality and freedom for the creature.
It is for these reasons that Schelling begins the section of 
Human Freedom entitled "The Possibility of Evil" by arguing that 
Flchtean idealism, whatever Its merits, must be transcended. The value 
of idealism is that it has revealed the possibility of freedom as an 
ontological reality, a reality which is basically a self-determining 
process. It is his effort to retain this ontological freedom as a real 
possibility that leads Schelllng to reject both Spinoza's realism and
^HUmah Freedom, p. 24.
'̂ Human Freedom, pp. 24—25.
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Fichte's idealism.
For it is immaterial to pantheism, as such, whether 
many individual things are conceived in an absolute 
Substance or many individual wills are conceived in 
one Primal Will,1
At stake is the concept of freedom, or lack thereof, inherent in each of 
these theories,
Schelling's earlier Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and 
Criticism, published in 1795, helps to clarify the reasons behind his 
rather quick dismissal of both.the Spinozistic and Fichtean positions in 
the present work.^ Philosophical Letters was a careful examination of 
both Spinozistic realism, or dogmatism, and Fichtean idealism, or 
criticism. Schelling had argued that both dogmatism and criticism reach 
the same theoretical conclusion— the theoretical annihilation of the 
finite self. This is the case because both positions destroy the 
essential polarity of consciousness. Consciousness is always conscious­
ness of an object by a subject. But dogmatism and criticism attempt to 
reduce the totality of experience to one of the poles, thereby falsi­
fying the whole experience. While dogmatism argues that knowledge can 
be made Intelligible only on the hypothesis that the objective order is 
the active principle from which the universe derives its content, 
criticism argues that knowledge can be made intelligible only on the 
hypothesis that the subjective order is the active principle from which 
the universe derives its content. For criticism, reality is an Absolute 
Ego which produces its experience from within itself and progressively
^Human Freedom, p . 26.
am indebted for my discussion of the Philosophical Letters to 
Copleston's account of the work, Copleston. pp. 100-104.
36
organizes that experience according to the necessities imposed by its 
own moral and teleological nature. Dogmatism reduces the subject, or 
finite self, to the Absolute Object, while criticism reduces the object 
to the Absolute Subject or infinite striving.
But while both of these positions lead to the same theoretical 
conclusion and while neither can theoretically refute the other,
Schelllng argues that a choice between them can be made on the practical 
level. The practical demands of each position express different ideals 
of man's moral vocation. Dogmatism requires that the finite self accept 
its already existing ontological situation as a mere modification of the 
infinite substance and renounce its illusory sense of freedom, thereby 
surrendering itself to the absolute causality of the divine and infinite 
substance. Criticism, viewing the absolute as infinite striving, re­
quires that the finite self engage in unceasing free moral striving to­
ward one's moral vocation, albeit that that vocation is a finite manifes­
tation of the infinite striving Absolute.
But while Schelling clearly prefers the Fichtean position, there 
is the clear implication in the Philosophical Letters that some sort of 
synthesis is necessary. The Absolute must transcend the customary 
distinction between subject and object. Schelling suggests, even while 
preferring the moral implications of Fichtean criticism (which he calls 
"the spirit of idealism"), that the Absolute must be subject and object 
in identity. The resulting emphasis on the principle of identity is the 
guiding focus in Schelling's thought during the next decade. He first 
proceeds, in his development of the Philosophy of Nature, to demonstrate 
that there is an ideal aspect of nature, that nature is the struggle of 
.objective reason to organize itself through ever higher manifestations
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until consciousness appears. Then, in the System of Transcendental 
Idealism, he argues for a preestablished'harmony in which the Absolute 
is the identity or neutrality of subject and object, or spirit and 
nature.̂
But in Human Freedom Schelling has reinterpreted his principle of 
identity, and this reinterpretation carries important implications for a 
discussion of freedom. He thinks that both subject and object, spirit 
and nature appear to be the product of something more profound than 
either of them, something to which neither the term subject nor object
can be applied. Schelling’s effort to resolve the epistemological prob­
lem of the subject-object dichotomy, coupled with his acceptance of the 
’’spirit of idealism,” and its emphasis on the striving self, leads him 
to posit Will as primordial reality. Will, as primoridial reality, or 
God as antecedent, expresses itself in two ways, as subject and object,
as Ego and Nature. Consequently, Schelling retains many of the ideas of
both Spinoza (dogmatic realism) and Fichte (critical idealism) and 
synthesizes them into a theory of pantheistic voluntarism. For 
Schelling, both Spinoza and Fichte were in touch with reality, even if 
from a limited perspective. Both had grasped a part of the one ultimate 
reality. Will. But both positions needed to be complemented by the 
other.
^Schelling states the problem in the following manner. ’’How at 
the same time the objective world conforms to representation in us, and 
representations in us conform to the objective world, cannot be con­
ceived, unless there exists a preestablished harmony between the two 
worlds of the ideal and the real. But this preestablished harmony is 
itself not conceivable unless the activity by which the objective world 
is produced, is originally identical with that which displays itself in 
volition, and vice versa.” System of Transcendental Idealism, in Modem 
Classical Philosophers, compiled by Benjamin Rand (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), p. 543.
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Metaphysical Voluntarism
In the preceding section I have demonstrated the manner In which 
Schelllng seeks to vitalize pantheism and how his attempt to resolve 
certain epistemological difficulties leads him to posit Will as primor­
dial reality- In addition, I have stated his hope of uniting the 
metaphysical systems of Idealism and realism Into one comprehensive 
system.^ It Is now possible to summarize Schelling's rather complex 
thought to this point, thereby clarifying the Import of his metaphysical 
voluntarism. Schelllng Insists that pantheism can be vitalized by 
positing Will as primordial reality- God, as primordial reality, as 
Will, Is Identical with the world, but as the antecedent or ground of 
the world's existence. Schelllng resolutely affirms that such a move 
guarantees Individuality and the possibility of autonomy to the creature- 
Furthermore, he Insists that the epistemological concerns surrounding 
the subject-object dichotomy demand a common ground which Is neither 
mere subject nor mere object. And this common ground, according to 
Schelllng, Is Will.
In the present section I shall show how Schelllng, having posited 
Will as ultimate reality, attempts to apply his presupposition of 
ontological freedom to the resolution of various problems. Schelllng's 
major concern In Human Freedom Is how to account for the transmutation 
of God Into the world while exempting God from either physical or moral 
responsibility for the existence of evil. If God Is to be truly God and
^Schelllng states It thus: "Idealism Is the soul of philosophy;
realism is Its body; only the two together constitute a living whole" 
(Human Freedom- p. 30).
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worthy of worship, Schelling argues, then He can be neither responsible 
for having directly created'evil nor morally responsible for having 
failed to prevent evil. His second problem is to show how man is respon- 
ible for the presence or absence of evil. His concern to make human 
freedom intelligible is his point of departure for constructing a concept 
of God.
To further clarify his theory and what he means by freedom, 
Schelling distinguishes three possible concepts of freedom. First, there 
is the concept of material freedom as represented in Spinozistic realism 
or dogmatism. Second, there is the concept of formal freedom as repre­
sented in Fichtean idealism or criticism. But while idealism is the 
initiation into a higher philosophy, it is "not adequate to show the 
specific differentia, i.e. the precise distinctiveness of human free­
dom."^ Having already rejected both of these theories as yielding an 
inadequate notion of freedom, he now rejects them because he regards 
them as inadequate to resolve the problem of evil. To resolve the 
problem of evil, Schelling offers his own concept of what he calls 
"vital freedom," a freedom which "is a possibility of good and evil."^
The remainder of Human Freedom is devoted to developing and defending 
this third theory of freedom by relating it to the concept of God, the 
nature of man, and the redefinition of good and evil.
Whatever the final merits of Schelling’s philosophy, it is little 
wonder that he regarded himself as having initiated à revolution in
^Human Freedom, p. 25.
'̂ Hümàn Freedom, p. 26.
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philosophy more powerful than, even Kant's "Copernlcian Revolution,"^ 
especially if he can accomplish all his intentions. His is a revolution 
in which Will, as eternal striving as opposed to a fixed essence, as an 
Infinite dynamic creativity as opposed to a static reality, is primordial 
reality and in which "freedom is its most essential presupposition."^
Initial implications
Before proceeding to Schelling's concept of God, it is necessary 
to state three important implications of his thought to this point.
These implications, following from his having posited Will as ultimate 
reality, will facilitate understanding his concept of God. First, since 
the chief characteristic of Will is striving or willing, the clear 
implication is that reality is dynamic rather than static. Consequently, 
Schelling rejects the traditional concept of God as actus purus. as 
having no potentiality. Schelling is convinced that those who hold the 
traditional concept of a static God are unable to develop an adequate 
theodicy. Schelling substitutes a théogonie process in which God has an 
interior life which manifests itself through a series of dynamic forms. 
God has an internal life and a tragic nature that is common to all living 
beings. Two of Schelllng's posthumously published works. The Philosophy 
of Revelation and The Philosophy of Mythology, are an effort to write a 
history of religion which reveals the various forms or stages of the 
théogonie process. The obvious difficulty of such an approach is that 
it assumes that the stages in the history of religion correspond to the 
stages of divine development. Nevertheless, the théogonie approach is 
crucial to understanding Schelling's concept of God.
Ĥiimaii Freedom, p. 25.
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The second implication of making Will the ultimate principle of 
reality Is that Will, since It is given ontological priority over reason, 
is not subject to complete rational formulation. There remains an 
aspect of reality that is not subject to logical analysis or rational 
scrutiny. Schelling employs such, terms as "the Ungrund," "the unruly," 
Vthe dark abyss," "the irrational," "chaos," and "freedom" to refer to 
this aspect of reality.
The third implication has great procedural significance. Since
ultimate reality is Will and man is a part of reality, man himself,
according to Schelling, is the door to the deeper levels of reality.
Schelling argues that
the processes of human life from the utmost depths to the 
highest consummation must agree with the processes of 
universal life. It is certain that whoever could write 
the history of his own life from its very ground would 
have thereby grasped in a brief conspectus the history 
of the universe.1
It is through man that Schelling arrives at knowledge of both God and the 
world. In order words, Schelling employs psychological categories for 
ontological purposes.
Schelling's concept of God
Having characterized his own theory of real or vital freedom as 
"the possibility of good and evil," Schelling turns his attention to 
clarifying the precise nature of this freedom. His attempt to render 
human freedom intelligible is his point of departure for constructing a 
concept of God. . The possibility of evil must be reconciled with the 
personality of God in such a way that God is not responsible for the
^Ages of the World. pp. 93-94.
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existence of. evil. I shall state his theology In the broadest manner 
as a prelude to his theory of human nature and the good life or, more 
specifically, moral autonomy. It Is not my purpose to criticize his 
metaphysics but merely to outline It In order to clarify the theory of 
moral autonomy Implicit within It.
Schelllng refers to the Initial phase of the théogonie process of 
the divine life as that of pure indifference, the original undifferen­
tiated ground of all that exists. It Is that which is inaccesslable to 
reason. Being beyond the limits of human thought. It Is the mysterious 
of Ineffable. Since It Is not subject to cognitive analysis or 
conceptual definition, Schelllng refers to this ground of Indifference 
by such descriptive terms as "the primordial ground," "the unreason," 
"the abyss," and "the unruly." Lacking both consciousness and the 
light of reason. It Is a dark striving, an Infinite Impulse, an uncon­
scious will. It Is "a will within which there Is no understanding, and 
thus not an Independent and complete wlll."^ It would be misleading to 
refer to this primal ground as God In the traditional sense of being 
personal. It is the ground of God's personal existence but Is Itself 
Impersonal. It Is "that within God which Is not God himself.
Schelllng's thought owes much of Its philosophical Interest to his 
admission of this primordial ground which Is Impervious to thought.
Out of this ground of indifference break forth two equally 
eternal beginnings. Schelllng refers to each of these beginnings or
^Human Freedom, p. 34.
^Human Freedom, p. 33.
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principles as "potencies."^ A correct understanding of Schelling’s doc­
trine of potencies is of paramount importance. By the term "potency" he 
means potentiality, possibility, beginning, what can be but is not, a 
form of willing. Schelling does not employ the term in an Aristotelian 
fashion as meaning the entelechy or inner Impulse to achieve an inherent 
and predetermined goal. For Schelling, it is rather, in the broadest 
sense, the capacity to effect a change. Each potency is a form of ac­
tion or a mode of willing and is best characterized as a stage of growth 
or development in which a specific mode of action or willing is domi­
nate. On the one hand, the "first potency"^ is the stage of development 
in which the dominant mode of willing is expansion or outward thrust.
On the other hand, the "second potency"^ is the stage of development in 
which the dominant mode of willing is restriction or preservation.
Schelling’s initial voluntaristic monism yields to dualism. All 
reality contains this duality of principles in opposition. The concepts 
of potency and polarity or opposition are the fundamental concepts of 
Schelling’s philosophy. Two reasons may be adduced for his affirmation 
of polarity~one in the form of empirical verification and the 
second in the form of a cogent analytical argument. First,
^The doctrine of "potencies" is a constantly recurring theme 
throughout Schelling’s writings although the precise meaning of the term 
underwent slight modifications. The best account in English of 
Schelling’s usage of the term in his early writings is Brehier’s in his 
History of Philosophy, vol. VI, pp. 139-147. Tillich provides the most 
informative treatment'currently available in English of Schelling’s 
usage of the term in his later period. See Paul Tillich’s The Construc­
tion of the History of Religion in Schelling’s Positive Philosophy, 
trans. with an Introduction and Notes by Victor Nuovo, Lewisburg 
(Bucknell Univ. Press, 1974), pp. 43-76.
^The terms "first," "second," and "third" must not be understood 
as denoting a temporal order among the three potencies. They merely 
designate logically distinct moments within the character of Will.
Schelllng offers what he accepts as plausible empirical evidence for the 
existence of opposition from the very character of Will. The ambiguous 
character of Will itself reveals the possibility of self-contradiction. 
Everyone is experientially aware of'his capacity to will contradictory 
actions resulting from conflicting desires. In addition, everyone is 
experientially aware of his capacity to will contradictory actions 
resulting from a conflict between inclination and duty, e.g., to be moved 
to will what is cognitively understood as being opposed to one's own best 
interest or to be unable to perform what is cognitively understood as 
being in one's own best interest. Accordingly, Schelling argues that 
what is experientially true of man's will can also be posited as true of 
Will on the metaphysical level. It is the nature of Will to express it­
self in contradictory ways. Schelling, in an instantiation of his 
general procedure of employing psychological categories for ontological 
purposes, eventually takes this ambiguity within Will (derived from 
psychological phenomena) and both extends it to Nature and identifies 
it as integral to God. Second, a reasonably cogent analytical argument 
can be formulated within the framework of Schelling's thought. In his 
Philosophical letters  ̂Schelling had argued, in harmony with Fichte, 
that the philosopher is faced with two mutually exclusive paths— Real­
ism (dogmatism) and Idealism (criticism)— and that neither perspective 
can refute the other at the theoretical level. Given the two theoret­
ically irrefutable positions in conjunction with the self—contradictory 
character of Will, Schelling judges it plausible to argue that such 
opposition between principles and their consequences is the very nature
^See above, pp. 35-37.
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of reality, especially if ultimate reality is Identified as Will, The 
two antithetical positions can be regarded as the natural consequence of 
the contradictory expressions of Will.
It will be beneficial to state the full import of Schelling’s 
twin principles of potency and polarity before proceeding to their 
application within his concept of God, The polarity of opposition is the 
key to Schelling’s position on the philosophical problem.of the relation 
between Being and Non-being or the essentiality and existentiality of 
Being. Schelling considers this problem one of the central issues of 
philosophy and his position is best understood in contrast to prior 
positions on the problem. Four positions can be identified within the 
history of philosophy. First, Plato hypostatized Being and Non-being in 
two separate realms— the realm of Ideas and the experiential world. 
Second, Aristotle placed them in the polar relation of potentiality and 
actuality. Third, one was derived from the other, whether existence 
from essence as in Spinoza and Hegel, or essence from existence as in 
Sartre. Schelling develops a fourth position of maintaining Being and 
Non-being in perpetual opposition. Schelling identifies the "first 
potency" as the limitless, expansive force of Non-being. As such, it is 
meonic freedom, the principle of individuation, the irrational will to 
selfhood, that which resists the restriction or limitations of thought.
It is the dynamics of all that is. Next, he identifies the "second 
potency" as the realm of Being. This potency is the principle of limi­
tation or restriction. It is the principle of universalization, 
complete selflessness, that which is thought itself. It is the form or 
structure of all that is.
In addition to the first two potencies or contrary principles
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which are maintained in perpetual contrariety, Schelling posits the 
"third potency." This potency is the stage of development in which the 
dominant mode of action is synthesis or integration. Through its 
mediation between the first two potencies, the third potency transforms 
them from a contrariety of exclusion into one of mutual inclusion. This 
third potency, since it arises from within the Primordial Will, is 
capable of synthesizing the first two potencies by means of an internal 
relation. Thus, the first and second potencies become not only insep— 
erable but inexplicable in isolation. Moreover, it is by virtue of the 
third potency that God becomes "personal" or possesses "personality."
For Schelling, we are only justified in conceiving God as a personal 
being if we posit both an original antithesis within the primal ground 
or essence of God and a synthesis of the contradictory principles. In 
order for the infinite Being to possess personality, it must be capable 
of integrating the contrary principles within itself by means of an 
internal relation. In other words, personality cannot result from an 
external relation. Personality results because the infinite Being is 
self-determining or autonomous in the integration of its constituent 
elements.
These three potencies are central to Schelling's philosophy 
because of their flexibility. In fact, his theogony is an effort to 
explain how God and Nature are inclusive but not exhaustive of these 
three ontological principles or potencies of expansion, restriction and 
integration. Each potency is a direct expression of the Primal Ground 
and in each the same triplicity of potencies must be repeated. By means 
of three potencies Schelling is able, to his own satisfaction, to delin—
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eate how God transmutes himself into the world, thus revealing the full 
import of his vitalistlc pantheism.
Against this backdrop of his overall system and its basic
principles of potencies and polarity, Schelling's concept of God can be
explicated with a minimum of difficulty- The initial phase of the
théogonie process.of the divine life, as conceived by Schelling, is the
Primordial Will as the undifferentiated ground of all that exists. This
Primal Ground is "the incomprehensible basis of reality in things, the
irreducible remainder which cannot be resolved into reason" (Verstand).̂
As the eternal basis or ground of God's existence, this Primal Ground
"must contain within itself, though locked away, God's essence.God's
essence is the basis of his existence as ground or antecedent while his
existence is the consequence of his essence. Each is logically prior
to the other, i.e., the basis is logically prior as the ground of God's
existence and God is logically prior as the justification of the Ground.
Schelling states the case in the following manner:
God contains himself in an inner basis of his existence, 
which, to this extent, precedes him as to his existence, 
but similarly God is prior to the basis as this basis, 
as such, could not be if God did not exist in actuality.3
But out of this ground of Indifference two principles or potencies 
break forth— a will to expansion and a will to preservation. It is the 
conflict between these two principles which yields the vitality, and 
tragedy, of the divine being. "Without contradiction there would thus 
be no motion, no life, no progress, but eternal immobility, a deathly
^Human Freedom, p. 34 - 
^Human Freedom, p. 36. 
Ĥiiman Freedom, p. 33.
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slumber of all powers."! This contradictory opposition is necessary to 
the divine life and constitutes the ground of God's eternal self-reve­
lation within human history and the natural order. "If primal nature 
were in harmony with itself, it would remain; there would be an abiding 
one and never a two, an eternal immobility without progress."^ But 
precisely what stands in opposition and what is the character of the 
opposition?
Schelling, in imagery that displays simultaneously both his posi­
tion within the Idealistic movement and the influence of 91ato, speci­
fies the nature of the contrary principles in reference to the divine 
life. The first potency is the longing of the divine to give birth to 
himself, to send himself forth. "This primal longing moves in antic­
ipation like a surging, billowing sea, similar to the 'matter' of Plato, 
following some dark, uncertain Ihw, Incapable in itself of forming any­
thing that can endure.While Primordial Will expresses its multitu­
dinous longings, objectifies its manifold impulses, each of these 
expressed longings is Incapable of enduring of itself. Hence, there 
arises within the divine life a deliberate effort of consciousness to 
discover within each impulse a universal meaning or pattern of which 
that specific impulse is an instance.
. . . there is bom in God himself an inward, imaginative 
response, corresponding to this longing, which is the first 
stirring of divine Being in its still dark depths. Through 
this response, God sees himself in his own image, since his 
imagination can have no other object than himself.%
These images within the divine life, arising from the light of reason.
^Ages Of the World, p. 105.
'̂ Hümàri'Freedom. p. 35.
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are thought-determinations (universal concepts or abstract categories)•
Originating within the second potency, they have an existence separate
from the individual impulse. As such, these thought-determinations
resemble the Platonic Forms and function within the divine life much as
the Kantian categories, serving to bring order to reality.
Following the eternal act of self-revelation, the world 
as we now behold it, is all rule, order and form; but 
the unruly lies ever in the depths as though it might 
again break through, and order and form nowhere appear 
to have been original, but it seems as though;what had 
initially been unruly had been brought to order.^
The divine life develops through the perpetual interplay between
the activities of these two potencies or powers. The inner life of God
is thus conceived by Schelling as a dynamic process of self-creation.
The same powers which act without consciousness in producing the Real
realm of Nature act with consciousness in producing the Ideal realm of
human history. In this manner Schelling maintains that the same duality
of an expansive and a limiting force which Fichte had shown to exist in
consciousness also pervades the whole of Nature. The universe, in both
its Ideal and Real aspects, is involved in a continual evolutionary
process in which each new addition of the first potency and the
corresponding thought-determination of the second potency are synthesized
or integrated into a new arrangement or combination with the previous
accomplishments of the process.
It can readily be seen that in the tension of longing 
necessary to bring things completely to birth the 
innermost nexus of the forces can only be released in 
a graded evolution, and at every stage in the division 
of forces there is developed out of nature a new being 
whose soul must be all the more perfect the more differ—
•̂ Hthnan Freedom, p. 34.
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entiatedly it contains what was left undifferentiated 
In the others,^
This process of differentiating what was originally undifferentiated in 
the Primordial Ground is coincidental with the théogonie process. "The 
process of creation consists only in an inner transmutation . . of
the basis or ground of the divine being.
Thus it is possible to see the full import of Schelling's 
vitalistlc pantheism. The divine life of God’s self—creation not only 
develops in the universe, but it develops through the universe. "The 
whole spatially extended universe is nothing but the swelling heart of 
the godhead."3 This transmutation of the Primal Ground as the "procès-. 
Sion of things from God is God’s self-revelation."^ The history of the 
world is a continuous unfolding of God, the differentiation of what was 
undifferentiated in the Primal Ground. Accordingly, all things are 
included within God, but "the concept of immanence is completely to be 
set aside insofar as it is meant to express a dead conceptual inclusion 
of things in God."3 Because Schelling posits the basis or Primal Ground 
of God’s being as Will, the universe is the expressed objectification of 
that which was in the basis and is now incorporated in God,
Since the universe is the medium of God’s revelation and devel­
opment, that revelation can never be final, for then all development and 
with it all manifestation of freedom would end. The théogonie process
^Human Freedom, p. 37.
^Human Freedom, p. 38.
^Ages of the World, p. 215
■ ̂Human Freedom, p. 19.
^uman Freedom, p. 33.
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Is a dynamic, open-ended development of the divine life. As such, it 
is a process of becoming, since "the concept of becoming is the only one 
adequate to the nature of things."^ God is the synthesis of the first 
potency's meonic freedom of Non-being and the second potency's universal 
categories of Being, This synthesis, for Schelling, constitutes the 
Absoluteness of God. God as Absolute is the totality of all that is 
involved in and resultant from the actions of the potencies• In other 
words, God as Absolute is the synthesis of the activities of the first 
and second potencies. Furthermore, this synthesizing activity of God 
constitutes the vitality of God, A "living being," for Schelling, is a 
living unity which contains the opposites— however great the tension 
between them— not without but within itself, and God certainly contains 
the opposites within himself since they arise from the basis of God's 
existence. Finally, this synthesizing activity is what Schelling 
designates as "personality." Personality develops only in contrast with 
a natural foundation and, with this as a basis, through conflict with 
opposing forces. Personality is the relation in.opposition of that 
which in and for itself is not God but which can become God.^
Schelling's general metaphysical principles of potencies and polarity, 
and their application to God, provide a backdrop against which his 
concept of human nature and ultimately his theory of autonomy can be 
delineated.
^Human Freedom, p. 33, 
2Human Freedom, p. 74.
52
Schellliig's Concept of Man
In the previous section I described the manner in which 
Schelling's fundamental principles of potencies and polarity were em­
ployed to develop a conceptualization of God as a théogonie process. In 
the present section I shall demonstrate their application to man. 
Schelling's concept of man is the logical consequence of systematically 
employing his fundamental principles to explain human phenomena. Accord­
ingly, his theory of man is the construction of a model of man which in 
many respects parallels his concept of God.
There are, however, three major permutations. The first permu­
tation is that Schelling assigns man a crucial position within the 
théogonie process which constitutes the universe. The second permutation 
is the addition of specific terms such as "selfhood," "spirit," and 
"soul" to designate either certain aspects of human nature or the 
relationships among those aspects. Further, Schelling provides clarifi­
cation of the central notion of "personality" by discussing the manner 
in which man is a concrete instantiation of his general principle of 
personality enunciated earlier.^ The third permutation is the attempt 
to demonstrate how man alone is responsible for the presence of evil. I 
shall discuss each of these permutations in the following subsections.
Man's position within the 
théogonie process
The earlier characterization of Schelling's theogony as the
^See above, p. 51,
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process of God s self-creation may be amended to Include Its character­
ization as the circuit of selfhood. Man* according to Schelling, 
occupies a position of singular importance within this circuit of self­
hood. The phrase "circuit of selfhood" appropriately describes the 
attempts of the German Idealists to complete the program of Kant's 
Critical Philosophy. But the meaning and function of this circuit of 
selfhood needs to be clarified. Accordingly, I shall outline the manner 
in which It conveys the spirit of Fichte's philosophy and then discuss 
Its general meaning in Schelling's thought.
In Fichte's philosophy the circuit of selfhood takes the form of 
demonstrating how the objective world Is constructed by the knowing self. 
Fichte accepted Kant's basic premises and their Implication that con­
sciousness, or the knowing self. Is the key to understanding reality. 
Whoever would understand reality must first understand the knowing self. 
But Fichte, by rejecting the Kantian thlng-ln—Itself as Inconsistent 
with Kant's premises, argued that the Critical Philosophy had to be 
transformed Into a consistent Idealism. In short, Fichte argued that 
the objective world had to be regarded as the product of the knowing 
mind. But Fichte, in recognizing that the world cannot be reasonably 
regarded as the product of an Individual or finite self, felt compelled 
to regard the world as the product of a supra—individual or Absolute 
S e l f F i c h t e  sought to perfect Kant's philosophical system by 
synthesizing pure reason, which provides the form of its knowledge, with
^Fichte's move of elevating the Transcendental Unity of 
Apperception to the status of an Absolute Self may be challenged. But 
Fichte thinks there is justification for the move within Kant's Critique 
of Pure Reason. Kant says that the representations of the self "must 
conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together In 
one universal self-consciousness"(B 132). Thus, Fichte not only
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practical reason, which creates the objects of its knowledge. Thus, 
Fichte elevates the Kantian Transcendental Unity of Apperception to the 
level of an Absolute Mind (self-consciousness) which creates both the 
objects (the real world) and the knowledge (the ideal) by which the 
objects become known. Thus, the circuit of selfhood, in Fichtean 
Idealism, is the record of the steps whereby the Absolute Self produces 
its experience out of itself: the circuit of selfhood records the steps
whereby the Absolute Self posits or determines Nature in order to realize 
its own powers or potentialities.
Schelling, however, is dissatisfied with Fichte's treatment of the 
external, natural order as a dead and mechanical product of the Ego. 
Schelling became convinced in 1798 "that the way from nature to spirit 
must be as possible as the reverse way upon which Fichte had entered.
To develop this way from nature to spirit, Schelling argued that Nature 
must be viewed as the living expression of Primordial Will. Nature is 
the evolutionary product of the dialectical differentiation of that 
which was initially undifferentiated within the Primal Ground, and man 
is a part of nature. Hence, man appears as an evolution from and within 
nature. Further, Schelling holds that a theory accounting for the 
evolutionary appearance of consciousness within the natural order is
interprets the Transcendental Deduction as demonstrating that some set of 
categories is necessary, but also as suggesting that these categories 
are products of "one universal self-consciousness" or Absolute Self. 
Further, .Fichte contends that consciousness itself can be accounted for, 
and knowledge made intelligible, only if consciousness itself is 
postulated as the active principle from which the universe is derived.
^This personal statement of Schelling’s purpose is quoted in 
Royce’s The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 185.
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needed to complement Fichte's theory.̂  Accordingly, the circuit of 
selfhood in Schelling's philosophy records the steps through which 
Primordial Will expresses itself first as unconscious nature, rises to 
consciousness in man, and finally returns to itself through human 
history.
Schelling delineates the full circuit of selfhood in his System 
of Transcendental Idealism. Initially the self objectifies itself and 
becomes aware of this objectified expression in the form of immediate 
experience or sensation, or the simple consciousness that something is. 
But the self, while conscious of its objects, does not recognize them as 
the products of its own activity. Thus, the self inevitably views the 
objects as purely natural phenomena subject to natural law. Nature is 
the unconscious life of the self. But reflection arises as the self 
continues to express itself in the circuit of selfhood. Through 
reflection the self comes to recognize the world of intelligible, 
phenomenal objects as the result of the synthesis of the real and the 
ideal. Finally, further reflection leads the self to recognize nature 
as the product of its own unconscious activity. Accordingly, the 
natural order, or the self in the process of becoming, is for Schelling 
simply the order of those existential positions which the self posits 
and then rejects in its movement as potency from undifferentiated to
^Royce calls this move "Schelling's epoch-making idea" that 
provided the impetus of subsequent philosophy, and adds that "to 
complete the undertaking of idealism, you need a theory of the facts of 
nature, so interpreted as to be in harmony with the view that only ideas 
are the realities, and yet so adapted to experience as to free your 
idealism from the arbitrariness of the inner life of mere finite selves." 
Ibid. p. 185.
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differentiated. The various positions are recognized successively by 
consciousness as something other to itself while simultaneously being 
intimate constitutive moments of its own process. ̂ The self under 
consideration cannot be any finite, individual self. But its objective 
world contains many individual empirical selves.
Man occupies a position of singular importance within the 
objective aspect of the circuit of selfhood because he is the being in 
whom self-consciousness first appears. Schelling deduces two 
implications from man's singular position within Human Freedom. First, 
since man is a microcosmic expression of the principles of potency and 
polarity present in the macrocosmic process, man is the being in whom 
the entire process first becomes articulated, Schelling develops some 
specialized terms to facilitate the clarification of this process in 
man. Second, man is the pivotal point in whom the outward, unconscious 
evolution of nature is reversed in order to initiate the conscious 
evolutionary return of the infinite self back into itself. As the being 
in whom self-consciousness first appears, man has two paths open to him. 
On the one hand, he may set himself in opposition to the universal 
process by attempting to universalize the particularity of his own being. 
On the other hand, he may deliberately contribute to the universal 
process by realizing the unique vocation which constitutes his being as 
an expression of the Primal Ground, The former path is the occasion of 
man's fall or the entrance of evil, and the latter offers man autonomy.
X shall expand these implications in the next two sections.
^The critical question here is whether Schelling has accounted 
for the appearance of consciousness or merely given consciousness a place 
within an overall schema. I shall return to this question within my 
closing, critical remarks.
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Màn arid the disclosure of 
the processes of life
Inasmuch as the life of man recapitulates the life of the whole,^ 
man possesses both a ground and the polarity of the first and second 
potencies. In fact, since h@ possesses self-consciousness, man is the 
creature in whom the entire process is made completely articulate.^
Man, according to Schelling, is the crown of creation and the most inter­
esting and rewarding object of philosophic attention because man is the 
creature in whom both the fall and the state of things before the fall 
rise for the first time into consciousness.
As an expression of Primordial Will, man’s original ontological 
reality is a negativity of freedom. "In original creation • . . man is 
an undetermined reality."^ The first potency of expansive freedom, the 
principle of darkness, is the self-will of creatures. But the elevation 
of this abysmal center into the light of consciousness occurs in no 
creature visible to man other than man himself.^ Schelling employs the 
term "selfhood" or "self-will" to refer to the activity of the first 
potency in man. This principle of selfhood, however, can be present in 
man at different levels. At the lowest level, and in isolation, "this 
self will of creatures stands opposed to reason as universal will."4 It 
is, as such, the dark principle whereby man is separated from God.
^See above, p. 41. 
^Human Freedom, p. 39. 
%uman Freedom, p. 63. 
'̂ nmah Freedom, p. 38.
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But the principle of selfhood can exist at a higher level. When 
this principle of selfhood Is transfigured by the light of the second 
potency, then something higher arises In man. Schelling employs the 
term "spirit” to denote the synthesis of the first and second potencies 
In both God and man. "That principle which rises up from the depths of 
nature and by which man Is divided from God, Is the selfhood In him; but 
by reason of Its unity with the ideal principle, this becomes spirit."^ 
Schelling also employs the more restrictive term^"soul" to denote the 
synthesizing activity in man. "Inasmuch as the soul Is the living 
Identity of both principles, it is spirit."^
The principle of selfhood may exist on an even higher level when 
Integrated Into "personality." The notion of personality Is the key 
concept In Human Freedom, and Schelling, in his own self-confident 
manner, regards himself as having developed the only comprehensible 
conception of the divine personality.^ The notion of personality Is also 
the key to understanding his theory of autonomy. The best approach to 
his concept of personality Is through his explicit. If somewhat per­
plexing, discussion of the divine personality. The following statement 
concerning the nature of the divine personality will serve as a 
convenient starting point.
[Q f personality consists . . .  In the connection of an 
autonomous being with a basis which Is Independent of It,
In such a way namely that these two completely Interpenetrate 
one another and are but one being, then God is the highest 
personality by reason of the connection of the Ideal 
principle within him to the Independent basis (Independent 
relative to the Ideal principle)— since the basis and the
^Human Freedom, p. 39
^Human Freedom, p. 93.
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existent entity in hlm necessarily unite to become 
one absolute existence.^
Two things stand out in this passage— the necessity of God’s existence
as an integrated personality and the nature of God’s existence as an
integrated personality. A spatial metaphor may be used to characterize
the relations involved in the nature of the divine personality. "Spirit"
refers to the horizontal synthesis of the first and second potencies
arising from the Primal Ground, while "personality" denotes the vertical
synthesis of spirit as the existential or consequential nature of God
with the Primal Ground. God is personality in such a way that there is
no contrariety between God as Primal Ground and God as consequent.^ But
caution must be exercised at this point. The realization of personality
in God, the synthesis of Ground and Consequent, is not a temporal
process. While logically distinct potencies may be distinguished within
the divine being, there is no temporal succession. Moreover, since God
as Ground and God as Consequent are identical although not the same,^
the development of personality within God is an internal relation and
not the mere incorporation of what was originally external. Thus,
Schelling argues, that God is necessarily an integrated personality.
Man, in contradistinction to God, is not necessarily an integrated
^Human Freedom, p. 74.
^The concept of personality provides Schelling with the solution 
to one of the critical problems of dialectical philosophy from Hegel to 
Tillich— the problem of maintaining the vitality of God once the 
dialectical opposites have been reconciled. Schelling’s metaphysical 
voluntarism permits him to argue that the unruly principle within the 
Primordial Will is ever capable of expressing further aspects of itself 
which must then be synthesized with the other aspects of God in an 
unending process.
3See above, p. 27.
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personality, for the basic elements are separable in man. God's 
Ground is Himself as Primal Will. But man's ground is nature as the 
enduring and vital record of God's former self—revelation. Hence, in 
order for man to become an integrated personality, he must synthesize 
himself as nature, or empirical ego, with himself as ideal consciousness. 
Evil is that which prevents the synthesis between the empirical and the 
ideal. Accordingly, Schelling moves toward an explanation of the nature 
of evil.
Man and the origin of evil
Schelling's discussion of evil has two aspects— its possibility 
and its actuality. The possibility of evil resides within the polarities 
constitutive of the théogonie process. In God, as an infinite being, 
these polarities are maintained in a perpetual, harmonious tension. But 
this "unity which is indissoluble in God must be dissoluble in man'*̂  as 
finite being, and this possible dissolution constitutes the possibility 
of evil. Yet Schelling contends that God is not the source of evil, nor 
is he responsible for evil. Even within God there exists the possibility 
that the unconscious will, the drive in the depths of the divine 
personality, might break away from its identity. But God as infinite is 
able to absorb all diversity and maintain such diversity in harmonious 
tension. Hence, actual evil as a real possibility cannot originate with­
in God, although the ideal possibility is there. The unity of the two 
principles can be disrupted only in finite creatures, or more 
specifically, only in man as the creature in whom self-consciousness
^Humah Freedom, p. 39.
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first appears. But how does this disruption occur? Is flnltude Itself 
the cause 6f evil? Is this disruption Inevitable, or deliberate, or 
accidental?
Explanations of the nature of evil, according to Schelling, may 
be either non-dlalectical or dialectical. If non-dialectical, evil may 
be Interpreted as either a negative or a positive concept. The negative" 
conception reduces evil to "the so-called malum metaphysicum." Schelling 
singles out two examples of evil as a negative concept for special 
treatment— the Leibnizian view that evil is the necessary consequence of 
finltude and the Augustinian view that evil is a privation of good. 
Schelling rejects both of these negative concepts of evil because they 
"leave the understanding and moral consciousness alike dissatisfied."^ 
Neither of these concepts of evil exempts God from some sort of moral 
responsibility for the existence of evil without damaging implications 
for the traditional attributes of God. More specifically, Schelling 
rejects the Leibnizian position because "evil is not derived from 
finltude in itself, but from finltude which has been exalted to indepen­
dent being."2 He rejects the Augustinian position because evil must "not 
only be founded on something inherently positive, but rather on the 
highest positive being which nature contains."^ Hence, Schelling argues 
that evil cannot be adequately explained as a negative concept.
Schelling discusses as an example of evil as a positive concept the 
long-standing interpretation that the sole explanation of evil lies in
^Human Freedom, p. 43. 
Ĥiiman Freedom, p. 46 note. 
■ %iiman Freedom, p. 45.
the realm of man's senses and passions.^ Within this rationalistic view 
of ethics, "freedom consists in the mere mastery of the intelligent 
principle over the desires and inclinations of the senses, and the good 
is derived from pure reason."^ But this view does not do justice, in 
Schelling's opinion, to the concept of freedom as the possibility of 
good and evil. Schelling regards man's physiological drives as the sine 
qua non of freedom. "To be sure, wherever passion and desire are, there 
is already a kind of freedom."^ Further, the rationalistic interpreta­
tion of evil does not conform to his own notion of personality. 
Personality entails the incorporation or synthesis of the passions with 
reason, not their mere mastery by reason. Thus, Schelling rejects all 
non-dialectical interpretations of evil, taking the position that the 
only adequate concept of evil must be dialectical.
Having eliminated various possible non—dialectical explanations 
of evil, Schelling proceeds to develop his own dialectical concept. 
Schelling argues, in short, that evil consists in strife between the two 
polar principles or potencies within man while good consists in complete 
accord or synthesis between the polarities.^ Man's self-will, in 
attempting to universalize the particularity of his being in opposition 
to the universal will of reason, initiates a division within his 
spiritualized selfhood of the very principles which in God are indissol­
uble ,̂  The presence of strife between the polar principles prevents
^Human Freedom, p. 47. 
^Human Freedom, p. 53. 
Ĥiiman Freedom, p. 70. 
'̂Htimari Freedom, p . 40.
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the development of spirit within man’s existential being, which in turn 
prevents the synthesis of man s existential being with his essential 
being or ground in the form of personality.
Having defined the nature of evil, Schelling turns his attention 
to the difficult question of the origin of evil. As he states it, "what 
has to be explained is not simply how evil comes to be real in individu­
al men, but its universal effectiveness."^ To seek the source of evil 
is to seek that which solicits man to evil. Evil may originate from 
either an uncreated source or a created source. If evil originates from 
an uncreated source, then the source may be either an evil first cause 
or primal nature. Schelling dismisses both of these possible sources 
because they do not possess the two polar principles in such a way that 
they are capable of that dissolution which is the nature of evil.2 
Hence, evil must originate from a created being. Now a created source 
may be either external to man or internal. If external, then the source 
may be either evil per se or a fallen created spirit. But it cannot be 
evil per se because it would not contain the duality of principles whose 
dissolution is necessary for the presence of evil.^ But neither can 
evil be said to originate from a fallen created being, for this begs 
the question of how evil originates within a created being in the first 
p l a c e .2 Hence, the source of evil must lie within man. And if within 
man, then evil may originate from either passions or from man’s own
^Human Freedom, p. A9.
^Human Freedom, p. 51.
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choice. But since the passions are not evil they cannot be the source 
of evil.1 Hence, "evil ever remains man’s own choice.
Since he has defined evil as the dissolution of the polar 
principles and the source of the dissolution as being within man, 
Schelling must now show precisely how man Is solicited to evil. 
Schelling, In a passage summarizing his general position on this Issue, 
says :
The general possibility of evil, as has been shown, 
consists In the fact that, instead of keeping his 
selfhood as the basis or the instrument, man can 
strive to elevate It to be the ruling and universal 
will, and, on the contrary, try to make what is 
spiritual In him Into a means.3
Aroused selfhood may prompt man to attempt to preserve his own particu­
lar existence,4 to exalt his self-will above the universal will.^ By 
seeking to absolutize one of the polarities of his own being, man 
introduces into his being and, consequently, another spirit occupies the 
place where God should be-^ "Aroused selfhood is not in Itself evil 
but insofar as it has totally torn itself asunder from its opposite."^ 
But there is within evil "that contradiction which devours and always 
negates itself" since, in its ambition to absolutize itself, selfhood 
"falls into non-being."? Selfhood falls Into non-being precisely
^See above, pp. 61—62,
^uman Freedom, p. 68.
^Human Freedom, p. 58.
^Human Freedom, p. 41-
^Human Freedom, p. 80.
?Human Freedom, p. 69.
because, in seeking to absolutize Itself, It cuts Itself off from Its 
fundamental potentiality to achieve conscious realization of Itself as 
part of the théogonie process.
Schelling further characterizes this aroused selfhood which 
absolutizes the particularity of Its own being as a positive perversion 
of being. Insofar as aroused selfhood seeks to separate itself from its 
supernatural status as part of God's self-creation in gaining the full 
ejdilbltion of Its essential nature It becomes self-centered.^ When 
aroused selfhood, or self-consciousness, becomes self-centered the 
result Is a "counterfeit of being"2 or a false life.^ To absolutize 
the particular Is to falsify the whole. Self-centeredness refers to the 
condition In which aroused selfhood arrogates to Itself the totality of 
being or cuts Itself off from the ground of being In seeking to 
absolutize Itself. Such a condition, for Schelling, is evil.
Moral Autonomy
Schelllng's purpose in Human Freedom is to establish a theory of 
freedom as the real possibility of good and evil. The bulk of his labor 
Is devoted to demonstrating how freedom Is the possibility of evil. 
Schelling, unfortunately, does not adequately develop the doctrine of 
freedom as the possibility of good. He merely offers a few scattered
^Human Freedom, p. 41. Schelling approvingly quotes Franz von 
Header's distinction between self-centeredness and the centered self 
(see p. 42, footnote). Paul Tillich employs this same distinction.
See, for example. Love. Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1954), pp. 33-34.
^Human Freedom, p . 90.
^Human Freedom, p. 41.
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suggestions regarding the conditions which contribute to man's attain­
ment of autonomy. But the remainder of his theory may be either in­
ferred in contrast to his doctrine of evil or deduced from other ele­
ments of his philosophy. Accordingly, since I have already treated the 
fundamental elements of Schelling's philosophy and his extensive discus­
sion of the nature and origin of evil, it is now possible to clarify the 
theory of autonomy implicit within his philosophy.
Schelling's doctrine of freedom must be understood not so much 
in terms of moral action, although the moral aspect is an essential 
ingredient, as in terms of the ego's realization of its essential 
principles. Freedom, for Schelling, means (1) attaining reflective 
consciousness of the basic powers of the mind and nature, and (2) engag­
ing in creative activity whereby the ego expands its reflective con­
sciousness. These two senses of freedom conjoin. Since ethics 
addresses the issue of the first principles of human conduct, and the 
issue of the first principles of human conduct addresses the issue of 
the appropriate ends of human activity, ethics must necessarily seek to 
clarify the ends of human activity. The end of human activity, 
according to Schelling, is the development of personality. Personality, 
or reflective consciousness, is the necessary condition of moral action.
The full appreciation of the nuances of Schelling's concept of 
personality forces one to conclude that personality is synonymous with 
autonomy. While personality is something to be gained rather than some­
thing possessed from the start, it, nonetheless, is the complete experi­
ence of freedom wherein man is autonomous. This interpretation of human 
personality is consistent with Schelling's doctrine of the divine per­
sonality. The théogonie process, for Schelling, is a teleologies!
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process wherein the Absolute Ego moves towards the emergence of a form 
of concretely existing consciousness in which the full range of its 
essential principles is self-consciously exhibited. Such a form of 
concretely existing consciousness is what Schelling terms "personality” 
in God. Since the finite ego, or the individual, is an instantiation of 
the Absolute Ego, it must possess the same triplicity of principles and 
be capable of a form of expression analogous to the Absolute Ego. By 
clarifying the solutions which Schelling offers to problems inherited 
from Kant, we can further elucidate his identification of personality 
and autonomy.
Solutions to Kantian 
problems
Schelllng's concept of the autonomous personality incorporates 
solutions to a complex of major problems inherent within Kant's moral 
philosophy. I shall focus attention on three of these problems. The 
. first problem concerns the relationships between the four egos within 
Kant's philosophy— the empirical, the transcendental, the noumenal, and 
the moral selves. Kant failed to develop a satisfactory theory of the 
relationship between these four selves. The second problem concerns how 
man can reasonably be held responsible for immoral actions, especially 
since Kant appears to claim that free actions are moral while immoral 
actions are determined. The third problem concerns individuality, which 
is apparently precluded by Kant’s demand for objectivity and universal— 
Izabillty in moral actions. The fact that Schelling devotes attention 
to these problems discloses the unmistakable influence of Kant, and 
Schelling's solutions reveal the manner in which he moves beyond Kant.
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First, the clarification of the relationships between the four 
selves— the empirical, the transcendental, the noumenal, and the moral—  
discussed in Kant's philosophy constitutes one of the central issues in 
post-Kantian German philosophy. Schelling's doctrine of personality 
provides one solution. In the first place, Schelling identifies the 
serialized empirical ego as the product of the first potency which gives 
rise to Nature or the real aspect of reality. Nature is the history of 
the struggle of objective reason to organize itself through ever higher 
levels until consciousness appears. At the lowest level inorganic 
Nature develops in complete accord with the necessities of the 
Primordial Will. At the intermediate levels organic Nature develops 
through the impetus of desires and inclinations. At a higher level 
consciousness appears. The initial stage of consciousness is the 
awareness of the empirical ego or the self as known. At this level the
empirical ego recognizes itself as part of nature and as determined by
its own impulses and desires. This is the lowest level of selfhood 
wherein the self stands opposed to reason as the universal will.
In the second place, Schelling identifies the transcendental ego 
as the product of the second potency which gives rise to the ideal
aspect of reality. Kant had regarded the transcendental ego as the
empistemological correlate of all human acts of knowing. It was the 
necessary presupposition of knowing, providing unity to our inner and 
outer experience. In Kant's philosophy the transcendental ego is more 
of a unifying principle than a person. Schelling, however, apparently 
reifies the transcendental ego by regarding it as the manifestation of 
the second potency. Since the second potency as the will to universal­
ization is the will to organize experience into universal categories.
69
It follows that the categories of the understanding are now regarded by 
Schelling as constituent elements of the transcendental ego whereby it 
determines experience according to the necessities of reason.
To this point Schelling has merely incorporated Kant’s position 
with two additions— the identification of the empirical and transcenden­
tal egos with the first and second potencies. But the explicit recog­
nition and integration of the empirical and transcendental egos produces 
what Schelling terms "spirit.” Selfhood as spirit, according to 
Schelling, is the standpoint of Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Kant’s 
philosophy represents the developmental stage of consciousness in which 
consciousness overcomes the determinism inherent within the unconscious 
activity of the empirical ego by explicitly recognizing the role of the 
transcendental ego. Selfhood as spirit is "will beholding itself in 
complete freedom, no longer the tool of universal will operating in 
nature, but alone and outside of nature.Consciousness, as spirit, 
comes to realize that the determinism of the natural order results from 
applying its own categories to the phenomenally given. While the 
transcendental ego recognizes itself as freely superimposing its 
categories upon the empirical order, it does not regard itself as having 
freely chosen those categories. Consciousness still views itself as 
acting in accordance with the necessity of its own categories. Hence, 
the relation between the empirical and transcendental egos remains one 
of opposition or external relation. Knowledge, in deriving its content 
from the empirical world and its form from the human understanding, is 
the only bridge between the empirical and transcendental egos. But the
^Human Freedom, p. 40.
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synthesis attained in knowledge remains dubious since man, if he remains 
within the Kantian stance, can never know how closely his knowledge 
conforms to reality. A similar opposition between man's empirical 
desires and his rational sense of duty is illustrated in Kant's ethical 
theory. Such uncertainty and opposition, at least for Schelling, can­
not be regarded as autonomous activity.
In the third place, Schelling identifies the noumenal ego with 
the Primal Will or the ground of man's being as ontological freedom. 
Man's expanding reflective consciousness, as he continues on the circuit 
of selfhood, recognizes that both the real and the ideal aspects of 
reality have their ground in the Primal Will. Hence, within the stage 
of the circuit of selfhood exemplified by Schelling's philosophy, the 
empirical and transcendental egos are understood as being expressions of 
the Primal Will. ïfhat was previously regarded as an external relation 
of opposition between the empirical and transcendental egos is now 
regarded, within this stage, as being potentially capable of transfor­
mation into an internal relation. Further, as the passage of selfhood 
from the empirical to the transcendental provided man a sense of freedom 
in determining the empirical order, so the passage to the present stage 
provides man.a sense of freedom in determining the categorical struc­
tures whereby the transcendental ego organizes its experience. The 
finite ego, in recognizing its ground as ontological freedom, has now 
retreated to its origins. But because it has retreated to the princi­
ples from which it originates, it is now ready to fulfill its destiny 
and appropriate these principles into a unified autonomous personality. 
While selfhood as spirit is the indispensable preparatory stage for the
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development of personality, selfhood as personality transcends the 
Kantian position.
In the fourth place, the moral self may be Identified with what 
Schelling terms personality. The end of human activity Is the develop­
ment of personality In which man attains the full reflective conscious­
ness of the self's basic powers and engages in the creative activity^ 
whereby the self further expands Its reflective consciousness. Person­
ality Is the reflective consciousness and Integration of man's- essential 
ground with its existential expressions. It Is only as personality that 
man can possibly achieve the final realization of his potentialities 
because all the previous stages within the circuit of selfhood are 
characterized by the unconscious determination of man's existence by one 
of the polarities of man's essential being. Personality Is character- • 
Ized by a dynamic Interplay of the polarities directed toward the 
achievement of chosen ends. Personality denotes a "living being" or 
a dynamic unity which integrates the forces inherent within itself. Man 
may be characterized as autonomous if and only if he has attained 
personality; all actions committed by a being which has failed to 
develop personality are amoral. The moral self is the dynamic unity of 
the empirical, the transcendental and the noumenal selves.
The second major problem within Kant's theory of autonomy 
resolved by Schelling is the difficulty of accounting for immoral 
action. Kant, in claiming that the moral self is a purely rational 
will, had difficulty in explaining how a purely rational will could
^Schelling's inclusion of creative activity as an indispensable 
element of personality is dictated by his aesthetic interests. But this 
dimension of personality lies outside the scope of this dissertation.
choose evil. Further, Kant claims that morally right actions are
determined by noumenal causes while morally wrong actions are determined
by phenomenal causes. Hence the question arises. How can a purely
rational will even commit immoral acts, much less be held responsible
for them? Kant’s answer, one which is apparently inconsistent with his
overall philosophy, comes to the suggestion that
immoral action consists, not in the noumenal self acting, 
but in the noumenal self neglecting to act and thus 
letting phenomenal causes take their course so that the 
action is determined by desire, this being the only 
alternative to determination by the moral law.^
Schelling’s solution incorporates the above suggestion of Kant, but 
provides a more adequate foundation. Schelling not only identifies 
both the empirical and transcendental egos as expressions of the 
noumenal ego, but he also defines good as the synthesizing interplay 
between the two while evil is the disruption of the interplay. Evil or 
immoral action results whenever the self, for whatever reason, arrests 
its development and fails to achieve full reflective consciousness.
This arresting of development may result either from the self’s becoming 
fascinated with the pleasure derived from satisfying its empirical 
desires and inclination or from the self’s becoming content with the 
security found in obeying the demands of reason as enshrined in custom­
ary morality and social roles. In either case the arresting of develop­
ment results from absolutizing one of the polarities of man’s being 
while excluding the other. Hence, because both the polarities of man’s
A.C. Ewing, A Short Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, Chicago (Chicago University Press, 1938), p. 235. See pp. 236- 
40 for a discussion of the manner in which Kant’s answer to this problem 
contradicts other aspects of his philosophy.
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existential being are expression of his essential being, man Is the 
agent ultimately responsible for the disruption of forces which prevents 
future growth.
The third major problem within Kant’s doctrine of autonomy is the 
issue of individuality. Standing in bold contrast to the impersonality 
that is seemingly required in Kant’s ethic of objectivity and univer- 
salizability, Schelling’s doctrine of personality permits the inclusion 
of individuality. Schelling explicitly argues that his form of panthe­
ism need not preclude individuality.^ But Schelling’s precise principle 
of individuation Is unspecified. Two interpretations are possible. On 
the one hand, individuality could mean that each man is a unique 
objectification of a particular impulse of the Primordial Will.
Schelling’s explicit criticism of Fichte for holding this view apparent­
ly entails his own rejection of it.2 On the other hand, individuality 
could mean that, although their essential structures are identical, men 
are individualized by the degree to which they are self-conscious of 
their nature. Such a Leibnizlan view of individuality is not only 
compatible with Schelling’s over—all philosophy but is also consistent 
with his infatuation with Leibniz. Schelling’s doctrine of personality, 
however, adds an important dimension to the Leibnizian doctrine. Since 
personality is relational in nature (rather than substantival), it 
entails not only gaining self-consciousness of the fundamental princi­
ples of man’s being but also integrating or synthesizing these princi­
ples. Thus, for Schelling, not only may each person possess different
^See above, p. 27ff. 
^See above, p. 34.
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degrees of awareness about these principles» but even persons who 
possess the same degree of awareness may integrate them In individual­
ized ways.
Man's transcendental fall
In spite of the theory of autonomy implicit within Schelling*s 
philosophy, his moral theory is truncated by the inclusion of a doctrine 
of a transcendental fall such that every man incurs original sin. This 
doctrine of a transcendental fall probably prevented Schelling from 
eliciting the theory of autonomy implicit within his philosophy and 
partially prompted his later preoccupation with religious questions.
Three important points may be made in passing regarding this 
transcendental fall into a state of original sin.^ First, it is non­
temporal and non-cognitive. It is a fall resulting from a willful act 
not in time and of which the will is cognitively unaware. Nonetheless, 
it initiates man’s character, which determines subsequent actions. 
Second, it is an individual, not a racial or species, fall. It is not 
a fall incurred by one or a few and then imputed to all men. "For evil 
can only arise in the innermost will of one’s own heart, and is never 
achieved without one’s own deed."^ Hence, each individual is responsi­
ble for his own fall. Third, it is limited to man. Nature is incapa­
ble of evil, at least in the moral sense and probably in any sense. 
Nature is completely determined by God, in whom there is no actual evil. 
But what is the nature of original sin, and what are its dynamics?
^Schelling*s doctrine of a transcendental fall bears a striking 
resemblance to the doctrines of both Kant and Schleiermacher.
^Human Freedom, p. 79.
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Schelling characterizes original sin as the exaltation of self-
1will, which results in the disunion of or discord between the polari­
ties of man’s being. "Man from eternity took his stand in egotism and 
s e l f i s h n e s s . "2 By a choice made "from eternity" Schelling evidently 
means a choice made before the individual is fully cognizant of the 
choice. Once the tension within man’s being is broken, original sin 
initiates a character within man which determines both future actions in 
accordance with the original sinful tendency and the nature of man’s 
ineffective or pathological synthesis of the polarities. Man’s 
fascination with the initial stages of his aroused selfhood causes him 
to forfeit further development, i.e., he absolutizes the particularity 
of his being "even though this evil is raised to self-consciousness only 
through the entrance of its opposite."^ Man becomes cognizant of his 
sinfulness through awareness of the possible integration of the 
constituent polarities of his being into an autonomous personality.
Schelling further discloses the theological undercurrents of his 
philosophy by the inclusion of a doctrine of redemption, according to 
which man overcomes the discord resulting from sin. This discussion 
leads to further problems.
Schelling’s doctrine of 
redemption
Man’s proclivity to sin and the development of an ineffective or 
heteronomous personality may be rectified through redemption. Three
^Human Freedom, p. 41.
^Human Freedom, p. 66. Also compare below, p. 80f.
^uman Freedom, p. 66.
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aspects of Schelling's doctrine of redemption may be distinguished— Its 
nature, Its dynamics, and Its purpose. I shall discuss each of these 
aspects In turn.
-Redemption, in short. Is the de-absolutlzatlon of selfhood or 
the reduction of selfhood from absolutized actuality to the level of 
potentiality. "Only selfhood which has been overcome, that means 
brought back from activity to potentiality. Is good; and as potential, 
having been overcome by the good Its remains evermore In the good.*'̂  
Schelling adds further that "evil Is bad only Insofar as It goes beyond 
potentiality,"^ that is, goes beyond potentiality to absolutized 
actuality. Redemption Is the act of counter-acting the tendency of 
aroused selfhood to absolutize Itself. Redemption results In effecting 
a new being, or synthesis between the constituent polarities of man's 
being.
Schelling's discussion of the dynamics of redemption presents an 
apparent contradiction. On the one hand, he appears to argue that 
redemption results from a divine action. "As man now is, the good, the 
light as It were, can be produced only out of this dark principle 
through divine transmutation."^ On the other hand, he appears to hold 
that redemption Is the consequence of the natural teleologlcal activity 
of the potencies.
^Human Freedom, p. 80 (emphasis mine). The crucial phrase "from 
activity to potentiality" reads in the German "Aktivitat zur 
Potentialitat." Gutmann, in the translator's notes, suggests "from 
actuality to potentiality," p. 112. This suggested translation, 
although not warranted by the text, is more in keeping with Schelling*s 
thought and comes closer to his probable meaning.
2Human Freedom, p. 85.
%uman Freedom, p. 66.
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In the man in whom this transmutation has not yet 
taken place but in whom, too, the good principle 
has not completely died, there is that inner voice 
of his own better self, (better in respect to him­
self as he now is). It never ceases to urge him to 
accomplish this transmutation, and as he only finds 
peace in his inner self through a real and decisive 
change, he becomes reconciled with his guardian 
spirit as though the original idea had only now 
been satisfied.1
Schelling regards the contradiction as only apparent and not real. His 
vitalistic pantheism entails the truth and reconcilability of both 
these positions. At one level, the urge for transmutation is the nat­
ural expression of man's polarities, while at another level man's 
polarities must be viewed as the externalized expression of God as 
Primoridal Will.
The purpose of redemption is the completion of the théogonie
process through the appropriation of Nature within God as Consequent or
Absolute. God becomes aware of his powers through the agonies of human
life. "Being is only aware of itself in becoming. . . . All history
remains incomprehensible without the concept of a humanly suffering
God."2 Further, man is the turning point within the theogony whereby
the process of God's externalisation is reversed and the process of
internalization is initiated.
Man is the beginning of the new covenant through 
whom, as mediator, since he himself is connected 
with God, God (the last division being attained) 
also accepts nature and takes it to him. Man is 
thus the redeemer of nature towards whom all its 
archetypes strive.^
^Human Freedom. P- 67.
^Human Freedom, p. 84.
^Human Freedom. p. 92.
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But man can serve as the redeemer of nature only if he has attained the 
full realization and integration of his powers as an autonomous 
personality.
Critical Assessment
To this point I have avoided making any extended critical 
assessments of Schelling*s philosophy, seeking instead to render a 
faithful and sympathetic interpretation. There are, however, several 
substantive criticisms which may be directed against Schelling. These 
criticisms fall into two groups— those directed in general against the 
character of Schelling*s system as contained in Human Freedom and those 
directed in particular against his implicit theory of autonomy.
Difficulties regarding 
Schelling*s system
Josiah Royce claims that Schelling*s efforts to develop his 
philosophy in a systematic manner resulted from his close association 
with Hegel in Jena. Hegel had insisted that ''philosophy must become a 
system, or else remain naught."^ Schelling accepted this challenge and 
incorporated it into his lectures during 1800-01. The result was his 
System of Identity. But in his haste to develop a philosophic "system," 
Schelling indulges in some dubious moves which are central to his 
argument in Human Freedom.
The first criticism of his "system" concerns his famous Principle 
of Identity, or that "A is A." Students of philosophy are familiar 
with Hegel* s unkind remark that the Absolute which Schelling derived
^Josiah Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 194.
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from this principle Is "the Infinite night in which all cows are black." 
But in Human Freedom Schelling. reinterprets this principle in the form 
of a conditional proposition, "p implies p." The subsequent differen­
tiation between God as Antecedent or Ground and God as Consequent is 
central to his argument. But how is this reinterpreted Principle of 
Identity to be understood? If he regards the statement "p implies p" 
as referring to entities, then he is guilty of a serious logical error 
since this formulation of the Law of Identity refers to the truth of 
propositions. If he regards "p implies p" as referring to both the 
logical and the ontological orders, then he has failed to delineate the 
relation between the two orders which makes possible the transition 
from the one to the other. Since Schelling does not address himself to 
this question, one of the central features of his argument remains, to 
say the least, shrouded in mystery.
The second criticism of his "system" concerns the extreme 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of rendering meaningful a discussion 
of a theogony within which temporal succession is both present and 
absent. The notion of temporal succession is central to Schelling*s 
discussion of God’s théogonie self-creation within the world. Yet he 
argues that the conquest of personality within God involves a logical 
progression, not a temporal succession. The problem is one of switching 
from a logical progression within the Absolute to a temporal succession 
in Nature (which is, nonetheless, an aspect of the Absolute) without 
having delineated the relationship between the logical and temporal 
orders. Schelling’s failure to face this issue results in his contra­
diction.
Finally, serious consideration must be given Hegel's charge
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concerning the arbitrariness of Schelling's dialectic. Schelling’s 
system frequently appears as an arbitrary dialectical schema within 
which he places many things rather than a dialectic within which things 
appropriately develop. Note, for example, his philosophy of Nature, or 
the real. The details of his philosophy of Nature appear extremely 
arbitrary, if not fanciful.̂  Again, Schelling claims that Fichte’s 
philosophy needs to be complemented by a theory of self-consciousness• 
But Schelling, in spite of his claim, does not adequately explain the 
appearance of self-consciousness. It is presupposed from the beginning.
These criticisms prompt an attitude of justified uncertainty 
regarding the final value of Schelling’s "system." A systematic 
thinker simply should not leave such major issues unresolved.
Schelling, quite simply, is more systematizing than systematic.
Difficulties regarding his 
theory of autonomy
Although his theory of moral autonomy is merely implicit, certain 
critical remarks may be offered regarding both what he does say and what 
he implies. First, while his purpose in Human Freedom is to develop a 
theory of freedom as the possibility of good and evil, his theory is 
seriously truncated by the inclusion of a doctrine of the transcendental 
fall in which all men participate. Thus, his explicit statements depict 
freedom more as a possibility of evil than as a possibility of good.
Second, his explanation of freedom as the possibility of evil 
is seriously biased. His only explicit explanation for the presence of 
evil is the destruction of the polarity of existence due to the aroused
^Compare,, for example, the discussion on page 49.
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selfhood issuing from the first potency. But what about the antithet­
ical aspect of- the second potency? Surely the freedom resulting from 
the interplay of the contraries is equally endangered by the will to 
order, regularity, and permanence arising from the second potency. Dis­
cussion of this possibility is completely lacking in Schelling. Once 
again Schelling appears arbitrary in his development. He has found and 
used what he wanted while failing to explore systematically other possi­
bilities implicit within his own fundamental principles.
Finally, Schelling’s discussion of freedom lacks comprehen­
siveness and concreteness. The comprehensive development of his prin­
ciples of polarity, as well as his theme of freedom as the possibility 
of good and evil, suggests the conclusion that man could be deprived of 
his freedom through the dominance of either the expansive potency or the 
restrictive potency, rather than merely the inevitable result of the 
aroused selfhood arising from the first potency. But his inclusion of 
the religious doctrine of a transcendental fall prevented the possibil­
ity of the loss of freedom through the dominance of the restrictive 
potency. Schelling’s discussion of freedom also lacks concreteness. He 
fails to specify how the polarities are to be synthesized as well as how 
the synthesis is to be maintained. IVhat is needed is a discussion of 
those partial or ineffectual syntheses in which one polarity dominates 
the other and the impact of these ineffectual syntheses upon the con­
sciousness of the individual. In short, Schelling’s theory needs to be 
complemented by a phenonenology of consciousness and its attendant forms 
of anxiety, frustration, and triumph. This is precisely the dimension 
to a concrete theory of autonomy which Kierkegaard develops. To 
Kierkegaard’s treatment we now turn.
CHAPTER II
KIERKEGAARD AS A PHILOSOPHER OP AUTONOMY
The writings of Soren Kierkegaard are at once provocative and
perplexing. A century after his death existential philosophers are
still gleaning the insights scattered across his pages, and Kierkegaard
scholars are still seeking the key which will permit them to hind those
insights systematically into a harvested sheath. As late as 1944 Aage
Henriksen summed up the state of Kierkegaard scholarship as follows:
A point of view which neither violates the totality 
nor the separate parts (of Kierkegaard's authorship)
does not seem to have been attained by anybody. The
core of the authorship has not been penetrated.^
Thompson, in 1972, goes on to suggest "there may be no 'core' of 
Kierkegaard's authorship to be 'penetrated'."^ This seems an unfortu­
nate, and unnecessary, state of affairs in which to leave the issue.
Let it be granted that the bulk and perplexity of Kierkegaard's work, 
coupled with his usage of pseudonyms, have prevented our penetrating the 
core., But our failure to penetrate the core does not warrant the con­
clusion that there is no core or that it will never be discovered.
As to the possibility of the core's non-existence, the sheer 
bulk and the rapidity of production of Kierkegaard's early writings—
^Quoted in Josiah Thompson, Kierkegaard: A Collection of





eight volumes of his aesthetic literature^ and twenty-one edifying 
discourses published during the three-year period between February 1843 
and February 1846— are inexplicable without some sort of supportive 
framework to provide both writer and writings a guiding focus, One 
might understand a literary author, a poet or novelist for example, 
producing a significant number of disconnected works in a relatively 
short time, but one cannot reasonably accept the presumption that a 
philosophical author would produce a number of disconnected works in a 
relatively short period. As to the possibility that the core will never 
be discovered, every alternative should be explored before scholars 
drop the issue. One such alternative is to seek the core which will 
clarify the unity of authorship and illumine its central theses behind 
the authorship rather than merely within it. It is generally recognized 
that Kierkegaard initiated a new philosophical perspective, viz.. 
Existentialism. It is not generally emphasized, however, that this 
perspective did not appear spontaneously within Kierkegaard.
Kierkegaard was a child of his day and was influenced by previous 
thinkers. Accordingly, my purpose in this chapter is two-fold. My 
primary task is to demonstrate the manner in which Kierkegaard may be 
interpreted as having engaged in a thought-experiment to elucidate (1) 
the precise nature of moral autonomy and (2) the conditions which either 
preclude its possibility or contribute to its attainment. My secondary 
task is to establish a reasonable presumption that Schelling was far 
more influential upon Kierkegaard than has been previously appreciated.
llhese eight volumes consist of the two volumes of Either/Or, 
Repetition, Fear and Trembling. Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of 
Dread. Stages on Life's Way, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
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Such an approach will clarify the relation between Schelling and 
Kierkegaard while simultaneously explicating the version of autonomy in 
Kierkegaard's philosophy.
In order to accomplish my dual purpose I shall proceed in the 
following manner. In the first section of this chapter I shall examine 
Kierkegaard's relation to Schelling. As a result of this examination 
I shall hypothesize a modified Schellingean framework as the core of 
Kierkegaard's authorship and the key to his moral philosophy. In the 
second section I shall test this hypothesis against Kierkegaard's 
theoretical discussion of the human self, thereby revealing how his view 
of the self as a synthesis essentially agrees with Schelling's and how 
the self may be autonomous or heteronomous. In the final section I 
shall establish how this hypothesized Schellingean framework is 
compatible, if not coincidental, with Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of 
consciousness as contained in his theory of the three spheres of 
existence and, further, that the purpose of his phenomenology of con­
sciousness is to lead the reader toward autonomy.
Kierkegaard's Relation to Schelling
The relationship between Schelling and Kierkegaard has never been 
completely explored. A few historical facts are indubitable. During 
his last years Schelling came out of retirement and returned to Berlin 
in 1841-42 to lecture on philosophy. His avowed purpose in these 
lectures was a polemic against Hegel’s system. In his audience were 
such contemporaries as Burckhardt, Engels, and Kierkegaard.̂  It is
^Karl Lbwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, Chicago (Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1964), p. 115. Hereafter referred to as Lowith.
85
noteworthy that Kierkegaard and Engels (together with Marx) became the
recognized leaders in the overthrow of Hegelianism around the middle of
the century. Suggesting that their attack was "promoted" by Schelling,
Lowith adds:
We meet all the motifs of his criticism also in 
Feuerbach and Ruge, Marx and Kierkegaard, as well 
as in Trendelenburg, to whose criticism of Hegel,
Kierkegaard frequently refers.1
Unfortunately the nature and extent of Schelling’s influence upon
Kierkegaard and Engels has not been fully investigated. By focusing on
the relationship between Schelling and Kierkegaard I shall contribute
part of that much-needed study.
Only the sketchiest discussions are afforded the Schelling-
Klerkegaard relation in the secondary Kierkegaard literature. Their
relationship is not even mentioned by such standard authorities as
D i e m ,2 Jolivet,^ Arbaugh and Arbaugh,^ and T h o m p s o n .5 Only their early
relationship, consisting of Kierkegaard’s initial infatuation and
disappointment with Schelling as a teacher, is mentioned by Swenson,^
^Lowith. p. 116.
^Herman Diem, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Existence. London 
(Oliver and Boyd, 1959). Hereafter referred to as Diem,
^Regis Jolivet, Introduction to Kierkegaard, New York (E.P. Dutton 
and Co., Inc., n.d.). Hereafter referred to as Jolivet.
^George E. Arbaugh and George B. Arbaugh, Kierkegaard’s Author­
ship, Rock Island, 111. (Augustana College Library, 1967) , Hereafter 
referred to as Arbaugh.
^Josiah Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, Carbondale, 111. (South­
ern Illinois University Press, 1967). Hereafter referred to as 
Thompson.
^David Swenson, Something about Kierkegaard, Minneapolis (Augsburg 
Publishing House, 1941), p. 16. Hereafter referred to as Swenson.
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Lowrie,^ and Croxall.^ The only discussions of Schelling’s possible 
philosophical influence upon Kierkegaard are to be found in Collins^ and 
P r i c e . 4 Both of these treatments are very inadequate and incomplete.
In order to develop a complete treatment of the Schelling- 
Kierkegaard relationship, it is convenient to separate it into three 
aspects: (à) their personal relationship as teacher-student,
(b) Kierkegaard’s rejection of specific doctrines of Schelling, and (c) 
Schelling’s positive doctrinal influence on Kierkegaard.
The teacher-student aspect of 
the Schelling-Kierkegaard 
relationship
While subject to different interpretations, the facts regarding
the teacher-student aspect of the Schelling-Kierkegaard relationship are
rather clear. Kierkegaard’s initial response to Schelling’s lectures
was one of excited infatuation.
I am glad to have heard Schelling’s second'lecture, 
indes^:fi%ably glad. I have sighed long enough, and 
my thoughts have sighed within me. When Schelling 
mentioned the word Virkellghed (actual daily life), 
in connection with the relation of philosophy to
^Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, Gloucester, Mass. (Peter Smith,
1970), pp. 234f. Hereafter referred to as Lowrie.
^T.H. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary, New York (Harper and 
Brothers, n.d.), pp. 11, 33. Hereafter referred to as Croxall.
^James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, Chicago (Henry Regnery 
Co., 1953). Hereafter referred to as Collins.
^George Price, The Narrow Pass, New York (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 
Inc., 1963). Hereafter referred to as Price. Price traces the forma­
tive influence on Kierkegaard’s thought beyond Schelling to Boehme. But 
this is because Price emphasizes only the voluntarism of all three men.
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Vlrkellghed. thought leaped within me as the 
bahe leaped in Elizabeth. I remember almost 
every word he said from that moment on. Here 
perhaps clarity may come. That one word 
reminded me of all my philosophic sufferings 
and pains.^
Kierkegaard's excitment was generated by Schelling's insistence that 
speculative philosophy, through its preoccupation with the abstract and 
universal, had not adequately faced the perplexities of the individual 
in his actual daily life. But Kierkegaard's initial infatuation soon 
gave way to apparent disappointment only four and a half months later. 
His disillusionment is revealed in the following statements :
"Schelling's later lectures have unfortunately little importance"; "I 
have given up Schelling entirely"; and finally, "Schelling drivels 
inordinately."2 In these later lectures, Schelling became entangled in 
abstract theosophical ramblings which, as we shall see shortly, 
Kierkegaard could not tolerate.
The facts regarding the student-teacher relationship, are subject 
to various interpretations. On the one hand, the series of sudden 
attacks on Schelling may be taken at face value, a view all too readily 
adopted by Kierkegaardian scholars. But here, as throughout 
Kierkegaard's writings, one must be aware of his love of irony. The 
attacks may be interpreted as concealing something else. Lowrie^ makes 
the interesting point— quite in keeping with Kierkegaard's temperament—  
that this disenchantment with Schelling was merely his ostensible 
purpose for hastily returning to Copenhagen while his actual reason was
1Croxall. p. 11.
^Lowrie. p. 235. Emphasis mine. 
^Lowrie. p. 235.
88
word that illness had overtaken his beloved, but rejected, Regina. At 
any rate, it is unlikely that a man could be so infatuated over another 
man's lectures (even remembering "every word he said") without retaining 
some lasting benefit from those same lectures. Thus, since the histor­
ical data are inconclusive, it is necessary to undertake a careful 
analysis of Kierkegaard's own writings to determine the extent, if any, 
of Schelling's doctrinal influence on Kierkegaard.
Kierkegaard's rejection of 
Schellingean doctrines
The most obvious difficulty with hypothesizing an influence upon 
Kierkegaard by Schelling is Kierkegaard's widely reported attacks upon 
Schelling in his aesthetic writings. Accordingly, X shall examine 
Kierkegaard's remarks about Schelling to determine (1) the precise 
nature of his attacks and (2) whether his critical remarks preclude the 
incorporation of other elements of Schelling's moral philosophy within 
his own philosophy.
Kierkegaard explicitly refers to Schelling's doctrines fewer than 
a dozen times, and these references usually appear to be deprecatory. 
Several of these references, while revealing, are quite brief. When 
discussing the possible relationship between soul and body, Kierkegaard 
rejects Schelling's "act of corporization" whereby freedom "posits its 
own body."l Again, he dismisses the fanciful "construction of history" 
in Schelling's theogony because it subjects history to the necessary
^Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, Princeton, N.J. 
(Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 121. Hereafter referred to as 
Dread.
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rules of knowledge.̂  And again, he criticizes Schelling for apparently 
limiting the role of dread to the "creative birthpangs of the Deity" 
while neglecting its role in the individual-^
Kierkegaard devotes more attention to Schelling’s doctrine of 
"intellectual intuition" as a new point of departure for philosophy, 
always in conjunction with Hegel’s rejection of Schelling’s new starting 
point. Kierkegaard’s mention of Hegel’s rejection of Schelling has led 
commentators to conclude hastily that Kierkegaard completely approves of 
Hegel’s rather caustic dismissal of Schelling’s doctrine. But a careful 
reading of the passages discloses an element of satire in Kierkegaard’s 
comments. Kierkegaard actually appears to condone Schelling’s recogni­
tion of the need for a new starting point, and to ridicule Hegel’s 
attempt to employ his own Method as such a new starting point, that is, 
to employ the Method to overcome the skepticism inherited from Kant. 
Hegel’s Method, according to Kierkegaard, actually re-situates philos­
ophy within the pre-Kantian assumption that "thought possesses 
reality."3 In Dread Kierkegaard ridicules Hegel for employing the 
"catchwords ’Method and Manifestation,’ to hide what Schelling recog­
nized more openly by the cue ’intellectual intuition and construction,’ 
the fact, namely, that this was a new point of departure."3 Kierkegaard 
then proceeds to criticise Hegel’s Method of Mediation while making no 
further reference to Schelling. In a parallel passage in the Concluding
^Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, Princeton, N.J. 
(Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 98. Hereafter referred to as 
Fragments.
spread, p. 53 footnote.
3pread. pp. 10-11.
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Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard refers to Schelling's "Intellectual 
Intuition" as a new point of departure for limiting the self-reflexive 
skepticism of thought. He then adds: "Hegel regarded this as a fault.
He speaks contemptuously of Schelling's intellectual intuition— and then 
came the Ifethod."̂  Once again Kierkegaard proceeds to criticize the 
Hegelian Method while ignoring Schelling. These two crucial passages 
—reveal that Kierkegaard is actually chiding Hegel for casually dismiss­
ing Schelling while committing a more serious error than Schelling, who 
at least recognized the need for a new point of departure for post- 
Kantian philosophic activity.
In addition, Kierkegaard apparently identifies Schelling's demand 
for a new starting point as an implicit recognition of the need for what 
Kierkegaard's terms "the Leap." Kierkegaard's actual purpose in discuss­
ing Schelling's doctrine of "intellectual intuition" is disclosed in a 
passage treating his (Kierkegaard's) doctrine of the Leap. The Leap
is something that cannot be attained either by 
means of the intellectual intuition of Schelling, 
or by what Hegel, dismissing Schelling's concept 
with disdain, proposes to substitute for it, 
namely, the Method. Tor the leap is neither more 
nor less than the most decisive protest possible 
against the inverse procedure of the Method.^
Whereas Hegel applied his Method only in retrospect, in sharp contrast
Kierkegaard's position is clearly that the Leap carries one forward in
time.
These references to Schelling merely underscore Kierkegaard's
^Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Princeton, 




rejection of the former's idealistic and theosophical tendencies. They 
do not preclude Kierkegaard's appropriating various elements of 
Schelling's implicit theory of autonomy, provided that Kierkegaard can 
establish a foundation for them other than Schelling's idealistic and 
theosophical foundation, which he has rejected.
Schelling's positive influence 
on Kierkegaard
Since Kierkegaard seldom gives credit to those persons whose ideas 
he appropriates, it might appear to be difficult to ascertain 
Schelling’s positive influence on Kierkegaard. In the absence of 
explicit credit, it becomes necessary to look for common themes, common 
terminology, similar moves, and even passages reminiscent of Schelling. 
Schelling’s influence is most easily detected in Kierkegaard's early 
writings where, I shall argue, it serves as a formative element in 
Kierkegaard's subsequent philosophic activity.
One of Kierkegaard's earliest writings, Johannes Climacus or. De 
Omnibus Dubitandum Est,̂  is crucial for my present purpose because, 
although unfinished and published only posthumously, it signals a 
pivotal change in Kierkegaard’s outlook. Apparently written in mid- 
1842, Johannes Climacus stands between his master's thesis. The Concept 
of Irony, and the tremendous literary outburst known as his aesthetic 
writings. The master’s thesis, finished in September of 1841 immedi­
ately prior to his departure for Berlin, where he attended Schelling's
^Soren Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus or. De Omnibus Dubitandum 
-Est, Stanford, California (Stanford University Press, 1958). T.H. 
Croxall, the translator, develops a solid argument for an 1842 date of 
composition. See.p. 17. Hereafter referred to as Johannes Climacus.
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lectures, has a strong Hegelian tone. But his aesthetic literature, 
appearing between February 1843 and February 1846 and after he attended 
Schelling’s lectures, sound a definitely anti-Hegelian note. The 
suspicion that Schelling may have been at least partially responsible 
for the change in Kierkegaard’s outlook is partially substantiated by 
close scrutiny of Johannes Climacus. Johannes Climacus suggests 
Schellingean influence— the themes, the moves, and even the terminology 
appear Schellingean. Schelling’s influence gains importance as one 
realizes that Johannes Climacus contains the seed-bed of Kierkegaard’s 
aesthetic writings. The following analysis of Johannes Climacus is 
designed to display the similarity of the basic themes in both 
Kierkegaard and Schelling.
The first part of Johannes Climacus  ̂is an extended attack on the 
alleged presuppositionless beginning of modern philosophy. Descartes, 
and after him Hegel, had argued that philosophy begins on the presup­
positionless foundation of doubt— "Doubt everything. The first part 
of the work closes with Johannes Climacus concluding that philosophy’s 
foundation of doubt is not as presuppositionless as Descartes and Hegel 
had assumed because they had not explained the origin of doubt. The 
second part, an extremely compact section of only nine full pages, opens
Ĵohannes Climacus is the intellectual biography of a man named 
Johannes Climacus, one of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms and the "author" of 
the Fragments and the Postscript. Thus, the aesthetic literature is 
bracketed between works "written" by Johannes Climacus.
^The first part of the work is an analysis of three propositions. 
The first is Descartes’: I'Everything must be doubted." The second is
Hegel’s: "One must have doubted in order to be brought to philoso­
phize." The third is: "Modern philosophy begins with doubt." See
pp. 115, 116.
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with Johannes Climacus raising the central question as to "why, 
ideally, doubt is possible in the mind or consciousness."^ His answer 
to this question is typically Schellingean: "The possibility of doubt
lies in consciousness, whose very essence is a kind of opposition or 
contradiction. It is produced by, and itself produces, a sort of 
duality."2
But what stands in opposition within consciousness? Again 
Kierkegaard's answer is Schellingean in tone: "The terms of the duality
are reality and ideality."^ Not only does Kierkegaard denote the polar­
ities of consciousness by Schellingean terms, but he also gives the 
terms Schellingean connotations. First, both Schelling and Kierkegaard 
identify "reality" as the realm of nature or the perceived world.^ 
Kierkegaard, however, further characterizes the perceptual realm as the 
realm of immediacy, a realm lacking definite relationships and one in 
which everything is equally true and untrue. Second, Schelling and 
Kierkegaard both identify the other pole of consciousness as "Ideality," 
which is understood as a set of categorical structures which are super­
imposed upon the perceptual realm.^ Ideality annuls the immediacy of 
Reality by introducing definite universal relationships. Consciousness, 
for Kierkegaard, becomes aware of Ideality through language, which is
^Johannes Climacus, p. 146.
^Johannes Climacus. p. 149.
^Johannes Climacus, p. 149. For a discussion of Schelling's
duality of reality-ideality, see above pp.’ 59f
■̂ Johannes Climacus, pp. 147-48.
^Johannes Climacus. pp. 147-48, For Schelling's discussion of the
meaning of "ideality," see above, p. 59.
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the attempt to order and express the perceptual realm according to
abstract universal concepts.
Speech is ideality. For when I speak, I introduce 
opposition . • • Reality I cannot express in speech, 
for to indicate it I use Ideality, which is a contra­
diction, an untruth.^ '
This opposition between Reality and Ideality as exemplified in speech is
the philosophical basis of Kierkegaard's famous doctrine of indirect
communication. Speech, by its very nature, is a falsification of
reality: "For what I say is quite other than what I want to e x p r e s s .
Hence, all communication through speech is only indirectly about
reality.
Third, Schelling and Kierkegaard both characterize consciousness
as the relationship between the polarities of reality and ideality.
"Consciousness then is Relationship, a relationship whose Form or
essence is Opposition."3 Kierkegaard further adds that consciousness,
in his sense of the term, cannot exist in the absence of either of the
polarities. As he phrases it:
Reality is not consciousness, any more than 
ideality is. And yet consciousness is not 
present without both and this opposition or 
contradiction between reality and ideality 
is the origin and essence of consciousness.
The opposition between reality and ideality in consciousness
introduces the element of ambiguity into human existence. "For only at
the moment when ideality is brought into relationship with reality does
^Johannes Climacus. P* 148,
^Johannes Climacus, p. 148.
^Johannes Climacus, p. 153.
^Johannes Climacus, pp.. 149-50.
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possibility ap p e a r . T h e  possibility of truth and untruth occurs as a 
result of a "collision"^ between reality and ideality wlthlr conscious­
ness. The duality of consciousness makes doubt possible, since con­
sciousness at the unreflectlve level can be deceptive. "The possibility 
of doubt then lies in consciousness."3 Hence, the proper foundation of 
philosophy is not doubt but rather that which makes doubt possible, 
namely, the polarities of consciousness.^
Kierkegaard draw three Important implications from the relational 
nature of consciousness. First, the divisions of classifications of 
consciousness are always trichotomous. "For when I say, ’I was con­
scious of such and such _a sense impression*, I mention a trinity (I, 
consciousness, impression).*'^ Schelling had also argued that the divi­
sions of consciousness are trichotomous. Second, Kierkegaard argues 
that "consciousness is spirit."& This is also a typically Schellingean 
move. The full import of these two implications for Kierkegaard * s 
philosophy will be developed later.
^Johannes Climacus. p. 149.
2Johannes Climacus,' p. 153.
^Johannes Climacus, p. 149.
Among the alternative readings not included in the final draft 
of Johannes Climacus. Kierkegaard left some very suggestive remarks 
about the role of doubt. These alternative readings are included in the 
Appendix to the translation of Johannes Climacus— the pagination is 
given in parentheses. "Johannes Climacus perceived that in doubt there 
has to be an act of the will. Otherwise, to doubt would be identical 
with being uncertain"(182). "If then I must emerge from doubt by a free 
act, X must have entered it by a free act— an act of the will"(187) .
"The possibility of doubt is essential to existence. It is the mystery 
of human life"(184).
^Johannes Climacus. p. 151.
^Johannes Climacus. p. 151.
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The third implication is more important, both for Kierkegaard’s 
present concern and for his later writings. Consciousness is a rela­
tionship which is accompanied by concern. The ironical doubt of 
Socrates and the provisional doubt of Descartes are intellectual 
functions, or functions of ideality. Such forms of doubt, according to 
Kierkegaard, are capable of disinterested or passionless reflection, 
and hence, they are ineffectual in dealing with "the experiences and 
adventures in which a man must be tried when setting out to doubt every­
thing,’*̂  The individual consciousness, on the contrary, is the 
attempted synthesis of reality and ideality, and "brings with it inter­
est or concern."^ This concern of consciousness in the affairs of 
actual daily life signals Kierkegaard’s advance beyond Schelling. 
Schelling had limited the concerns of the circuit of selfhood to a 
discussion of the Deity, while Kierkegaard intends to concretize it in 
terms of the individual finite ego.
The second work of Kierkegaard which suggest Schellingean 
influence is Dread. Kierkegaard had originally Intended to issue this 
book as his first attempt at "direct communication" but decided at the 
last moment to publish it under a pseudonym. Lowrie, accordingly, 
argues that "we need not apply to this book S.K.'s emphatic admonition 
not to attribute to him anything that is said by his pseudonym."^
In Dread Kierkegaard raises the question of the origin and meaning 
of original sin in terms of what actually happens within the individual
^Johannes Climacus, p. 144, 
2Johannes Climacus, p. 151. 
Spread, p. x.
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self-consciousness, and not in terms of a metaphysical or theological 
perspective. Hence, Dread must be understood on two levels: the mani­
fest level of the doctrine of original sin and the private level of the 
individual consciousness.
While the theme of the book is the role of dread as the precipi­
tating cause of original sin, its basic premise is identical with 
Schelling’s premise in Human Freedom— the disclosure of freedom as the 
possibility of good and evil (sin).̂  But is man free? And if so, how 
does man become aware of his freedom? Man is free and becomes aware of 
his freedom through the experience of dread. Dread is epistemologically 
prior to freedom, but freedom is metaphysically prior to dread. But 
what is dread, and what occasions man’s awareness of it?
Dread is the experience of vertigo in the face of possibility.
Thus dread is the dizziness of freedom which occurs
when the spirit would posit the synthesis, and free­
dom then gazes down into its ovm possibility, grasping 
at finiteness to sustain itself. In this dizziness 
freedom succumbs.2
I take it as significant that Kierkegaard, in connection with his 
description of dread as the dizziness of freedom, specifically acknowl­
edges Schelling’s discussion of the role of dread in the self-creation
of God,^ Kierkegaard, however, is occupied with applying this notion
spread, p. 19- 
^Dread. p. 55.
^The following quotations from The Ages of the World exemplify 
Schelling*s view of the role of dread in his theogony. The pagination 
is given in parentheses following each quotation- "Since the first 
potency therefore unites in itself opposing powers, of which the one 
always longs for the outside, the other presses back toward the inside, 
hence its life is also a life of vexation ("Widerwartigkeit") and dread 
("Angst"), since it does not know which way to turn and so falls into 
an involuntary, revolving motion"(134). "That original blind life.
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to the finite human consciousness, Kierkegaard adds further that "dread 
is freedom’s reality as possibility for possibility,"^
The term "possibility" is central to his characterization of free­
dom, as well as the totality of Kierkegaard’s thought, and must be 
understood precisely according to his own definition of the term. 
Kierkegaard characterizes possibility as the result of the collision of 
the polarities (reality and ideality) of consciousness.^ Understood in 
this light, dread is the proof not only of man’s freedom but also of 
his heterogeneity.
Kierkegaard identifies the heterogeneous components of man as the 
bodily, the soulish, and the spirit.
Everything turns upon dread coming into view. Man 
is a synthesis of the soulish and the bodily. But 
a synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united 
in a third factor. This third factor is the spirit.
This idea of man as the bodily;and the soulish synthesized by and in
spirit reveals Kierkegaard’s doctrine of the human self. The prospect
of man’s synthesizing the polarities of the bodily and the soulish gives
whose nature is nothing but strife, dread, and contradiction . .
(155), "Pain, dread, and vexation of past life are released, as was 
shown, by that crisis or differentiation of powers"(163). "It is futile 
to try to explain the manifoldness of nature as a peaceful unification 
("Ineinsbildugn") of different powers. All that comes to be can only 
do so in discontent; and as dread is the basic feeling of each living 
creature, so is everything that lives conceived and bom only in violent 
conflict"(211), "The predominant feeling that expresses the conflict of 
tendencies in being, when there is no knowing which way to turn, is that 
of dread ("Angst")"(226).
spread, p. 38.
^See above, p. 93.
Spread, p. 39.
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rise to man’s freedom and ultimately yields a variety of autonomy. But 
how are these three components to be interpreted?
Before focusing attention on the synthesizing spirit, it is 
necessary to concentrate on the constituent elements (the bodily and the 
soulish) which are synthesized. A note of caution must be sounded.
Since Kierkegaard does not employ these terms in any traditional sense 
as denoting substantival entities, I have retained the terms "bodily'* 
and "soulish", rather than "body" and "soul", to avoid confusion, as 
far as possible, with the more traditional usage. "The bodily" and 
"the soulish" bear remarkable similarities to Schelling’s fundamental 
principles of the first and second potencies, and correspond to 
Kierkegaard’s previous ideas of reality and ideality.^ The important 
difference between Kierkegaard’s polarities and Schelling’s potencies 
is that Kierkegaard limits them to the region of consciousness while 
Schelling reifies them as metaphysical principles.
I shall now clarify Kierkegaard’s use of these terms. First, "the 
bodily" refers to reality as perceived by human consciousness. As far 
as consciousness is concerned, there is no such thing as a body in the 
Cartesian substantival sense of res extensa. There are only bodily 
states. Hence, "the bodily" refers to consciousness’ fleeting states of 
perceptual awareness originating within the transient, sensuous, finite, 
perceptual order of reality. Accordingly, in various discussions 
throughout his writings of the syntheses constituting the human self.
Ipor a discussion of Schelling*s potencies, see above, pp.
For a discussion of reality and ideality in Kierkegaard, see above, 
?• 42-47 and p. 93f.
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Kierkegaard refers to the bodily factor as reality, transiency, sensu­
ousness, finitude, or temporality.
Second, "the soulish" refers to ideality as grasped by human 
consciousness. As far as consciousness is concerned, there is no such 
thing as a mind or soul in the Cartesian substantival sense of res 
cogltans■ There are only mental states. Accordingly, "the soulish" 
refers to consciousness' mental states of awareness originating within 
the transcendent, intellectual, infinite, rational order of ideality. 
Hence, in various discussion throughout his writings of the syntheses 
constituting the human self, Kierkegaard refers to the soulish factor 
as ideality, transcendency, intellect, infinitude, or eternity.
Third, "spirit" is the factor which synthesizes the bodily and the 
soulish. Once again it must be emphasized that Kierkegaard does not use 
the term "spirit" in a traditional sense. Hence, Spirit does not 
necessarily refer to the divine in man. Kierkegaard has previously 
identified spirit with consciousness,^ and he proceeds to increase the 
specificity of his concept in three aspects. (a) The first addition 
is that spirit refers to the self. "Man is spirit. But what is spirit? 
Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation 
which relates itself to itself." ' (b) He further enriches the concept
by specifying that the self as spirit refers to self-consciousness. 
Self-consciousness "is the decisive criterion of the self. The more
^See above, p. 95.
^Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto 
Death, Princeton, N.J. (Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 146. The 
latter work will hereafter be referred to as Sickness.
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consciousness, the more s e l f ( c )  Finally, he specifies that self-
consciousness is grounded in the will. "The more consciousness, the
more will, and the more will the more self. A man who has no will at
all is no self; the more will he has, the more consciousness of self he 
«has also." The self as self-consciousness is a synthesis of the bodily 
and the soulish brought about by an act of will. But, since the 
polarities of the self are in constant flux, the self is a perpetual 
becoming. Thus, the self is continually at issue for the self. In 
order to gain and maintain his self, man must continually engage in 
self-consciously synthesizing the polarities of consciousness. To fail 
to synthesize the polarities, to succumb to the dizziness of freedom, is 
to lose the self as spirit or self-consciousness.
In conclusion, it is possible to summarize the similarities in the 
thought of Schelling and Kierkegaard, thereby clarifying the extent of 
the former’s formative influence upon the latter. First, both men 
identify the objective pole of experience as "reality" (or "actuality") 
and^the subjective pole of experience as "ideality." In reference to 
man, Schelling*s "first potency" corresponds to what Kierkegaard calls 
"the bodily" and Schelling’s "second potency" corresponds to what 
Kierkegaard calls "the soulish." Second, both men characterize con­
sciousness as a relationship between the constituent polarities of 
experience. That is, both define man in terms of a dialectic of rela-
^Sickness. p. 162.
^Sickness, p. 162. Kierkegaard’s remark prompts a question re­
garding the locus of the will. Is will the presupposition of con­
sciousness, the result of consciousness, consciousness itself, or a 
fourth element? The same question arises concerning the locus of free­
dom. See below, p. 95, where an answer to both questions is provided.
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tionshlps. Third, both identify the collision between reality and 
ideality as the source of doubt and the possibility of freedom. Fourth, 
both men have a voluntaristic element, although as we shall see shortly, 
this plays a decidedly different role in their philosophies.
A major difference
Though there is evidence of Schelling’s Influence on Kierkegaard, 
there is one major difference between their theories, which serves as 
a prelude to Kierkegaard’s philosophy because it has implications of the 
utmost importance for his dialectical view of man. Whereas Schelling 
had reified his potencies into metaphysical principles, Kierkegaard 
carefully maintains his polarities within the realm of consciousness•
In this manner Kierkegaard extricates his view of man from the sort of 
dubious metaphysical underpinnings employed by Schelling. But it must 
be noted that both men are seeking to come to grips, in their respective 
ways, with the implications of Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Schelling 
attempts to explain the origins of the polarities or antinomies 
resulting from Kant’s philosophy by treating them as expressions of a 
Primordial Will. Kierkegaard, however, merely accepts the polarities as 
given (within consciousness) and then explores their consequences for 
man. Consequently, Kierkegaard’s dialectic focuses on the various ways 
in which consciousness relates to the polarities. Spirit is a relation­
ship, a relationship between the polarities of consciousness. But, as 
we have already observed, it is a relationship accompanied by concern. 
And the highest concern of consciousness is its concern over its own 
self or the manner of the self’s existence. But what are the implica­
tions of this difference for Kierkegaard?
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The first implication concerns the nature of what Schelling and 
Kierkegaard call "spirit#" Schelling had argued that spirit results 
from, or is, the synthesis of the first and second potencies. 
Kierkegaard, however, accepts spirit, along with the bodily and the 
soulish, as part of the given. More specifically, spirit is the third 
term which accomplishes the synthesis of the bodily and the soulish; 
spirit has ontological priority over the bodily and the soulish. Conse­
quently, Kierkegaard adopts a position contrary to much of western 
philosophy. Classical philosophers, according to Kierkegaard’s inter- 
pretion, had regarded the human self as a psychophysical dualism, a 
union of psychic and somatic elements, According to his interpretation 
of the Classical philosophers, they viewed the human self as merely 
a "negative unity", i.e., a unity which is a mere conjunction or inter­
section of two elements. Plato for example had thought of the human 
self as a synthesis of reason and appetite in which the spirit is the 
mere togetherness which unites reason and appetite. But Christianity, 
according to Kierkegaard, had introduced the idea of the spirit as a 
"positive third term." For Christianity, the union of the psychic and 
somatic elements in the self is affected by this third term, which 
Kierkegaard identifies with consciousness. "The self as spirit is the 
natural synthesis of body and soul become conscious of itself and free 
with respect to itself."^ In the Christian view, according to 
Kierkegaard, the spirit (or consciousness) relates itself to each of the 
constituent factors and then again in tuxm to itself. Accordingly, the 
self is not only a synthesis, but a synthesis which rests upon choice.
^Louis Mackey, "The Poetry of Inwardness" in Kierkegaard: A
Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Josiah Thompson, p. 56.
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The second important consequence of restricting the polarities to 
the region of consciousness and then focusing on consciousness is that 
Kierkegaard draws clear distinctions between the terms "actuality",
"the actual", "the possible", and "possibility".^ By "actuality" 
Kierkegaard means the object as it is in-itself or transcendent to 
consciousness, while "the actual" denotes the object as known or grasped 
by consciousness, as immanent within consciousness. "The possible", for 
Kierkegaard, refers to anything which is conceivable. It is the 
possibles, arising from what Kierkegaard calls ideality or the soulish 
which introduce meaning into the sensory manifold, thereby providing it 
with definite relationships from the standpoint of consciousness. 
Kierkegaard makes a further distinction between cognitive and ethical 
possibles. Cognitive possibles result from an act of a thinker but have 
no direct effect on the cognizing subject. They merely introduce mean­
ing into the actual world, thereby effecting its transition from an 
unintelligible to an intelligible state within consciousness. The 
range of cognitive possibles is limited only by the power, or weakness, 
of man's imagination. Ethical possibles also originate from an act of 
the thinker but differ from cognitive possibles in that they effect a 
change in the thinker. Ethical possibles acquire reference when they 
are chosen and appropriated as a model or pattern for the thinker's 
future. Once chosen as a pattern for one's future, possibles are trans­
formed into possibilities. Hence, "possibilities" denotes any possible
^One of the best discussions of these important distinctions is to 
be fond in Paul Holmer's article "On Understanding Kierkegaard" in A 
Kierkegaard Critique, edited by Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup, 
pp. 40-53. Hereafter referred to as HoXmer.
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which has been chosen and willed as a model for one’s future: It Is
willed as a possibility for me.
These Important distinctions may be Illustrated by focusing 
attention on a mountain. As an actuality, the mountain Is what It Is 
In-ltself, Independent of human perception or conceptualization. The 
mountain is actual insofar as It is perceived by man from different 
perspectives or under different lighting and/or climatic conditions•
But man’s sensory awareness of the mountain presents a variety of 
possibles, both cognitive and ethical. As a cognitive possible the 
mountain may be Interpreted In geological terms- as being composed of 
Igneous, metaphorphlc or sedimentary rocks, as containing faults, dikes, 
pressure ridges, ore deposits, etc.; in chemclal terms as composed of 
Iron, silicon, hydrogen, oxygen, etc.; in biological terms as contain­
ing diverse flora and fauna; in aesthetic terms as an object to be 
painted or photographed; in recreational terms as an area to be hunted 
or climbed or skied; In economic terms as timber to be harvested or as 
ore to be mined or as land to be subdivided and sold as homesites; or In 
a host of other possibles whose range is as great as man’s imagination. 
As an ethical possible the mountain may be Interpreted as something to 
provide pleasure or as a natural environment to be preserved and 
protected or as something to inspire religious awe. These ethical 
possibles may then be willed as a model for my future conduct and there­
by transformed Into a possibility.
The third Important consequence of Kierkegaard's focusing on 
consciousness is one of his greatest contributions to philosophy. 
Kierkegaard discovered that these ethical possibles can be described 
from the transcendental standpoint of consciousness, and that these
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possibles can be transformed into specific possibilities which may then
be categorized according to certain fundamental types. His typology of
ethical possibilities presents certain modes in which"man may exist in
the world, certain patterns of conducting one's life. Kierkegaard's
concepts of the possible and possibility provide a key to understanding
his philosophic activity.
Kierkegaard's writings are a public and cognitive 
mode of creating and describing possibles for the
person who choses to entertain them. And the
principle kind of understanding which Kierkegaard's 
writings demand . . .  is every reader's encounter 
with these possibilities.!
Thus, attempts to reduce Kierkegaard's philosophy to an account of his
own psychological make-up or to correlate it with his biography, while
of historical interest, are wrong-headed. They miss the fundamental
thrust of his philosophy, which is to force the reader to encounter the
possibilities for himself and to choose between (or among) them.
The fourth Implication of Kierkegaard's restricting the polarities 
to the region of consciousness is that it leads him to focus on the 
various possible ways in which spirit or consciousness can relate to the 
oppositional factors of the bodily and the soulish. Consciousness may 
relate itself to the bodily factor, or to the soulish factor, or to 
both factors simultaneously. I shall return to this point in the next 
section.
The final implication of restricting the polarities to the region 
of consciousness is that it raises the problem of self-knowledge. Since 
consciousness the relationship between diverse elements, it cannot be
^Holraer. p. 48.
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an object of direct knowledge for itself. As consciousness becomes more 
aware of its duality it also becomes more concerned over itself. The 
self becomes an issue for itself simultaneously with and proportionately 
to consciousness’ increasing awareness of its duality. Further, the 
self cannot be fully understood by being reduced to either of the 
constituent factors. The self cannot be reduced to reality or actuality 
in the sense that immediate sensory experience is actual. Neither can 
it be reduced to ideality, for it cannot be completely described in 
language- Finally, Kierkegaard explicity and repeatedly affirms that 
the self is a synthesis. But so regarded as a synthesis, man is not yet 
a self. The self is a possibility to be achieved; it is not something 
granted to man as a natural endowment. If man were already a self 
through natural endowment, then consciousness would not be accompanied 
by such concern over the self. But if selfhood is a possibility to be 
achieved, it may also not be achieved. This problem of the self and of 
self-knowledge is one of Kierkegaard’s central preoccupations.
Thus, this major difference and its implications leads to the 
conclusion that while Schelling had a possible formative influence upon 
Kierkegaard as revealed in Johannes Climacus and Dread. Kierkegaard went 
beyond Schelling in several important respects which disclose the 
peculiar and distinctive features of his philosophy. The nature of con­
sciousness as a relationship determines both the method and the problem 
of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. The duality within consciousness 
necessitates both his method of indirect communication and his central 
problem of the nature of the human self. Accordingly, I shall turn to 
a more complete analysis of certain aspects of Kierkegaard's theory of
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consciousness and their Implications for his philosophical psychology 
and his ethical theory,
A hypothesis
Sufficient data regarding the reasonable supposition of 
Schelling*s formative Influence upon Kierkegaard and his own advance 
beyond Schelling have now been gathered to justify formulating a 
hypothesis which will guide my subsequent discussion. Spirit's concern 
over the character and quality of the self ""s existence gives rise to the 
central theme of Kierkegaard's philosophy. This theme may be stated as 
an existential Imperative: Choose thyself! Understood In this light,
Kierkegaard's philosophy Is a phenomenology of man's spiritual develop­
ment and Is concerned (1) with describing the various ways In which man 
attempts to become a self and (2) with disclosing the adequacies and 
Inadequacies of these various attempts. In short. It Is a careful and 
detailed descriptive analysis (1) of the more obvious and prevalent 
ways in which consciousness relates to Its constituent polarities and 
(2) of their practical Impact on the men involved.
Kierkegaard's typology of possibilities focuses on three 
fundamental attempts to become a self, which he designates as the 
aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. A recurrent question In the 
secondary literature Is, Why does Kierkegaard focus on only three such 
attempts to become a self? The hypothesis which X am advancing provides 
a clear answer to this question. Given the polarities within con­
sciousness (reality or the bodily, and Ideality or the soulish), there 
are a limited number of possible relationships. (1) If consciousness 
remains Insensitive to the polarities, then a deliberate effort to
109.
become a self Is precluded. In this case we have the mode of human life 
which Kierkegaard calls "the public." (2) Consciousness may relate 
Itself to the bodily and Ignore, In whole or In part, the soulish. In 
this case we have the "aesthetic" sphere. (3) Consciousness may choose 
to relate Itself to the soulish and Ignore, In whole or In part, the 
bodily. In this case we have what Kierkegaard calls the "ethical" 
sphere. (4) Finally, consciousness may choose to relate Itself or 
choose Itself In both the polarities by maintaining a balance between 
them. This Is what Kierkegaard calls the "religious" sphere. I shall 
argue, further, that the first three possibilities yield forms of 
moral heteronomy while only the religious yields what Kierkegaard 
considers to be a form of moral autonomy.
But if there are three possible ways In which man may choose to 
become a self, how is he to choose among them? Kierkegaard’s response 
Is that the choice must be "irrational" In the sense that It must be 
made In the fact of "objective uncertainty." Given the three spheres, 
one can only choose— Indeed he must choose If he Is to become a self—  
among them without logical or rational criteria to guide or justify his 
choice. Such a choice Is accompanied, consequently, by dread or 
anxiety.
Kierkegaard's claim that the choice must be made In the face of 
objective uncertainty Is reminiscent of the claim of Fichte and 
Schelling that a choice between the philosophies or realism and idealism 
cannot be made on the theoretical level but must be made on the 
practical level. Fichte had argued that the "sort of philosophy one
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chooses depends on what sort of man one Is.”  ̂ Schelling had argued 
that both realism and idealism eventually lead to the theoretical 
annihilation of the self and that the self can only be rescued by 
synthesizing realism and idealism.% Kierkegaard can be interpreted as 
arguing that one's choice of a philosophical outlook is essential to the 
type of self one becomes « Hence, the choice of a philosophical 
perspective cannot be made on the theoretical level alone. In fact, 
given the all important task of becoming a self, Kierkegaard is 
indirectly suggesting that one should choose a philosophical, outlook 
conducive to and productive of the type of self one chooses to become.
A choice among the three spheres cannot be made by juxtaposing them on 
the theoretical level. At the theoretical level, each sphere is 
complete, mutually exclusive of the others, and capable of standing its 
ground against the others. The choice must be made at the practical 
level in terms of the impact of each sphere on the self which is forged 
by each choice. Kierkegaard carefully preserves this distinction 
between theoretical irrefutability and practical adequacy: failure to
observe this distinction can only result in a confusing distortion of 
Kierkegaard's philosophy.
But while Kierkegaard cannot demonstrate the superiority of any of 
the spheres at the theoretical level, it is clear that his personal 
conviction is that the religious sphere is superior, at least at the 
practical level. Kierkegaard, in fact, attempts to communicate 
indirectly the superiority of the religious sphere through various
^See above, p. 33. 
^See above, p. 35ff.
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personae depicted in his aesthetic literature- The superiority cannot 
be "proved" cognitively at the theoretical level; rather it be
"accepted" at the practical level.
Kierkegaard’s manner of demonstrating the superiority of the 
religious sphere at the practical level is related to another recurrent 
question in Kierkegaardian scholarship. This peripheral issue concerns 
the status of those forms of consciousness which Kierkegaard designates 
as "irony" and "humor." Do these constitute two additional spheres, or 
merely boundary zones separating the three explicit spheres? According 
to my hypothesis "irony" and "humor" are merely boundary zones between 
the aesthetic and the ethical, respectively. They serve a vital role, 
however, because they indirectly disclose the inadequacies, at the 
practical level, of the relationships constituting the aesthetic and the 
ethical spheres.
The Nature of the Human Self 
Considered Theoretically
Numerous difficulties are encountered in Kierkegaard’s discussion 
of the human self. These difficulties arise in part because of the 
language Kierkegaard employs when discussing the self. He not only uses 
terms which may be unfamiliar to the contemporary reader, but, what is 
worse, occasionally uses familiar terms in unfamiliar ways. And these 
difficulties also arise in part because of his method of approaching the 
topic. Kierkegaard repeatedly asserts that the self becomes an issue 
for itself, or a consciousness characterized by a concern for itself, 
because of the duality within consciousness. And his writings are 
designed to intensify this concern by forcing his reader to confront the
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various possibilities of being a self. Moreover, Kierkegaard actually 
offers two discussions of the self. First, he presents a theoretical 
discussion of the self In such works as The Concept of Dread and The 
Sickness unto Death. Second, through the medium of his various 
pseudonyms and personae in such works as Either/Or, Stages on Life's 
Way, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript he presents a portrayal 
of the manner in which the aesthetic, ethical and religious individuals 
attempt to achieve selfhood. The theoretical discussion presents the 
problems of achieving selfhood from the perspective of an impartial, 
objective thinker, while the dramatic discussion presents the problems 
of achieving selfhood from the perspective of "concrete" persons 
actually involved in becoming or choosing a self within the limits of 
the various possibilities.
In this present section I shall concentrate on his theoretical 
discussion of the self, reserving the dramatic presentation for the 
final section of this chapter. X shall argue that the theory of con­
sciousness and its implications for selfhood previously encountered in 
Johannes Climacus provide the foundation and key to his later theo­
retical discussion of the self. X shall argue further that the view of 
selfhood which Kierkegaard develops in his theoretical discussion (1) is 
his personal preference, (2) yields an interpretation of selfhood where­
in the self is autonomous, and (3) corresponds to what he terms the 
religious possibility of becoming a self.
Some preliminary remarks are in order concerning the status of 
Dread and Sickness within the Kierkegaardian corpus. Since X have
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previously discussed the status .of Dread,̂  those remarks need not be 
repeated. Regarding Sickness, there is general argeement among 
Kierkegaard scholars that, while published under a pseudonym, it 
occupies a peculiar position within the Kierkegaardian corpus. Several 
reasons may be adduced in support of its peculiarity. First, Sickness 
belongs to the religious, not the aesthetic, literature, and there is 
general agreement that the religious literature of the Kierkegaardian 
corpus is the expression of Kierkegaard's own preference for becoming a 
self. Second, he had initially intended to publish it under his own 
name but finally reached an agonizing decision to issue it under a 
pseudonym.^ Third, the new pseudonym, Antl-Climacus, is not only new 
but also presents a new type of pseudonym!ty. Anti-Climacus is not a 
persona or exemplification of a certain choice of selfhood but a nom de 
plume designed to protect the author from personal attack. With this 
new type of pseudonym Kierkegaard wishes to avoid the possible criticism 
that he regarded himself as superior to his readers, as having attained 
the perfect Christian life. Hence, Anti-Climacus can discuss the 
rigorous demands of the Christian life, and Kierkegaard, as an'existing 
individual, can continue to strive toward the heights portrayed by 
Anti-Climacus. As Lowrie says in the introduction to his translation, 
"here . . . every word can be regarded as his o w n . Sickness is 
direct, not indirect, communication* Finally, Dread and Sickness. along 
with Fear and Trembling, form a trilogy that Kierkegaard intended to
^See above, p. 96f.
^For a discussion of this point, see Lowrie, p. 456f. 
^Sickness, p. 138.
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provide an analysis of three fundamental human experiences— dread or 
anxiety, fear, and despair— encountered in achieving selfhood. In con­
clusion, Dread and Sickness may be regarded as occupying a peculiar 
status among Kierkegaard's writings.and as expressing Kierkegaard's own 
preference for selfhood. I shall now proceed to analyze the concept of 
selfhood outlined in these two works.
The polarities of consciousness
Kierkegaard repeatedly states that man is a synthesis, and that 
regarded as a synthesis he is not yet a self. Three questions may be 
raised about this statement: \fhat is to be related in this synthesis?
What does he mean by "synthesis"? and TJhat does it mean to say that 
man is not yet a self?
In reference to the various factors to be related in the synthesis 
comprising man, Kierkegaard identifies four sets of polarities. These 
polarities are the bodily and the soulish, the temporal and the eternal, 
the infinite and the finite, and possibility and necessity.
Kierkegaard's discussion of the first two sets of polarities plays an 
integral role in Dread, while his discussion of the last two sets of 
polarities plays a vital role in Sickness. Preparatory to analyzing 
these polarities, it must be remembered that these polarities exist 
within consciousness. Kierkegaard does not regard them as metaphysical 
principles productive of man but rather as given within consciousness. 
Bearing this point in mind, we may both comprehend what Kierkegaard says 
regarding the self as a synthesis and avoid some wrong-headed criticisms 
which are occasionally directed against his philosophy.
First, consciousness is polarity of^the bodily and the soulish in
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which spirit is the third term which effects or accomplishes the 
synthesis.^ Consciousness becomes aware of two antithetical types of 
being——the bodily and the soulish— within itself. We have previously 
seen that Kierkegaard, in Johannes Climacus- identifies "reality” as 
that which is perceptually known by consciousness and "the bodily" as 
that whereby man becomes perceptually aware of reality.^ In addition, 
he identifies "ideality" as a set of categorical structures which are 
superimposed upon the perceptual realm and "the soulish" as that whereby 
man introduces definite relationships and meaning into the perceptually 
given.^ Kierkegaard’s discussion, to this point, is strongly reminis­
cent of Kant’s discussion of empirical cognition. But given the overall 
moral thrust of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, it is only reasonable to 
conclude that he is attempting to transcend and correct Kant’s theories 
on a vital point. Kierkegaard is concerned with providing what might 
be termed a transcendental aesthetic of moral sensibility.^ Hence, 
whereas Kant had assumed an irreconcilable conflict between the demands 
of practical reason and the inclinations (appetites) of the body which 
led him to conceptualize reason as exercising a repressive control over 
the bodily appetites, Kierkegaard argues that the bodily appetites-must 
be integrated with the demands of reason in order to produce man as a 
synthesis. In other words, the self is to be a synthesis of the bodily
spread, p. 39.
^See above, pp. 93 and 99.
^See above, pp. 93f and 100-
^Compare George Schrader, "Kant and Kierkegaard on Duty and 
Inclination" in Kierkegaard; . A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by 
Josiah Thompson, p. 327.
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and the soulish wherein the bodily appetites provide the thrust or 
dynamics of human action and the soulish provides the direction or focus 
of those actions. Hence» while neither of the polarities is reducible 
to the other, neither must they be interpreted as expressing an 
inevitable and irreconcilable conflict: they may be integrated. In
fact Kierkegaard asserts that man's sensuous appetites become sinful 
only when the tension between the bodily and the soulish becomes 
disrupted through dread in such a way that consciousness succumbs to the 
dread and attempts to sustain itself in the finiteness of the bodily to 
the exclusion of the soulish.^
Second, Kierkegaard states that consciousness is a polarity of the 
temporal and the eternal. He characterizes this pair of polarities as 
being fundamentally different from the first pair. Whereas the former 
synthesis was a relationship involving three terms (a synthesis of the 
soulish and the bodily sustained by spirit), the present synthesis "has 
only two factors: the temporal and the eternal."^ A few pages later he
adds that this synthesis is the consequence and expression of the first 
synthesis. "The synthesis of the eternal and temporal is not a 
second synthesis, but is the expression for the first synthesis in 
consequence of which man is a synthesis of soul and body sustained by 
spirit."^ Evidently this synthesis is not fashioned in the same manner 
as the former one and occupies a somewhat different status from the
Ipread, pp. 51-57, 
Spread, p. 76. 
Spread, p. 79.
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first one. A consideration of the constituent polarities of this syn­
thesis will clarify both the nature and the status of this synthesis.
Whatever else Kierkegaard nay mean by characterizing consciousness 
as a polarity of the temporal and the eternal, one fundamental point 
emerges. He regards the self as a composite of (a) that which is in its 
own nature successive and (b) that which is in its own nature non- 
successive. On the one hand, the self as a temporal or successive being 
develops in response to a constantly changing variety of temporal 
stimuli. That is to say, the self's perceptual and emotional states are 
constantly changing. On the other hand, the self as an eternal or 
non-successive being is a being possessing a certain continuity or 
identity throughout all of its successive temporal states. How do these 
two polarities originate and, more important for Kierkegaard, how can 
they be related or synthesized in man?
Employing Kierkegaard's own hint that this synthesis is an 
expression of the first synthesis it is possible to further clarify his 
intended meaning. Time as inner sense is applicable to both bodily and 
soulish states, but it is applicable in different ways. On the one 
hand, time as the temporal or as grasped from the perspective of the 
bodily must be interpreted as an infinite succession of discrete 
moments each of which is a process, a going-by. Hence, time cannot be 
legitimately divided into the past, the present, and the future. Viewed 
from the perspective of the bodily, time is merely the going-by of the 
present. On the other hand, time as the eternal or as grasped from the 
perspective of the soulish is that which introduces definiteness between 
and continuity among these discrete moments. "For thought, the eternal
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is the present as an annulled (aufgehoben) succession-"^ Moreover, 
represented visually in terms of spatiality, "eternity is a going- 
f o r t h . I n  short, time is a going-by when considered from the stance 
of the bodily and a going-forth considered from the stance of the 
soulish. Thus, the polarities of the temporal and the eternal originate 
from the application of time as inner sense to the polarities of the 
bodily and the soulish respectively. But how can the temporal and the 
eternal be synthesized?
The intersection or union of these two polarities yields what
Kierkegaard terms "the instant", which becomes a central category of his
philosophical anthropology.
The instant is that ambiguous moment in which time 
and eternity touch one another, thereby positing 
the temporal, where time is constantly intersecting 
eternity and eternity constantly permeating time,^
Through positing or constituting the instant, consciousness or spirit 
posits the parts of its duration into a unified, continuous whole and 
also gains awareness of the future as.the possible. Thus, the polari­
ties of the temporal and the eternal are synthesized by and within con­
sciousness, and the possibility of their synthesis is contingent upon 
recognizing and synthesizing the polarities of the bodily and the 
soulish.
Third, consciousness is a polarity of the finite and infinite. 
Kierkegaard's discussion of these polarities and their synthesis 




Unlimited &lT£Lpoy)^ and Schelling’s discussion of the First and Second
Potencies.2 Kierkegaard, in fact, explicitly states (1) that the finite
3is the limiting factor while the infinite is the expansive factor, and 
(2) that "infinitude and finitude both belong to the
s e l f . "4 Such an unequivocal reference to Plato invites a brief 
investigation of Plato's discussion of the principles of the Unlimited 
(infinitude) and the Limit (finitude) in order to gain a possible clue 
to Kierkegaard's usage of these terms. In general Plato regarded the 
Unlimited and the Limit as two of the ultimate metaphysical principles 
which, when combined or integrated by the Cause or creative agent in 
response to the motivational factor of Eros, yields the actual world or 
the M i x e d .5 More specifically, the Unlimited is the factor of 
indefiniteness, the absence of boundaries, or sheer multiplicity. The 
Unlimited as such is the merging of all forms or the absence of 
individuation, and the principle of objective vagueness and confusion 
in nature. The Limit, on the other hand, is the principle of order 
which introduces organization and distinctness into nature and sets 
boundaries within the flux.
In this light we may take Kierkegaard to be developing a theory of 
the self's origin analogous to Plato's theory of the world's origin.
^See, for example, Philebus 14-18, 23-30.
^See above, p. 42f and p. 46f.
^Sickness, p. 163,
^Sickness, p. 168.
^I am indebted here to Raphael Demos' discussion of this topic in 
his work. The Philosophy of Plato. Demos argues that the five principle 
principles of the Unlimited, the Limit, the Mixed, the Cause and Eros 
are the keys to Plato's philosophy.
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The self's actual existence Is a mixture characterized by a perpetual 
tension between two primordial factors, the finite and the Infinite.
The self as finite recognizes Itself, on the one hand, as limited by 
physiological, historical, social and conceptual factors, and, on the 
other hand, as capable of Infinite or Indefinite development within 
those limits. The self as Infinite expands Its horizons through the 
faculty of the Imagination.^ "Imagination is the reflection of the 
process of Inflnltlzlng"^ whereby the productive Imagination expands Its 
horizons through the media of feeling, knowledge, and will. Man 
recognizes the potential of securing either Innumerable sensory 
experiences of or factual data about the world and recognizes the 
Innumerable possibilities or choices for acting within the world. But 
the Imagination becomes "fantastical" when It "so carries a man out Into 
the Infinite that It merely carries him away from himself,thereby 
volatilizing the self through feeling, knowledge, or will.
Consequently, limits must be Imposed upon the Inflnltizlng process. The 
self as finite Imposes limitations or restrictions upon those 
Innumberable possibilities by appropriating specific possibilities as 
his own while forfeiting other possibilities. But the limiting or 
flnltlzlng process also contains a potential danger If It excludes the 
Inflnltizlng process. It may result In man's "defrauding" himself of a 
self by losing his self In socially Institutionalized mores established 
by previous generations.
The actual or concrete self, then. Is analogous to the Mixed or
^Sickness, p. 163. 
^Sickness, p. 164-
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the actual world In Plato's cosmology. And consciousness is the Cause 
or creative agent which fashions the self by integrating the finite and 
the infinite in response to Eros or, to use Kierkegaard's preferred term 
when discussing the formation of the self, passion. Thus, Kierkegaard 
argues that "the self is the conscious synthesis of infinitude and 
finitude which relates itself to itself, whose task is to become itself" 
and, further, that to become a concrete self means to become neither 
finite nor infinite but rather to become a synthesis of the two.^ 
Choosing or creating the self is a process of becoming which may be 
likened to a spiral in which the self engages in constant self­
transcendence by oscillating between the infinite and the finite without 
permitting either polarity to disrupt the interplay between them. In 
this way the self is (a) self-determining and (b) self-determined. The 
self consists or exists in the perpetual interplay between the 
infinitizing and the finitizing processes, or in "moving away from 
oneself infinitely by the process of infinitizing oneself, and in 
returning to oneself infinitely by the process of finitizing.
Fourth, Kierkegaard declares that consciousness is a polarity of 
possibility and necessity, and his discussion of this pair of polarities 
is by far the most complex and perplexing of the four. Kierkegaard's 
intention in discussing this crucial point is clearer and less 
problematic than his demonstration of the point. As to his intention, 
he raises the issue of possibility in an effort (a) to establish freedom 
within the range of human experience, i.e., to refute determinism in
^Sickness. p. 162. 
^Sickness, p. 162f.
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general, and (b̂  to overcome the particular sort of determinism inherent 
in Hegel's doctrine of "transition," i.e., that human history, whether 
Individually or collectively, is an unfolding of necessity. By freeing 
human experience from the control of necessity, Kierkegaard intends to 
make room for freedom, responsibility, and ultimately faith in the life 
of the concretely existing individual. He raises the issue of necessity 
in an effort to provide continuity or history to the life of the 
individual and responsibility for that history.
Kierkegaard's demonstration of this point rests on two separate 
arguments. He presents, on the one hand, what I shall term the "logico— 
metaphysical" argument,̂  and, on the other hand, what I shall term his 
"existential" argument. I shall concentrate on this latter argument 
since I think it is more consistent with the principles which 
Kierkegaard laid down in Johannes Climacus and sheads more light on the 
hypothesis which I am developing. This existential argument is 
important because it transfers the discussion of moral autonomy from a 
metaphysical to an epistemological foundation. Kierkegaard, however.
^Kierkegaard presents this argument in the "Interlude" which he 
introduces into the Philosophical Fragments. The logical aspect of the 
argument is based on a corrected version of Aristotle's discussion of 
the relationships between necessity, possibility, contingency and 
actuality. As a result of his argument, Kierkegaard claims that 
Actuality is the relation of Necessity and Possibility rather than 
Possibility and Actuality being related by Necessity. Thus, he states, 
"all coming into existence takes place with freedom, not necessity"
(p. 93), thereby establishing spontaneity within the natural realm. 
Finally, he elevates freedom or indeterminism to a metaphysical status 
and presents what might be termed a Voluntaristic Argument for the 
existence of God, or as he states it, "the operation of a relatively 
freely effecting cause . . . points ultimately to an absolutely freely 
effecting cause"(p- 94). This entire argument, while of no little 
importance, diverts Kierkegaard from what I consider his stronger 
argument as well as his major interest in human existence.
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does not develop this line of reasoning in any one place, and so the 
several parts of the argument must be gleaned from various parts of his 
writings. I offer the following reconstruction of the general features 
of his argument.
The key to Kierkegaard’s argument is his discussion of the dual 
nature of consciousness, or the dual manner in which consciousness is 
aware of its world. Man as consciousness, on the one hand, interprets 
his past as controlled by the laws of necessity, i.e., that each event 
in his history has been caused by a prior event. But man as con­
sciousness, on the other hand, interprets his future as having possi­
bility, i.e., that there is spontaneity or indeterminacy in his world 
and that the presence of this possibility demands purposive choice of 
the individual. Thus, to say that the world possesses necessity and 
possibility is to make an epistemic statement about man’s knowledge of 
the lived-world. This point is further substantiated by Kierkegaard’s 
distinctions between actuality, the actual, the possible, and 
possibility mentioned earlier.^ Kierkegaard takes seriously Kant’s 
distinction between the world as it is in-itself and the world as it is 
known. Thus, by ’’actuality” Kierkegaard refers to the world as it is in 
itself, while by "the actual” he refers to the world as it is known by 
man. But in the very act of employing what Kant called theoretical 
reason to formulate his knowledge of the world man also employs what 
Kant called the practical reason and assigns meaning or value to the 
world as known. It is through assigning value to the world that man 
becomes aware of what Kierkegaard calls possibles. These possibles
^See above, pp. 104f.
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present alternative courses of action to man, and whichever course of 
action he chooses becomes a possibility for him.
Having identified necessity and possibility as diverse aspects of 
human knowledge, Kierkegaard does not attempt to reduce either of them 
to the other or to derive one from the other. He regards both necessity 
and possibility as legitimate and indispensable ingredients in man's 
knowledge of the world. And as elements within human knowledge in 
general, they also serve a vital role in man's knowledge of himself. As 
applied to the individual, necessity refers to those aspects of the 
individual which affect what one is but which were acquired beyond one's 
control. Necessity, as such, is inclusive of man's "facticity," i.e., 
his past and his present socio-cultural matrix, and of man's "nature," 
i.e., a man's natural desires and dispositions as a natural being. 
Possibility, on the one hand, refers to that whereby the individual 
ex-ists or "stands-out" from the natural environment which constitutes 
his necessity. Possibility is a subjectively posited telos resulting 
from a resolute choice of a specific possible. It-is a self-chosen 
goal which yields simultaneously an appropriate means or life-style for 
comporting oneself toward one's subjectively posited goal. Freedom is 
manifested in, and made possible by, the subjective appropriation of 
necessity and possibility. "The self is freedom. But freedom is the 
dialectical element in the terms of possibility and necessity.In 
this dialectical interplay the necessity which dominates man's being qua 
natural being is cancelled as an absolute determining factor and pre­
served as a dynamic but relative factor by being integrated with Pdssi-
^Sickness, p. 162.
125
bility. Thus» the self as actuality is a synthesis of necessity and 
possibility. Or, as Kierkegaard phrases it, • . actuality is a unity 
of possibility and necessity"^ which implies that without such a unity 
of possibility and necessity the self does not exist in actuality but is 
an unrealized possibility.
Kierkegaard’s doctrine of freedom as a dialectical interplay 
prompts a crucial question about the locus of freedom. Is this freedom 
present as the cause or as the consequence of the dialectical 
interplay?^ An answer to this question demands a distinction between 
two different meaning of freedom within Kierkegaard’s philosophy. On 
the one hand, freedom is present as the cause of the interplay in the 
sense that freedom is the ontological reality of man. It is this 
ontological sense of freedom which man first experiences through the 
phenomenon of dread. On the other hand, freedom is the consequence of 
this interplay in the sense that freedom becomes an ethical reality for 
man. Ontological freedom acquires ethical significance or becomes an 
ethical reality when it is preserved as an essential element in man’s 
actual lived experience.
Ontological freedom can be exercised in such a way that it may be 
either preserved or forfeited. If ontological freedom is preserved as 
an ethical reality, then man’s existence is autonomous or self-deter­
mining . If ontological freedom is forfeited, then man’s existence 
becomes heteronomous• It is one of the great paradoxes of human
^Sickness, p. 169.
^The answer to this 
previous question regarding the locus of the will. See above, p. 101.
question also provides an answer to the
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existence that man through a free choice can forfeit his ontological 
freedom and fail to realize freedom as an ethical reality.
Thus, we have the answer to the first question mentioned earlier.1 
The self is to be a synthesis achieved by relating four sets of 
polarities: the bodily and the soulish, the temporal and the eternal,
the infinite and the finite, and necessity and possibility. But this 
raises the second question mentioned earlier:^ In what sense is the 
self a "synthesis?" This question leads quite naturally to the issue of 
the nature of thé dialectic employed by Kierkegaard. The Kierkegaardian 
dialectic can be best characterized as a "tri-lectic," that is, it is a 
relation between three factors wherein two polarities are integrated by 
the third factor without neutralizing any of the factors. Consciousness 
as ontological freedom is the factor which relates itself to each of the 
polarities and in turn relates each of the polarities back to itself as 
ontological freedom, thereby achieving ethical freedom.
We are now in a position to answer the third question raised
above,2 i.e., in what sense is man as a synthesis to be regarded as not
yet a self? Kierkegaard’s statement contains an ironical attack upon
Hegel. Regarded as a synthesis in the Hegelian sense, man is not yet
a self. Hegel regarded the dialectical synthesis as the mediation
between opposites; For Kierkegaard, the dialectic is conceived as a
perpetual interplay, rather than a neutralization, of opposites. Hence,
the self, for Kierkegaard,' may be characterized as
this particular self-consciousness or this relating, 
intermediate being which relates its various aspects.
^See above, p. 114. 
^See above, p. 114.
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functions, states, or capacities to itself in 
a dynamic, 'moving* synthesis which is never 
finished or complete in time as long as this 
being exists.1
The self is not a static or finished synthesis but rather a dynamic, 
dialectical synthesis characterized by unending striving. The self as 
ethical reality is an insecure and straining synthesis wherein the 
various polarities are related by consciousness without their being 
neutralized. And, since the various polarities are continually being 
experienced in various ways, the synthesis must be constantly renewed 
and maintained. Hence, Kierkegaard says that the . . self, every 
instant it exists, is in process of becoming . . If man's
ontological freedom is preserved by means of the synthesis as an ethical 
reality, then man's self exists as autonomous or self-determining. If 
man's ontological freedom is forfeited, then man's self acquires a 
heteronomous existence. I shall analyze each of these forms of 
existence in the next two sections.
Man as heteronomous; despairing
Although man is a set of polarities, the terms of that polarity 
are not automatically or unconsciously integrated. They must be 
integrated by an act of will. But most men, judging from Kierkegaard's 
portrayal, fail to will (or will not to will) the integration of the 
polarities. That is, they fail to transform freedom as an ontological 
possibility into a concrete lived existence. Thus, they forfeit their
^George J. Stack, "Kierkegaard: The Self as Ethical Possibility"
in Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, III, 3, p. 59.
^Sickness, p. 163.
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ontological freedom. This is what Kierkegaard apparently means when he 
refers to man's loss of the true (authentic?) self. Several questions 
may be raised concerning man's forfeiture of ontological freedom.
First, why do some men forfeit their ontological freedom, or why do they 
fail to transform their ontological freedom into ethical freedom? This 
question involves both the motivation and the means whereby a man may 
forfeit his ontological freedom. Second, how does a man become aware, 
if he can, of his forfeiture of ontological freedom? Third, from a 
theoretical standpoint, what modes of existence are acquired by the man 
who has forfeited his ontological freedom? And finally, what justifies 
characterizing these resulting modes of existence as heteronomous? I 
shall answer these questions in the present section.
First, why do some men forfeit their ontological freedom, thereby 
failing to achieve concrete ethical freedom? The answer to this 
question must be sought in the nature of consciousness as characterized 
by Kierkegaard. The duality of consciousness produces special problems 
in reference to self-knowledge. When applied to the self, the 
polarities of consciousness result in an initial epistemic uncertainty 
because no single polarity ca*. provide an interpretation of the self 
which is satisfactory to the other polarities and the various inter­
pretations of the self arising from each polarity do not automatically 
fit together to form a complete understanding of the self. Moreover, 
this epistemic uncertainty produces an ontological insecurity. This 
ontological insecurity is most clearly detected in the experience of 
dread, which also discloses the possibility of freedom. Consequently, 
the self according to Kierkegaard, may be said to seek to overcome 
epistemic uncertainty and ontological insecurity by identifying itself
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with one of the polarities. Hence, man is motivated to forfeit his 
ontological freedom in an effort to escape the dread which accompanies 
his awareness of freedom.
By considering the outcome of the motivation to forfeit his 
ontological freedom it is possible to ascertain the means or conditions 
whereby the self can forfeit its freedom. Freedom is forfeited whenever 
there is a disrupture or disintegration of the polarities of con­
sciousness. Such a disruption occurs whenever consciousness focuses its 
attention upon one of the polarities to the subordination and/or neglect 
of the other polarity. It is precisely this disruption of the polari­
ties or failure to posit a synthesis of the polarities which Kierkegaard 
designates as man’s "original sin," although it is unclear whether he 
intends "original sin" to refer to an actual disruption of what was 
previously integrated or merely an awareness of what has not yet been 
integrated.^
Second, how does man become aware of the fact that he has for­
feited his ontological freedom? In a word, despair, according to 
Kierkegaard, discloses the fact that freedom has been lost. As dread 
reveals the possibility of freedom, so despair discloses a partial or 
total loss of freedom. . But what is despair? Despair is an internal
^Kierkegaard, in an important comment, provides two instantiations 
of sin as a disruption: "When then the possibility of freedom manifests
itself before freedom, freedom succumbs, and the temporal now emerges in 
the same way as did sensuousness with the significance of sinfulness" 
(Dread, p. 81). Thus, the separation of the temporal from the eternal 
as well as the bodily from the soulish is sin. By "sensuousness" 
Kierkegaard does not mean simply the erotic or the sexual (which are 
modes of sensuousness) but rather an existence dominated by sensory 
awareness. He also refers to tlsérs.̂ type of existence, as we shall see 
later, as the aesthetic.
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alienation or a characteristic of a mode of existence in which the self 
is alienated from part of Itself, Kierkegaard variously describes 
despair as a sickness,1 a disrelationship of the self in relation to 
itself,^ a sickness unto death,^ and a sickness of the spirit.^ Thus, 
consciousness is self-corrective, at least in the sense that despair 
discloses that something is amiss within the self. Hence, in analyzing 
Kierkegaard's discussion of despair it Is possible to ascertain the 
answers to the remaining questions concerning man's forfeiture of 
ontological freedom.
Since Kierkegaard characterizes despair as a sickness, it is 
convenient and justifiable to analyze despair like any other illness. 
Accordingly, Kierkegaard may be said to be discussing the etiology of 
despair— isolating its source, describing its dynamics and 
symptomatology, and charting its development. And this is precisely the 
task Kierkegaard assigns himself in Sickness, a work of importance 
because it is as if he were retrospectively surveying his earlier 
aesthetic works and summarizing the principles embedded in them.
In the first place, the source of this internal sickness is 
consciousness. Consciousness is the ultimate pathogenic factor in that 
it is in and through consciousness that man becomes aware of the 
polarities of consciousness and the dread of freedom, and then is first 
tempted to overcome dread and the uncertainity of existence by
^See, e.g.. Sickness, p. 143. 
^See, e.g.. Sickness, p. 147. 
^See, e.g.. Sickness, p. 150- 
^See, e.g.. Sickness, p. 157.
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Identifying itself with one of the polarities- Several important
implications follow from the fact that consciousness is the source of
despair. First, despair can never result solely from tragic external
circumstances; despair is an internal disrelationship within the self.
Kierkegaard, in fact, insists that it is the self, or rather the
disrelationship to the self, of which man despairs. Second, since
consciousness is a universal feature of man, Kierkegaard argues that
despair, in some form, is universal:
• . , there lives not one single man who after all is 
not to some extent in despair, in whose inmost parts 
there does not dwell a disquietude, a pertubation, a 
discord, an anxious dread of an unknô -m something, or 
of a something he does not even dare to make acquaintance 
with, dread of a possibility of life, or dread of himself, 
so that . . . this man is going about and carrying a 
sickness of the spirit.1
Third, although he argues for the universality of despair, it is his
obvious intention to demonstrate that the consequences of the despair
characterizing every non-Christian form of existence are more
destructive and disastrous to the self than those of a Christian
existence.
But what are the dynamics of despair? It is obvious that man is 
not motivated directly to despair. Man is Indirectly motivated to 
despair by an inadequate attempt to overcome dread and the uncertainty 
of existence.
Kierkegaard's typology of despair includes an extended discussion 
of the symptomatology of despair. To appreciate his symptomatology of 
despair, it is necessary to keep in mind his view of the self. The
^Sickness, p. 155.
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self, for Kierkegaard, Is "a relation which relates itself to its own 
self."^ But a relation can be either a negative one of disrelation or 
a positive one of inter-relation. Now despair is "the disrelationship 
in a relation,"2 or a negative relation. Hence, since man is a polarity 
and despair is a disrelationship within that polarity, Kierkegaard 
argues that "all its [i.e., despai^ symptoms are dialectical.It is 
in this context that Kierkegaard presents his basic premise for plotting 
the symptomatology of despair: "the forms of despair must he
discoverable abstractly by reflecting upon the factors which compose the 
self as a synthesis."4 He adds to this the important procedural note 
that "no kind of despair can be defined directly (i.e., undialec- 
tically), but only by reflecting upon the opposite factor."5 In other 
words, a specific symptom of despair is not only caused but must be 
described by the absence of its polar opposite. Thus, the forms of 
one's despair varies with the kind of imbalance within the self and 
one's degree of self-consciousness. More specifically, the despair of 
the self can take diverse forms depending, first, upon which pair of 
polarities within consciousness (the soulish/the bodily, finitude/infin- 
itude, temporality/etemality, possibility/necessity) is disrupted and, 
second, upon the degree of self-consciousness within the self. More­
over, in plotting the symptomatology of despair, Kierkegaard answers our
^Sickness, p. 146. 
^Sickness. p. 148. 
^Sickness, p. 157. 
^Sickness. p. 162. 
^Sickness. p. 163.
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third question, "What modes of existence are acquired by the persons who 
have forfeited their ontological freedom?".
By focusing abstractly and dialectically upon the polarities of 
consciousness, Kierkegaard presents the symptoms of four forms of 
despair. The first form of despair is the despair of infinitude which 
has as its prominent symptom the lack of finitude.^ The despair of 
infinitude results because consciousness, through choosing the unre­
strained exercise of the imagination, infinitizes itself through the 
acquisition of either innumberable sensory experiences of the world or 
factual data about the world. When the self is dominated by the 
imagination, it becomes fantastical and produces a counterfeit of true 
selfhood because it lacks the restrictions or guiding focus of the 
polarity of finitude.
The second form of despair is the despair of finitude in which the 
prominent symptom is the lack of infinitude.^ Because it lacks the 
expansive, transcending power of the infinitizing process, the self 
which suffers the despair of finitude chooses to lose itself to the 
controlling power of cultural roles, historical movements, and/or 
physiological drives. Such a self becomes a face—less number, defrauded 
of true selfhood by "the others." He is the truly socialized, 
acculturated, well-adjusted man with a deep, if unconscious, sense of 
despair or self-estrangement.
The third form of despair is the despair of possibility in which
^See, Sickness, pp. 163-165.
^See, Sickness » pp. 166-168.
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the prominent symptom is the lack of necessity.^ In this form of 
despair the individual becomes so intent upon pursuing novel and 
exciting possibilities such as scientific investigations, intellectual 
pursuits, political ambitions, business endeavors and financial invest­
ments, social causes, aesthetic productions, or recreational activities 
that he moves farther and farther from his true self, forgets his self­
development, and finally loses his self altogether. Hence, he may 
awaken to ask, "In spite of all my accomplishments, who am I?" Without 
its limits, even self-imposed limitations, the self evaporates or 
volatilizes itself in possibility. Such a despair may cause the self 
to evaporate itself in hope or in fear— the hope of unending possibilr- 
ities or the fear of impending disaster, the fear of losing all.
The final form of despair is the despair of necessity in which the 
prominent symptom is the lack of possibility.^ Without the liberating, 
expansive power of possibility, the individual succumbs to either 
determinism or triviality. The despair of determinism terminates in a 
suffocating fatalism in which everything effecting the self results 
from external factors totally beyond the control of the individual. The 
despair of triviality terminates is a mode of existence in which the 
individual's outlook on life is dominated by a tranquilizing probability 
— whatever eventuates is the probable, whatever happens to the self 
results from probability. The improbable, which is nevertheless 
probable, provides this self with its only breath of freedom. But such 
a form of existence, which Kierkegaard characterizes as Philistine, is
^See, Sickness, pp. 168-170.
^See, Sickness, pp. 170-174,
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devoid of the imagination which can revive a suffocating self, and, 
hence, it is in despair.
But in spite of the valuable insights into the symptoms of despair 
gleaned by reflecting abstractly upon the various polarities of con­
sciousness, Kierkegaard adds that "principally, however, despair must be 
viewed under the category of consciousness : the question whether
despair is conscious or not, determines the qualitative difference"^ 
between the forms of despair. With this important note Kierkegaard 
moves beyond plotting abstractly the symptomatology of despair to 
charting its development in concrete individuals. If consciousness of 
self determines the qualitative differences between actual forms of 
despair, then "with every increase in the degree of consciousness . . . 
the intensity of despair increases: the more consciousness, the more
intense the despair."2 Consequently, Kierkegaard distinguishes between 
a form of despair, on the one hand, which lacks self-consciousness and 
two forms of despair, on the other hand, which possess some degree of 
self-consciousness.
The despair which lacks self-consciousness^ is the form in which 
despair is minimally present and is designated as the despair of 
innocence, although he also denotes it as the despair of paganism. The 
chief characteristic of the despair of innocence is complete oblivion to 
the possibility of existing as spirit (in Kierkegaard's sense of the 
term). Thus, the despair of innocence, the most common in the world, is
^Sickness, p. 162.
^Sickness, p. 175.
^See, Sickness. pp. 175—180.
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the most dangerous because it sufferer Is unaware of himself as 
potential spirit, and to be unaware of oneself as potential spirit is to 
preclude the possibility of deliverance from despair. Kierkegaard adds- 
further that the sufferer of the despair of innocence is dominated by 
his "sensuous nature and the psycho-sensuous" and that he lives in the 
sensuous categories of the agreeable and the disagreeable. The despair 
of innocence or paganism corresponds to, and provides a valuable 
interpretative schema for, his concrete discussion of "the public" mode 
of human existence.^
Once a man becomes aware of the polarities of consciousness, or 
once the self becomes an issue for the self, while simultaneously 
failing to posit a synthesis of the polarities as spirit, there are two 
possible forms of despair which the self may suffer. But, since actual 
concrete men possess varying degrees of self-consciousness, these two 
forms of despair are distinguished by an increasing consciousness of the 
self and their own despair. Or as Kierkegaard states the case, "the 
degree of consciousness potentiates despair."^
The primary form of conscious despair is "despair at not willing 
to be oneself: or the despair of weakness.^ In suffering this type of 
despair, the self fails to will or wills not to will to be oneself as 
spirit. That is, it wills not to will or posit a synthesis of the 
polarities of consciousness. But there are two varieties of this
^See below, pp. 146-47. 
^Sickness, p. 182.
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despair depending upon which set of polarities the individual chooses 
as the determining factors of selfhood.
The individual, on the other hand, may suffer despair "over the 
earthly or over something earthly.This form of despair results from 
choosing a sense of selfhood which is determined by those polarities 
more compatible with "the bodily." Since this form of selfhood is 
"pure immediacy" and its despair is "passive, succumbing to the pressure 
of the outward circumstance," such a man recognizes that he has a self 
only by the external, i.e., through the variety and intensity of sensory 
experience available to the self. His self is merely something included 
along with "the other" in the temporal flow of the world. By 
identifying his self with the bodily polarity, its dialectic is grounded 
in the hedonistic categories of the agreeable and the disagreeable. Its 
central concepts are good fortune, misfortune, and fate: clear
indications of the dominance of an inadequate understanding of the 
polarity of possibility and the absence of a proper understanding of 
necessity. By focusing the self in the locus of temporality— to the 
neglect of etemality— the self despairs in either dread of an uncertain 
and perhaps disagreeable future or regret over an irretrievable past. 
Thus, he is bound to the present. The only logical inference is that 
Kierkegaard is here describing theoretically the determinates of the 
despairing self which corresponds to the aesthetic mode of concrete
^See, Sickness. pp. 184-194.
^See below, pp. 147-52. It should be obvious to the reader famil­
iar with Kierkegaard that the categories of this type of despair are 
Identical with the categories of the aesthetic existence in Either/Or 
and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The only difference is that
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The individual, on the other hand, may suffer despair "about the 
eternal or over oneself.This form of despair results from choosing a 
sense of selfhood which is determined by those polarities which are more 
compatible with "the soulish" or man's intellectuality. This, according 
to Kierkegaard, is an advanced form of despair because the individual 
possesses an increased awareness of the nature of the self and despair. 
One of the prominent characteristics of the individual in this form of 
despair is an emphasis on "introversion," which is the opposite of 
immediacy. The individual seeks to overcome epistemic uncertainity and 
ontological insecurity by withdrawing into the interiority of the 
soulish. He becomes enmeshed in a quest for moral and cognitive 
absolutes within the categorical structures of reason. Hence, such an 
individual exhibits a strong need for solitude in order to think his own 
thoughts, to explore the recesses of the soulish in the hope of finding 
these absolutes. Thus, he attempts to satisfy an inadequate under­
standing of the eternal. Further, such an individual, by possessing an 
inappropriate understanding of necessity, views the world as a field of 
the phenomenally given upon which the intellectual self can exercise or 
superimpose the categoreal structures of reason. He may be "a 
university man" who, possessing an inadequate understanding of Infinity, 
seeks to be larger than the world, to encompass the world within the 
categorical structures of reason, to reduce the world to a system of 
thought (an apparent jab at Hegel). Or, if he is morally inclined, he
my hypothesis permits the identification of the dynamics of the aesthet­
ic existence.
^See, Sickness, pp. 194-200.
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may engage himself in great causes, seeking with a sense of urgency to 
transform the world according to his own moral absolutes. But the 
eventual outcome of such endeavors is despair because the constantly 
changing pattern of the phenomenally given simply will not conform with 
finality to rational formulation. More importantly, he has neglected or 
lost a valuable side of the total self issuing from the bodily. Once 
again the only logical inference is that Kierkegaard is here describing 
theoretically the determinates of the despairing self which corresponds 
to the ethical mode of concrete existence.^
The final stage of despair which Kierkegaard discusses is "the 
despair of willing despairingly to be onself."^ In this stage of 
sickness the individual despairingly determines to be himself and, 
hence, there enters a note of defiance. Further, since there is an 
increasing consciousness of the self, or the polarities of consciousness 
and the incongruities between them, the individual is conscious that 
despair is its own deed or that it issues directly from the self rather 
than merely from external circumstances. Hence, the individual wills to 
stand his ground, to assume his existence in the face of unresolved 
incongruities. If the individual is an active sufferer he may enshroud 
himself in Stoic indifference to the incongruities, resolutely refusing 
to let anything diminish his ataraxia. If the individual is a passive 
sufferer he may enshroud his consciousness with the consolation of 
providence, half expectantly waiting and half demanding that he be taken 
care of. Thus he lays claim to "the Power" in spite, out of unacknowl-
^See below, pp. 152-56.
^See, Sickness, pp. 200-207.
140
edged malice. This Is the most utifortunate form of despair since, with 
the requisite ingredients fully acknowledged, the individual wills not 
to will to forge his self, to posit a synthesis, to integrate the 
polarities in a manner of his own choosing. Thus, he chooses in compla­
cency to forfeit the struggle which justifies existence; in despair he 
wills despairingly to despair.
Thus, we arrive at the final question. What justifies character­
izing these modes of existence as heteronomous? A complete and adequate 
answer presupposes my discussion of Kierkegaard's theory of the self as 
autonomous to be developed in the following section. Nevertheless, a 
few broad comments may serve as a provisional answer while simultane­
ously conducting the inquiry toward the topic of autonomy. The common 
characteristic of all forms of despair is a failure to posit the spirit 
or self as the synthesis of the polarities. Thus, "not to be one's own 
self is despair."^ To be one's self as spirit is to exist as freedom, 
and to exist as freedom is to inter-relate the polarities.̂  Thus, 
Kierkegaard tells us that "the soulish-bodily synthesis in every man is 
planned with a view to being spirit."3 But consciousness may will to 
fail to accomplish such a synthesis by focusing the locus of the self 
within one of the polarities. And such a choice produces a state of 
existence in which consciousness, through absorbing itself within one of 
the polarities, eventually permits itself to become determined by the 





determined by the determinates of a particular polarity, man is no 
longer self-determining. Thus, his ontological freedom has been 
forfeited. Man has freely chosen (ontologically) not to be free 
(ethically).
The self as autonomous
My task in the present section is to clarify how Kierkegaard's 
abstract theory of man as consciousness presents the prospect of an 
autonomous human existence. While he offers only a few direct state­
ments regarding such an existence, the essentials of his theory can be 
deduced in contrast to his discussion of a despairing, heteronomous 
existence. If a disruption of the polarities within consciousness 
implies a despairing or heteronomous existence, then we may deduce that 
an autonomous existence implies the integration of the polarities.
Thus, Kierkegaard's theory of man as a synthesis of various polarities 
implies a moral theory of self-realization in which the realized self is 
an autonomous or self-determining one. I shall be concerned here with 
Kierkegaard's abstract discussion of the prospect of achieving ethical 
freedom or autonomy, reserving treatment of his concrete discussion to 
the subsequent section.
Dread discloses the presence of ontological freedom and the 
possibility of ethical freedom, but the mere disclosure of the possibil­
ity of freedom is not sufficient to render the self autonomous. The 
self can become autonomous only by grasping, interpreting, and then 
choosing which possibles it will appropriate and how it will appropriate 
them within the self. The recognition and resolute choice of specific
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possibles introduces responsibility, since the self could have choosen 
other possibles than the ones actually chosen.
But before the individual can synthesize the polarities into an 
autonomous self, it is necessary that the individual know first-hand 
both that which is appropriated within the self and that which is 
rejected. Hence, the individual must seriously explore each of the 
polarities while refusing to remain entangled in any of them. The 
trick is to venture into one polarity, then to return to its opposite, • 
and finally to integrate the results of both experienced polarities 
without losing the self in the process. Kierkegaard employs the 
analogy of breathing with its inward and outward movement to exemplify 
the freedom of true selfhood.^ A more adequate analogy might be that of 
a spiral in which the individual engages in constant self—transcendence 
by oscillating between various polarities without disrupting the inter­
play. Such a mode of existence is never static; it is an endless 
dialectic.
From this sketch of true selfhood, it is possible to deduce that 
the autonomous individual is one who accepts the appetites and sensa­
tions of the bodily along with the intellectuality of the soulish, 
giving neither priority nor preference to either one. Autonomy requires 
rationality, but not the sort of rigorous, legalistic rationality that 
refuses to heed demands from non-rational sources such as the bodily 
appetites. Kierkegaard's repudiation of Kant's moral rationalism does 
not entail an acceptance of moral irrationalism, an all too frequent 
charge against Existentialism in general and Kierkegaard in particular.
^Sickness. p . 173.
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Being autonomous means being liberated from both the demands of an 
excessive moral rationalism and mere hedonism. Hence, liberation does 
not mean license. The autonomous self integrates the demands of the 
bodily and the soulish in such a way that the bodily provides the thrust 
or dynamics of human action and the soulish provides the focus or 
directionality of human action.
At this point two questions must be raised concerning such a 
theory of moral autonomy. First, does the synthesis of a self alone 
guarantee that It will be a good self? And, second. Is Kierkegaard 
demanding that the self do something beyond Its own power since he has 
simply transformed a belief about what reason can accomplish into a 
belief of what the will can accomplish?
Whether intentional or not, Kierkegaard provides an answer to
such queries. The answer comes in the form of an additional, but very
important, premise:
This formula (i.e., that the self is constituted 
by another) is the expression for the total 
dependence of the relation (the self namely), the 
expression for the fact that the self cannot of 
itself attain and remain in equilibrium and rest 
by itself, but only by relating itself to that 
Power which constituted the whole relation.^
With the addition of this premise, Kierkegaard appears to be claiming 
that autonomy can be retained only via absorption in theonomy, in which 
the concretized self recognizes itself as grounded in ah all-encompass­
ing reality— God. It is God who serves as the ontological ground for 
the given polarities of consciousness. But because such a ground is 
beyond the limitations of human knowledge it must be acknowledged by a
^Sickness, p. 147.
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choice or "leap of faith." But while Kierkegaard interprets this 
premise in such a supernatural way that it becomes a God-premise, this 
premise could also be given a natural interpretation. According to such 
an interpretation, the human self results from consciousness (and its 
polarities) simply finding Itself thrown into a situation not of its own 
making. In this latter case, it is an easy transition to the contempo­
rary! '.theories of such existentialists as Heidegger and Sartre. In spite 
of Kierkegaard's obvious choice of the supernatural interpretation of 
this premise, I can find no compelling reason for necessarily following 
his interpretation. The overwhelming bulk of what Kierkegaard says is 
clear and relevant to an understanding of the human condition without 
accepting his "God-premise." But regardless of the interpretation one 
chooses, Kierkegaard employs this premise to reach a formula for the 
human self which is completely free of despair: "by relating itself to
its own self and by willing to be itself the self is grounded trans­
parently in the Bower which posited it."^
The difficulty with a theoretical discussion of the human self is 
that human existence is such as to preclude developing a simple model 
or paradigm whereby we can subsume each and every man. Kierkegaard's 
approach certaintly precludes any attempt at moral casuistry. Rather 
his entire philosophic output is calculated to sensitize man to the 
polar dimensions of human existence arising from the nature of con­
sciousness and the eventual outcome of various types of syntheses of 
these polarities. But even this must be accomplished at the practical
^Sickness, p. 147.
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rather than the theoretical level. Hence, we must turn our attention to 
Kierkegaard’s concrete and practical discussion of the human^self.
The Human Self Considered Concretely
To this point I have applied my hypothesis of a modified 
Schellingean framework to Kierkegaard’s abstract and theoretical dis­
cussion of the self. But the unconvinced reader may ask. As interesting 
as the previous discussion has been, how does it relate to the remain­
der of Kierkegaard’s thought, especially his more recognized doctrines 
of the three life-styles? Indeed, if the various personae of 
Kierkegaard’s ’’marionette theatre” can be shown to exemplify the various 
syntheses I have previously outlined, then my hypothesis will acquire 
greater credibility. Accordingly, in the present section I want to 
focus on Kierkegaard’s discussion of the problems of achieving selfhood 
from the perspective of ’’concrete” persons actually involved in becoming 
or choosing a self. I shall show that my interpretation of 
Kierkegaard’s theoretical discussion of the human self is illustrated 
and corroborated in his dramatic presentation of the problems of 
achieving selfhood. In short, I shall apply my hypothesis to 
Kierkegaard’s famous doctrine of the three spheres of human existence by 
analyzing some of his various personae in the light of my interpreta­
tion, thereby revealing the explanatory power of my hypothesis.
Kierkegaard’s writings portray three general categories of 
existence which in the secondary literature are variously referred to 
as ’’stages,” ’’spheres," "levels,” "modes," or "life-styles.” I reject 
the terms "stages” and "levels” as inadequate and inappropriate because 
they suggest a necessary sequential development which is alien to
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Kierkegaard’s thought. I prefer the terâs "spheres" or "life-styles." 
"Spheres" suggest the fact that each category is hermetically sealed 
from the others, while "life-styles" emphasizes the practical impact of 
each category on the individual’s actual dally life, a concern which is 
never far from Kierkegaard's attention.
The "public" life-style
Before applying my hypothesis to Kierkegaard's doctrine of the 
three spheres of existence, it is necessary to consider a type of human 
life which he considers all too common. This is the form of human life 
which Kierkegaard designates as "the public" and analyzes in The Present 
Age.^ This form of human life bears a strong resemblance to what 
Nietzsche later called "the herd man" with his attendant "slave 
morality" and to what Heidegger called "das Mann" or mass-man with his 
attendant conventionality and Inauthenticity,
This type of life is characterized by a definite lack of reflec­
tion on the nature and significance of selfhood. It consists in the 
unquestioning acceptance of traditional ideas and values, and the 
unconscious imitation of customary patterns of behavior. The men living 
this type of life are simply mirror images of the social ideas and 
values surrounding them. They unhesitantingly adopt the folkways, 
mores, and customs of their cultural matrix. As such, they may be 
described as "socialized men," "acculturated men," or even "adjusted 
men": these are rather contemporary expressions denoting what
Kierkegaard calls the "leveling" of mankind. "Leveling is eo ipso the
ISoren Kierkegaard, The Present Age, trans. by Alexander Dru, 
New York (Harper Torchbooks, 1962).
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destruction of the individual.*'^ As a form of living in which "all 
inwardness is lost,"2 men living in this manner may be characterized as 
exhibiting a "self-less-consciousness
Since this manner of living consists in the mere internalization 
of social norms surrounding the individual, various aspects of this type 
may bear a superficial resemblance to the three explicit spheres which 
Kierkegaard delineates later. But since they lack inwardness, which 
Kierkegaard considers the indispensable quality of being a real self, 
there is no depth in their committment to their social milieu. Such a 
person has merely entered the path of least resistance and may be best 
characterized by what Kierkegaard calls "dreaming i n n o c e n c e ."3 Being 
unaware of the p olarities of consciousness, they are insensitive to the 
dread,which, nevertheless, lurks in their being. The public is that 
form of living in which man has not even attempted, much less accom­
plished, any type of synthesis of the polarities of consciousness. In 
short, the "public" refers to the type of man for whom his self is not 
yet an issue.
The aesthetic sphere
If and when a man's self becomes an issue for him, one of the 
ways of existing as a self which he may choose is what Kierkegaard calls 
the aesthetic* While the specifics of the aesthetic life-style are as 
multifarious as the individuals who live it, certain broad traits are
^The Present A%e. p. 54. 
2xhe Present Age, p. 43. 
Spread, p. 37.
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easily detectable. Thé aesthetic life-style is so named because the 
aesthetically-oriented individual attempts to maintain an aesthetic 
attitude toward existence. An aesthetic attitude in art is one of 
distance or detachment. While the aesthetic attitude toward an art 
object is consistent and valuable, Kierkegaard argues that despair is 
the only result of maintaining such an attitude toward existence or 
one's existing self. The aesthetically-oriented individual is one 
whose self-consciousness, or self concept, is dominated by the perceptu­
al order. By attempting to maintain an attitude of aesthetic distance 
or objective detachment toward existence, the aesthetically-oriented 
individual fixes the locus of his self in the phenomenal realm. He 
regards himself as an empirical ego determined by objective reality.
The aesthete comes to grips with the dread of his being by seeking 
immediacy in the perceptual order, thereby hoping to escape dread by 
becoming enmeshed in the phenomenal world. As a mode of consciousness 
dominated by the perceptual of consciousness, the aesthetic life-style 
exemplifies hedonistic romanticism and hedonistic intellectualism. In 
the former case, the aesthete may simply identify his self with the 
various sensations derived from the phenomenal order. His self is, as 
Hume phrased it, >a "bundle of perceptions" without any continuity. In 
the latter case, he may identify his self as the accumulator of 
perceptual data derived from the phenomenal order.
The first point which I wish to emphasize, in keeping with my 
hypothesis, is that the aesthetic life-style results from a disruption 
among the polarities of consciousness in such a way that the individual 
has chosen to fix the locus of his self within the bodily polarity.
This can be seen in two ways. First, the essential traits or categories
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of the aesthetic sphere are precisely those categories which correspond 
to those polarities of consciousness most compatible with the bodily. 
Second, it can be seen in the nature of the aesthete’s despair. More 
specifically, his despair is due in part to the inadequacy of the bodily 
polarity in creating the self and in part to the continual operation of 
the neglected or rejected polarity of the soulish. Both of these 
avenues of support can be satisfied by selecting typical passages from 
among Kierkegaard’s dramatic presentation of the aesthetic sphere.
The central categories of the aesthete’s existence are derived 
from his choice of the bodily to resolve the issues of existence. Due 
to his exclusive commitment to the reality pole of consciousness, the 
aesthete is confined to the perceptual immediacy of the present. By the 
category of immediacy Kierkegaard seems to suggest that the aesthete 
wills to become "flesh incarnate," to absorb his consciousness in 
sensation by identifying himself with the phenomenal order. But actual 
sensory experience by its very nature is limited to the present. Hence, 
the aesthetic life is characterized by "the moment." Johannes the 
Seducer, for example, exclaims that woman is the moment, the occasion of 
complete sensual absorption in the external: his attitude toward woman
is simply an instantiation of the general aesthetic attitude toward 
life. The aesthete lives in possibility: these possibilities are not
his own but rather his passive realization of the possibilities of the 
external object. His possibilities come from outside himself, and he
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must wait expectantly for everything from without,^ The sensory stimuli 
from the external world produce his continually vassilating moods.^
The aesthete's despair arises in part from the inadequacy of the 
bodily to satisfy fully the demands of consciousness. The bodily 
cannot account for the apparent flow of time,^ and it certaintly cannot 
account for his anticipation of the future. Further, the bodily cannot 
account for memory. The young man A confesses the need to keep a diary 
in order to remember "the reason which led me to do this or that, not 
only in connection with trifles, but also in connection with the most 
momentous decisions."4 despair is also due in part to the impinge­
ment of the soulish. Kierkegaard argues that the soulish or ideality 
pole of consciousness is that which introduces definiteness and 
relationships into the region of consciousness. But the aesthete 
struggles to overcome the soulish by avoiding all reflection. Hence, 
the greatest danger to his existence is boredom because the repetition 
of any event arouses the reflection of ideality. He even seeks to 
escape memory: "there is nothing more dangerous to me than remember­
ing."^ The impingement of the soulish is responsible for his frequent 
outcrys of the meaninglessness of his life,^
The second point which I wish to emphasize, in keeping with
‘Either/Or. I, p. 296. 
^Either/Or, I, p. 31. 
%lther/Or. I, p. 25. 
^Either/Or. I, p. 32. 
5Elther/0r. I, p. 31. 
^Either/Or. I, p. 28.
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my hypothesis» is that the aesthetic life-style is heteronomous.
Heteronomy is a state of existence in which the individual is subject
to the rule of authority of another. The aesthete's actions are
determined by whatever is external to him. His possibilities are not
• chosen but merely assimilated from the external world. His life
imperative is: Enjoy thyself- Regardless of whether he seeks his
enjoyment in sensory pleasures, health» fame, position, or wealth, he
seeks it in contingent factors beyond his control. By his own
admission, the aesthete regards them as the fortunes of Fate (whether
good fortune or misfortune): "I am not the master of my life."^ And
to this he adds :
The arbitrariness in oneself corresponds to the 
accidental in the external world. One should 
therefore always have an eye open for the acci­
dental. always be expeditus, if anything should 
offer
If one attempts to derive his happiness from external sources, then one
must be able to control those external sources. But, regardless of how
carefully the aesthete attempts to orchestrate his enjoyment, those
factors remain beyond his control and actually control him. Hence, his
existence is heteronomous and he is faced with a frustration which only
potentiates his despair. Kierkegaard succintly and emphatically makes
this point through the medium of Judge William:
But he who says that he wants to enjoy life 
always posits ^ condition which either lies 
outside the individual or is in the individual 
in such ̂  way that it is not posited by the
^Either/Or, I, p. 30. 
^Either/Or, I, p. 296.
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Individual himself.̂
Judge William argues that the ethical can correct this problem.
The ethical sphere
The second way of existing as a self is that which Kierkegaard 
calls "the ethical." Kierkegaard's dramatic development of this mode of 
existence is presented through his pseudonym. Judge William. Judge
William's life-style can be summarized as a single imperative: Choose
2 3thyself. Collins points out that the Judge's conversations employ 
the "paraphernalia of German idealism," and then suggests that perhaps 
Kierkegaard has not altogether rescued his thought, nor his terminology, 
from his professed enemies. X think, however, that Kierkegaard is 
deliberately using their terminology and thought patterns, that his 
ethical life-style corresponds to his understanding of the type of ethic 
representative of the German tradition (especially Kant, Fichte, and 
Hegel), and that he is attempting to reveal the limitations and 
inadequacies of such an ethic from a practical standpoint.
The first point which I wish to emphasize, in keeping with my 
hypothesis, is that the ethical life-style results from a disruption 
among the polarities of consciousness in such a way that the individual 
has chosen to fix the locus of his self within the soulish polarity.
This can be shown in two ways. First, the essential traits or 
categories of the aesthetic sphere are precisely those categories which
^Either/Or. II, p. 184. 
^Elther/Or. II, p. 167, 218. 
^Collins. p. 80.
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correspond to the polarities of consciousness most compatible with the 
soulish. Second* this disruption of the polarities can be seen In the 
peculiar form of despair which Judge William suffers. More 
specifically, his despair Is due In part to the Inadequacy of the 
, soulish polarity In solving the perplexities of life and In part to the 
continual operation of the bodily polarity.
A careful examination of Judge William’s crucial (but typically 
ethical) treatise, "Equilibrium between Aesthetical and the Ethical In 
the Composition of Personality",^ discloses that the central categories 
whereby he defines his existence are Identical with the categories 
corresponding to the poles of consciousness which Kierkegaard calls 
"the Ideality" or "soulish" pole. One can also detect a strong current 
of German Idealism. Both of these aspects are displayed In Judge 
William’s arguments for the importance of choosing the self. By 
choosing oneself one "consolidates" the personality^ and provides 
"continuity"^ and "eternal validity"^ to the self; and these fulfill 
the demands of consciousness’ polarity of the eternal. But It Is not 
a creative choice because the pattern for the self Is embedded within 
the selfMoreover, this pattern is a finltized expression of an
^Either/Or. II, pp. 159-338. 
^Either/Or. II, p. 171. 
^Either/Or. II, p. 200. 
^Either/Or. II, p. 215. 
^Either/Or. II, p. 220.
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eternal^ and absolute Power. Judge Williams adds emphatically:
The ethical is the universal and so 
it is the abstract . . . When the ethical 
becomes more concrete it passes over into 
the definition of morals and customs . . .
Only when the individual himself is the
universal is it possible to realize the
ethical. This is the secret of conscience,
. . .  He who regards life ethically sees
the universal, and he who lives ethically
expresses the universal in his life, he 
makes himself the universal man, . . .
This transformation of himself into the universal man^ provides him with
a sense of "calling": "The ethical thesis that every man has a calling
is the expression for the fact that there is a rational order of things
in which every man, if he wills, fills his place . . ."5 Furthermore,
his calling provides a series of necessary duties; it is every man's
duty to work,® to marry,^ and to have friends.® The demands of the
polarities of finitude and necessity, for Kierkegaard, are satisfied
within the Judge's choice of a life-style. And by placing such emphasis
on one set of polarities the Judge neglects their opposites.
Judge William's despair, on the one hand, issues from the
inability of reason or intellectuality (i.e., the soulish polarity) to
^Either/Or. II, pp. 171, 181. 
^Either/Or. II, p..223. 
^Either/Or. II, pp. 159-260. 
^Either/Or. II, pp. 260, 265. 
®Either/Or. II, p. 297. 
®Either/Or. II, p. 292ff. 
^Either/Or. II, p. 309ff. 
®Either/Or. II, p. 327ff.
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deal adequately with all of life's dilemmas. More specifically, this 
Is seen (1) in the occasional but significant "contradictions" between 
the conflicting demands of his sense of duty and (2) in the occasional 
"exceptions" to a general moral maxim. The reflective individual 
recognizes that there are certain "hard-cases" or "difficult choices" 
which result either because of a conflict between specific moral maxims 
or because of the absence of a maxim which clearly fits the situation. 
Judge William's solution is either to ignore the situation or at least 
to apply an inadequate maxim.^
Judge William’s despair, on the other hand, arises because of the 
impingement of his bodily polarity upon an unstable mode of existence. 
The bodily demands that attention be given to the particulars within a 
situation. Now it is the so-called "exceptions" to the rules and 
"contradictions" among the rules which require an individual to focus on 
the particulars of a situation and to make an anxious, logically 
uncertain choice. In addition, "the bodily" demands that the appetites 
and inclinations of the body be satisfied rather than merely repressed 
or denied. One cannot avoid suspecting that Judge William's intellect- 
ualized approach to life fails to resolve the old Kantian problem of the 
conflict between reason and the bodily desires.
The second point which I wish to emphasize is that the ethical 
life-style is one of heteronomy. Judge William's insistence that the 
ethical life be grounded in a "calling" from some Power regarded as 
universal and eternal is an explicit admission of the heteronomous 
quality of his self. Kierkegaard is indirectly rejecting any suggestion
^Either/Or, XX, pp.
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that man's moral life is a finite expression of God's creative freedom. 
Of course, the same criticism might be directed toward Kierkegaard. The 
difference between the positions of the Judge and Kierkegaard is that 
the former argues for the*metaphysical ground of the moral life from the 
theoretical level while the latter only hints at it from the practical 
level. The heteronomous quality of the ethical sphere is implicitly 
admitted in the Judge's interpretation of committment. While the Judge 
has grasped the importance of choice and committment for the continuity 
of the self, he fails to find such continuity within himself alone.
Even his committment must be stabilized by an external agent, such as 
the Power or even marriage. His self is derived from his committment 
(viz., that his self is a reflection of the qualities inherent within 
that to which he is committed), rather than his committment being 
derived from his self. Kierkegaard offers the religious existence as 
an alternative to both the aesthetic and ethical forms of existence.
The religious sphere
In light of Kierkegaard's dramatic presentation, there are two 
points about the religious sphere which I want to emphasize: (1) the
religious, as Kierkegaard understands it, is grounded in the synthesis 
or integration of the polarities of consciousness, and (2) it produces 
a form of existence which is autonomous. But by the religious I am not 
referring to what Kierkegaard calls Religiousness A, which is a religion 
of immanence, of resignation, of suffering in self-annihilation, of the 
ethico-religious. I am referring to what he calls Religiousness B, 
wliich is a religion of transcendence, of faith, of suffering in self—
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assertion, of the aesthetic-religious.^ That the religious life-style 
involves an integration of the polarities can be seen from (a) the 
essential categories of the religious, (b) the nature of the criticisms 
which Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard's major religious persona in the 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, directs against the aesthetic and 
ethical life-styles, and (c) the character of the problems encountered 
in becoming a religiously existing self in Fear and Trembling.
Kierkegaard explicitly and repeatedly defines several of the
central categories of the religious in terms of the synthesis of the
polarities. "Sin" is the full realization that at the core of one's
existence there is a profound contradiction. Johannes Climacus, in the
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, even subscribes to what might be
called "the fortunate fall", since prior to sin there is no selfhood.
It is after the fall and in the light of sin as the recognition of
contradiction that the self begins to take s h a p e .2 "Spirit" is the term
Kierkegaard employs to designate the synthesis of the bodily and the
soulish. The self as spirit is not only a synthesis, but a synthesis
which rests upon choice. The self as spirit chooses which possibles it
will appropriate as its own and which possibles it will reject. The
nature of existence as a synthesis is illustrated by Johannes Climacus'
discussion of the relation between thought and feeling (imagination):
In existence all the factors must be co-present.
In existence thought is by no means higher than 
imagination and feeling, but coordinate . . .
The task is not to exalt the one at the expense 
of the other, but to give them equal status, to
ISee, Postscript. pp. 493-98, 507. 
2see, Postscript, pp. 516-19.
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unify them in simultaneity; the medium in which 
they are unified is existence.1
It is the aesthetic and ethical life-styles which attempt to give
priority to either feeling or thought respectively. Thus, neither the
aesthetic nor the ethical completely fulfill that which Kierkegaard
considers to be the true paradigm of existence.
In the light of existence as the integration of the polarities, 
it is possible to understand other categories belonging to the 
religious. "Inwardness" denotes the fact that the individual as the 
particular must integrate the polarities in the face of "objective 
uncertainty." "Faith" is that by which the self as spirit acquires 
everything.̂  By faith the religious individual remains open to the full 
range of the possibilities within the polarities of consciousness. 
"Suffering" denotes the fact that, since the polarities of the self 
are in constant flux, the self is a perpetual becoming and in perpetual 
danger of being lost or disintegrated.
Johannes Climacus' criticisms of the aesthetic and ethical 
spheres presuppose a position in which the polarities are integrated.
His first criticism is presented as he ranks the spheres according to 
their interpretation of what it is to exist.^ The aesthete finds no 
contradiction in the fact of existing: to exist is one thing, and the
contradiction comes from the external, phenomenal order. The ethical 
recognizes the contradiction of existence, but identifies it as a
^Postscript, pp. 310f.
2pear and Trembling, p. 59. 
^Postscript, p. 507.
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contradiction between the universal, moral demands of reason and his 
desires and Inclinations. Religiousness A'comprehends the contradiction 
as a mode of suffering but then seeks to overcome suffering through 
self-annlhllatlon. Religiousness B, or the Paradoxical Religiousness, 
fully comprehends that existence Itself Is or contains the 
contradiction. His second criticism Is presented as he ranks the • 
spheres according to the individual’s "dialectical" apprehension of 
inwardness.^ The aesthete is himself "undialectical," having his 
dialectic outside himself In self-assertion in such a way that the 
ultimate basis (the universal) Is not dialectical in Itself. Religious­
ness A Is Inwardly defined by self-annihilation before God. Religious­
ness B, which Is Johannes Climacus’ own position, is paradoxically 
dialectic, viz., he recognizes the importance and nature of his own 
Inwardness in Integrating the polarities. His third criticism deals 
with the attitudes towards suffering exhibited In the various spheres 
The aesthetic existence Is essentially enjoyment and, thus. It seeks to 
escape suffering. The ethical existence Is one In which the Individual 
seeks to over come the suffering due to one’s passions through victory 
over the bodily desires by the dominance of reason. It Is only the 
religious existence which fully recognizes and Inhabits the suffering 
which Is Inescapable to true existence.
That the religious sphere Involves an Integration of the 
polarities of consciousness Is shown in the problems to be encountered 
in becoming a religiously existing Individual. The first problem is
^Postscript, p. 507. 
^Postscript, pp. 255-7.
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whether there can be a teleologlcal suspension of the ethical?! The 
ethical as the universal, as applicable to everyone at every instant, 
demands that man abolish his particularity in order to become the 
universal. The religious, in contradistinction, demands that man 
suspend the ethical as -the universal in order to become the individual. 
The paradox of faith is that the particular is higher than the 
universal. It is only as the particular individual that a man may 
obtain a private relationship with God rather than a relationship 
identical with everyone else*s. The second problem is whether there can 
be an absolute duty toward God.^ As a particular individual involved 
in a private relationship with God, the individual relates himself 
absolutely to an absolute duty which is discovered in his own 
inwardness. It is his particular task which is simultaneously an 
absolute duty. But such an "absolute duty may cause one to do what 
ethics would forbid."3 Ethically speaking, Abraham is about to murder 
Isaac. Such a particular but absolute duty can only serve to intensify 
th suffering of existence contingent upon the recognition of the contra­
diction within consciousness. The third problem is whether Abraham, as 
the religiously existing individual, should voice his absolute duty?^ 
Abraham cannot communciate his intentions to Sarah, Eleazar, or Issac.
He cannot speak, for that is to forego his particularity and situate 
himself once again in the universal. Thus, "silence**, as a category of
!pear and Trembling, pp. 64-77. 
2pear and Trembling, pp. 78-91. 
3pear and Trembling, p. 79.
4pear and Trembling, pp. 91-129.
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the religious, results from the discovery that speech is incommunsurable 
with his existence. Abraham must conduct himself in solitude (due to 
particularity) and silence, without objective or logical justification, 
without the external support of friends or relatives, knowing that he 
may be judged immoral by conventional standards of ethics.
The second point vhich I wish to emphasize is that the religiously 
existing individual possesses a form of autonomy. This can be seen 
first through a simple inference. If man’s ontological freedom is 
preserved as an ethical reality, then man’s existence is autonomous.
But man’s ontological freedom can be preserved if and only if the 
polarities of consciousness are integrated by an act of will. The 
religious sphere involves the integration of the polarities. Thus, the 
religiously existing individual is autonomous. This inference is 
further substantiated by Kierkegaard’s remarks concerning some of the 
essential features of the religious sphere. The religious involves a 
”re-duplication” or "double reflection", which is the possibility of a 
second coming into existence within the first coming into existence, 
i.e., a second coming into existence which is qualitatively different 
from the first one. This re-duplication is accomplished through the 
integration of the polarities of consciousness. Life is a matter of 
either/or; but whereas the aesthetic and the ethical choose in an 
exclusive sense, the religious individual chooses in an inclusive sense. 
Stated differently, truth is subjectivity: it is the individual’s truth
a truth which permeates the whole of his life, which is reflected 
outwardly and back again, and which is the full appropriation of thought 
and feeling, of past and future, of necessity and possibility. Thus, 
Abraham does not seek the meaning or purpose of life in the demands of
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the phenomenal nor in the universal demands of reason» but rather as the 
solitary and silent individual he seeks the meaning of his life in a 
subjectively posited purpose. It is a purpose which cannot be justified 
in terms of the phenomenal or the rational: it must be regarded as
absurd. Kierkegaard speaks of the absurb as if it is something which 
grasps man. By means of the absurd the individual is open to the 
influences of "the Power" in his life. But as we have seen earlier,^ 
there seems to be no compelling reason to regard this Power as God.
IMPLICATIONS
I have developed an interpretation of Kierkegaard based on a 
modified Schellingean framework. But my interpretation does not depend 
upon the Schellingean background for its justification. Indeed, I have 
demonstrated that my hypothesis (1) is initially suggested in Johannes 
Climacus; (2) is substantiated in his more abstract and theoretical 
works such as The Concept of Dread and The Sickness unto Death; and (3) 
is helpful in resolving the perplexities surrounding the dynamics of 
the three modes of concrete existence. From a historical standpoint, 
my interpretative framework demonstrates the probability of a much 
stronger Schellingean influence on Kierkegaard than has previously been 
developed.
But even more important than the historical interest and 
exegetical value of this study is its thematic value. In the light of 
my interpretation of Kierkegaard, a very interesting theory of value 
predicates can be abstracted from his philosophy. Given some set of
^See above, p. 143f.
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polarities within consciousness (and we need not necessarily employ 
Kierkegaard's), we can deduce a theory of value predicates grounded in 
the nature of the self. The duality of consciousness Introduces the 
element of anxiety Into human existence. More especially. It Introduces 
anxiety about the self. The presence of this anxiety Implies that the 
moral task of man Is to choose to achieve a sense of selfhood by 
appropriating the respective polarities of consciousness. The result Is 
an ethic of self-realization In which the realized self Is autonomous 
or self-determining; It Is not a theory of self-reallzatlbnlsm based on 
an Immanent teleology but upon man's deliberate choices. Thus, man's 
actual existence Is a composite characterized and maintained by a 
perpetual tension between the polarities of consciousness. From this we 
may deduce a deflnlens of evil. By "evil" reference Is made to any 
entity, event, force, or Individual which disrupts or prohibits the 
fruitful Interplay of the polarities of consciousness whereby man, 
either Individually or collectively, can create and/or attain his 
destiny. A deflnlens of "good" can be deduced by way of contrast. But 
the polarities of consciousness, by virtue of their givenness, are 
morally neutral: their Interplay provides the human good; evil results
only when one polarity Is Ignored or eliminated and the contrary one Is 
claimed as all-lncluslve. In other words, anything which forces 
consciousness to restrict Its awareness to a specific feature of 
consciousness does damage to the totality of consciousness and precludes 
a sense of autonomous selfhood. To absolutize the particular is to 
fallsfy the whole of consciousness, and to falsify the whole is to 
preclude the Interplay of the polarities, the necessary condition of 
autonomous selfhood. Such a position stands opposed to all attempts at
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reductionism, whether naturalistic or idealistic. Even Kierkegaard's 
indirect criticism of the aesthetic and ethical modes of existence 
contains an implicit opposition to such reductionistic efforts.
This theory of evil permits a further distinction between natural 
evil and moral evil. A natural evil is any factor originating from non- 
human sources which presents a disruptive threat or destroys the inter­
play of the polarities of consciousness. Pain, for example, is a 
natural evil because, by forcing consciousness to focus or localize its 
attention upon the bodily, it disrupts the interplay. Again, a tornado 
is a natural evil because it disrupts man's pacification of the natural 
environment, which is a necessary condition for the development of 
intellectuality. A natural good, in contrast, is any factor originating 
'from non-human sources which contributes to or enhances the interplay 
of the polarities of consciousness.
The definition of moral evil proceeds along similar lines. A 
moral evil is any factor originating from human sources, whether 
internal or external, which presents a disruptive threat or destroys the 
interplay of the polarities. By focusing on internal sources of 
disruption we can gain some sense of personal moral obligation, an all 
too frequently missing aspect of many ethical theories. An individual 
has a self-obligation to gain and maintain his own integrity of self- 
determination through the appropriating interplay of the polarities. 
Unrestrained hedonism, for example, is evil because it forces con­
sciousness to focus its attention upon the bodily while ignoring man's 
rationality. Further, by focusing on external sources of disruption we 
can gain some sense of our moral obligation to others. We have an 
obligation to treat others in a way which will enhance the possibility
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of their achieving moral autonomy. Sexism and prejudice, for example, 
are morally evil because they reduce the "other" to the level of objects 
through assigning roles which ignore their ontological freedom and deny 
their right to be self-determining.
Such a theory of good and evil has great utility in the moral 
evaluation of social institutions. Any organized movement or social 
institution acquires an immoral quality when it denies its individual 
participants the right to be self-determining. Thus, a dictatorial 
or paternalistic attitude within academic or business or religious or 
social institutions is immoral. Excessive poverty or economic 
enslavement, for example, is immoral because it forces the individual 
to focus their efforts toward the most meager satisfaction of the • 
appetites and desires of the bodily.
CONCLUSION
I have developed an interpretation of Schelling and Kierkegaard 
which demonstrates the manner in which they sought to elucidate (1) the 
precise nature of moral autonomy or the manner in which man may be self­
determining and (2) the conditions which either preclude or contribute 
to its attainment. In conclusion I shall present a critical analysis 
showing (1) how Schelling and Kierkegaard confirm my thesis and (2) the 
'current relevance of the concepts herein advanced. The first point can 
best be made by (a) re-stating those elements of Kant’s moral philosophy 
most directly involved in the thought of Schelling and Kierkegaard,
(b) summarizing the salient points in their theories of autonomy, and
(c) tracing the development of these essential points within their 
theories in order to show how their conclusions must complement each 
other to provide a more comprehensive and defensible notion of autonomy. 
The second point can be made by noting some of the strengths and weak­
nesses of their theory of autonomy. Some of these points can be 
utilized or corrected by contemporary thinkers interested in developing 
a theory of moral self-determination.
The first phase of summarizing how my interpretation of Schelling 
and Kierkegaard confirms my thesis is to re-state those elements of 
Kant’s moral theory which prompted the Inquires of Schelling and 
Kierkegaard. Kant initiates his moral investigations by declaring that 
the original datum of ethical inquiry is our experience of a conflict 
between our consciousness of desires and inclinations ultimately
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derived from sense data and our consciousness of a sense of duty 
ultimately proceeding from reason. But the very existence of this 
conflict, according to Kant, discloses the Inadequacy of reason alone 
to direct man toward proper moral actions and the attainment of his own 
well-being. If reason alone is inadequate to resolve the conflict with­
in man's moral life, then what is the role of practical reason? Kant 
argues that the proper end of reason is the establishment of a good or 
pure rational will. This pure rational will has two functions; it 
determines what a man should do from a sense of disinterested duty, and 
it mediates between reason and man's multiplicity of desires and 
inclinations. But Kant, in the actual development of his moral 
philosophy, emphasizes the rational rather than the volitional aspect of 
this pure rational will. Moreover, Kant fails to demonstrate (a) how 
this pure rational will is formed, (b) how it mediates between reason 
and (c) how theoretical and practical reason are ultimately united.
E^ch of these unsolved issues contributed to the thought of Schelling 
and Kierkegaard.
Schelling attempts to establish the Will as the mediational 
factor between reason and desire by positing will as the ultimate 
ontological reality. Will as Primordial Being expresses itself through 
the polarities of impulse and reason. The polarities are then 
synthesized or integrated into spirit. Man as spirit, therefore, is 
self-determined and self-determining. Schelling employs the same move 
to clarify how theoretical and practical reason are united as well as 
to explain how the desires can be accepted and integrated rather than 
repressed within man as an autonomous self. Kierkegaard avoids the 
metaphysical difficulties of Schelling by focusing on the finite or
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concrete individual, thereby restricting the polarities to human con­
sciousness. Consequently, Kierkegaard does not become involved in an 
attempt to explain the origin of the polarities but merely accepts them 
as given, and then he argues that they can be synthesized by a resolute 
choice.
Second, my interpretation of Schelling and Kierkegaard shows that 
their theories share certain essential features which provide the 
framework of their theory of autonomy. Their combined theory gives 
ontological priority to the volitional rather than to the rational or 
the affective aspects of man. In addition, it is a theory of man as a 
being of consciousness in which consciousness contains polar opposites.* 
which must be integrated. Finally, it is a theory in which man is 
autonomous when he integrates the polarities and heteronomous when the 
tension between the polarities has been disintegrated or disrupted by 
man’s own choice;
But while their theories share these common features, there is an 
important way in which they must complement each other to provide a more 
comprehensive and defensible theory of autonomy. Schelling emphatically 
argues that a theory of man as possessing ontological freedom must also 
be tempered by showing that freedom needs restrictions in order to avoid 
being dissipated. Schelling merely discusses the possibility of man’s 
losing his freedom through the activity of the expansive principle; 
Kierkegaard argues that man can be deprived of his freedom through the 
dominance of either the expansive or the restrictive polarity of con­
sciousness. Schelling’s discussion is conducted at the abstract level 
while Kierkegaard’s is concrete. Consequently, Kierkegaard provides a 
more enlightening discussion of the conditions which contribute to man’s
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attainment of autonomy through his analysis of dread and the conditions 
which preclude autonomy through his analysis of despair.
The current relevance of the theory of autonomy developed hy 
Schelling and Kierkegaard can he ascertained hy noting some of the 
strengths and weaknesses of their discussions. The strengths disclose 
certain valuable suggestions to he incorporated within present moral 
theories of self-determination while even the weaknesses suggest further 
avenues of inquiry. There are four strong points within their combined 
theory. First» both men emphasize that any theory of autonomy which 
does not take into account the full range of human experience and the 
constituent elements of human nature is sure to be inadequate. A theory 
of autonomy which does not correspond to the facts of human experience 
and human nature is little more than metaphysical web-spinning. Second, 
both men point out that a tenable theory of autonomy must be one which 
leaves man open to future eventualities rather than binding him to 
either abstract moral maxims or isolated elements of human nature or 
even to prior commitments. Autonomous action is not action coincidental 
with universal moral maxims or detached facets of human nature or 
former choices but rather action which leaves man open to being self- 
determining as well as self-determined. Third, both men avoided the 
perennial danger threatening human autonomy in the usual philosophies 
of creationism by making freedom the very essence of the self. If the 
ontological reality of man is freedom, then man is himself in acting 
freely rather than obeying divine fiats or the inexorable laws of 
nature. Fourth, both men recognized that even a doctrine of radical 
freedom must include a provision for limiting or restricting that free­
dom, even if the limits are self-imposed.
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There are, however, several weaknesses within their theories 
which require further investigation. Among the internal weaknesses, 
the most serious is the strong religious presuppositions held by both 
men which may produce a misunderstanding of their theories. But this is 
not to say that the religious element in general is at fault. In the 
case of Schelling,^ his unfortunate and unnecessary inclusion of the 
specific doctrine of man's transcendental fall seriously truncates his 
theory of freedom as the possibility of both good and evil, and serves 
to limit freedom as the possibility of evil. If Schelling had omitted 
this specific doctrine, then the other religious elements in his thought 
would not have jeapordized his system and the elimination of the 
doctrine of a transcendental fall would have strengthened his theory of 
autonomy. In the case of Kierkegaard, the religious element is 
susceptible to misunderstanding. The frequent occurance of religious 
doctrines within Kierkegaard's philosophy might lead the careless 
reader to lapse into the view that he is defending traditional 
Christianity. But Kierkegaard constantly criticized the complacency 
and shallowness of institutional Christianity or "Churchianity.” We 
must remain cognizant that by the "religious" Kierkegaard means that 
life-style which integrates the various polarities of man's being into a 
self-determined and self-determining existence. Hence, the weakness 
concerning the religious element in Kierkegaard's thought is more that 
of the careless reader than his.
At least three external criticisms can be raised against 
Schelling and Kierkegaard. First, we may question whether they are
^See above, pp. 74f and p. 80.
171
correct in their identification of the constituent elements or 
polarities of human reality to be integrated within an autonomous 
existence On the one hand, we may ask whether a theory of autonomy 
needs to include all the factors upon which they concentrate attention. 
On the other hand, we may note their neglect of the socio-economic 
factors emphasized by Marx, the cultural—aesthetic factors emphasized 
by Nietzsche, and the factor of the unconsciousness emphasized by Freud. 
Should not these factors be considered in an adequate and defensible 
theory of autonomy? Secondly, we may raise the issue of the adequacy 
of the dialectical method for analyzing philosophical problems. Is the 
dialectical method adequate for dealing with ontological realities and 
is it logically sound? On this point we must remain cognizant of those 
on the one hand who have strenuously defended the dialectical method—  
for example, Hegelians, Marxists, and to a lesser extent, some of the 
existential phenomenologists— and those on the other hand who have 
repudiated the dialectical method. As important as this question is, 
it extends far beyond the domain of this dissertation. But this 
question is tangential to a third and more relevant question. Is it 
possible that the insights and suggestions of Schelling and Kierkegaard 
can be strengthened through the application of the methodological 
apparatus of phenomenology? This seems to be the current impact of 
Kierkegaard. Heidegger's version of authentic existence, for example, 
is an ontological version of Kierkegaard's conception of autonomous
existence. Even Schelling may have indirectly influenced Heidegger
/
through the mediation of Holderlin, Schelling's roommate at Tubingen,
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and Schelling certainly received direct attention in some of 
Heidegger's later writings.^
In conclusion, the theory of autonomy or self-determination 
developed by Schelling and Kierkegaard must be characterized as thought- 
experiments. That is, they are tentative and provocative, not 
definitive. But whatever the final verdict of history as to the value 
of their theories, those persons currently interested in developing 
a moral theory of self-determinism cannot, without loss, ignore the 
insights and suggestions of Schelling and Kierkegaard regarding the 
roles of appropriation and integration as well as the accompanying 
dread for a theory of autonomy.^
^For a recent discussion of this point, see Parvis Emad, 
"Heidegger on Schelling's Concept of Freedom" in Man and World. Vol. 8, 
no. 2 (May, 1975), 157-74.
^One current effort which recognizes the roles of appropriation, 
integration and dread for a theory of autonomy is that of Walter 
Kaufmann. See his Without Guilt and Justice, New York (Delta Publishing 
Co., Inc., 1973).
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